[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Ant McWatt]

Nice post Ron,  

That's an especially good point that: "It's all a rhetorical argument. 
That... the best rhetorical arguments, the most persuasive are those 
'predicated' on first hand immediate empirical experience."

That was a good reminder for me,

Thanks,

Ant

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> Date: Fri, 20 Apr 2012 07:54:21 -0700
> From: xacto at rocketmail.com
> To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
> Subject: Re: [MD] A problem with the MOQ.
>
> Tukka had said:
> As scientific truths and scientific methodology exist, they can be
> treated as subjects of ontological theories, such as the MOQ. To state
> that epistemological objectivity is different than the ontological
> objectivity of the MOQ would beg the question: in what form does
> epistemological objectivity exist in the context of the MOQ? How is it
> different from ontological objectivity? If this question is not
> answered, the thusly attained body of philosophy is rhetoric, which has
> no structure beyond the power of a persuasive appearance.
>
> Ron:
> It's all the power of persuasion. It's all a rhetorical arguement. Thats the
> point that is trying to be made. The best rhetorical arguements, the most
> persuasive are those "predicated" on first hand immediate empirical
> experience.
>
> Tuuka continues:
> Furthermore, in LILA Pirsig states the MOQ to subscribe to empiricism.
> Empiricism is a theory of knowledge, so the MOQ is an epistemological
> theory in its own right, in addition to being an ontological and an
> ethical theory. To speak of epistemological objectivity as if it were
> beyond the scope of the MOQ is to deny the explicitly stated empiricism
> of the MOQ.
>
> Ron:
> To speak of epistemological objectivity is to begin down the path of rationalism
> it begins to become a deduction from empirical experience and that is the keystone
> of what MoQ's empiricism is drawn from, it's drawn from direct immediate experience
> before rationalization. Understand that MoQ is a rationalized theory which points
> to the pre-rationalized empirical experience. Thats why it looks at any theory of experience
>  in terms of aestestics ie: usefulness, clarity in meaning and economy of explanation (Ocam's razor).
> Simply put, MoQ looks at what theories of knowledge are "best".
>
> The problem with logical theorems such as Goedels completeness is that they operate on
> closed systems of logic. MoQ is not a closed system of logic. Never claimed to be. It is a theory
> of knowledge. It's a theory on how we develop truth statements. Truth is an aestetic it is
> a species of "the good". MoQ asks "what makes it good?".
>
>


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