[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Ant McWatt]

Tuukka stated April 0tth:

> Ant, all,
> thank you for attempting to sort out this confusion. 

Tuukka,

Well, I hope it helps with improving the clarity of your SOQ project.  Without 
clarity, it's in danger of just disappearing without a trace.  


> However, repeating
> your statement that I conflate epistemological and ontological
> subjectivity does not do much, as I already accepted this statement for
> purposes of simulating the difference between them, and perhaps actually
> establishing this difference also for me.

Thinking of Frank Drebin in "Police Squad": "Well, that's cleared that all up then...."
(In other words, I haven't got a clue what youre talking about here).

> Pirsig himself does not devalue the ZAMM as much as I am now expected
> to. In LILA he states, that although the ZAMM way of perceiving reality
> is correct, he is just going to use a different approach in this book.

I'd like to see that quote about this "different approach" - in context. 
I don't believe it exists or, if it does, you've misconstrued something.

> He presents the approaches as interchangeable, just like polar
> coordinates and rectangular coordinates are interchangeable. Neither one
> is a "proto-map": both are proper maps.

No, that's well, well off line.  At the beginning of LILA we see how Rigel gets the better 
of Phaedrus because the latter doesn't have an "MOQ catechism" (for want of a better word) 
to refer to.  Much of LILA is devoted to introducing and building up such a catechism.

Regarding the example of polar and rectangular coordinates (in Chapter 8 of LILA), you're 
ignoring the important point just beforehand about seeking the "highest quality intellectual
explanation":

'One doesn't seek the absolute "Truth."  One seeks instead the highest quality 
intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any 
guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful
until something better comes along.'

 LILA contains a better MOQ than ZMM.  To ignore this critical fact is 

just going to undermine the intellectual value of your SOQ.
 

> As scientific truths and scientific methodology exist, they can be
> treated as subjects of ontological theories, such as the MOQ. To state
> that epistemological objectivity is different than the ontological
> objectivity of the MOQ would beg the question: in what form does
> epistemological objectivity exist in the context of the MOQ? How is it
> different from ontological objectivity? If this question is not
> answered, the thusly attained body of philosophy is rhetoric, which has
> no structure beyond the power of a persuasive appearance.
>
> Furthermore, in LILA Pirsig states the MOQ to subscribe to empiricism.
> Empiricism is a theory of knowledge, so the MOQ is an epistemological
> theory in its own right, in addition to being an ontological and an
> ethical theory. To speak of epistemological objectivity as if it were
> beyond the scope of the MOQ is to deny the explicitly stated empiricism
> of the MOQ.

I have nothing to add to what Ron stated about these two paragraphs yesterday. 
I'm glad he made the effort with you to go through them.


> Thank you for your effort,

Thank you. I wish you luck,

Best wishes,

Ant



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