[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Ron, Craig, Mark, Ham, DMB, Ant, all,

>   
> Ron:
> It's all the power of persuasion. It's all a rhetorical arguement. Thats the
> point that is trying to be made. The best rhetorical arguements, the most
> persuasive are those "predicated" on first hand immediate empirical
> experience.


Tuukka:
If you say so. But I am not persuaded by arguments that only make 
something look fancy without telling, what it is - so for me, this just 
begs the question.


>   
> Tuuka continues:
> Furthermore, in LILA Pirsig states the MOQ to subscribe to empiricism.
> Empiricism is a theory of knowledge, so the MOQ is an epistemological
> theory in its own right, in addition to being an ontological and an
> ethical theory. To speak of epistemological objectivity as if it were
> beyond the scope of the MOQ is to deny the explicitly stated empiricism
> of the MOQ.
>
> Ron:
> To speak of epistemological objectivity is to begin down the path of rationalism
> it begins to become a deduction from empirical experience and that is the keystone
> of what MoQ's empiricism is drawn from, it's drawn from direct immediate experience
> before rationalization. Understand that MoQ is a rationalized theory which points
> to the pre-rationalized empirical experience. Thats why it looks at any theory of experience
>   in terms of aestestics ie: usefulness, clarity in meaning and economy of explanation (Ocam's razor).
> Simply put, MoQ looks at what theories of knowledge are "best".


Tuukka:
I don't understand the grammatic structure of the first sentence.

Arguing the MOQ to be an epistemological theory is not necessary for 
purposes of arguing that SODV's "subjectivity" and "objectivity" are 
"subjective quality" and "objective quality" of ZAMM. In SODV, figure 4, 
Pirsig says that inorganic and biological quality are objective static 
patterns, and social and intellectual quality are subjective static 
patterns. Please note, that the patterns are not denoted as 
"intellectual" (epistemological), but as "static". The intellectual 
pattern is another thing, that's also present in figure 4. Hence, the 
objectivity and subjectivity of said patterns is of ontological nature, 
and not only of epistemological nature. There is no other ontological 
definition of subjectivity and objectivity that Pirsig could be expected 
to refer to, except the one in ZAMM.


> Ron:
>
> The problem with logical theorems such as Goedels completeness is that they operate on
> closed systems of logic. MoQ is not a closed system of logic. Never claimed to be. It is a theory
> of knowledge. It's a theory on how we develop truth statements. Truth is an aestetic it is
> a species of "the good". MoQ asks "what makes it good?".
>
>



Tuukka:
The SOQ is not a closed system of logic, and it's not purely formal. 
See: 
http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/formal-soq/#Formal-Romantic-Quality . 
Be advised that the forumula in the section is incorrect. You probably 
wouldn't be very interested of that anyhow, but just so you know.

    >  Tuukka earlier:
    Why is logos subjective? Is there another reason than Pirsig saying so?
    If there isn't, you are now prioritizing LILA over ZAMM, as Pirsig also
    said other things. Logos is not subjective in any relevant way, except
    the Buddhist "relative" way, popularized on MD by Marsha. The truths of
    logos are interrelated to each other, and mean nothing outside the
    context of that network of interrelated truths. This already is the
    message of Quine's confirmation holism. But unlike the truths of mythos,
    the truths of logos have a verifiable meaning within that network, and
    hence, they are objective. Furthermore, no static truths have verifiable
    meanings outside their context, as they don't exist outside the context.

    >  Ron earlier:
    Well, if you understand Quine, then you can understand why logos is contextually
    subjective in the same way as mythos because they both require a contextual
    framework of meaning. You admitted this. The arguenet is over one contextual
    framework as being "more" objective than another which doesent quite make sense
    since you just established that the meaning of the term "objective" is relative
    to the context of it's use. In effect you just stated that "objectivity" is essentially
    a subjective term.
    The idea that bridges all contexts is "the good" Pirsig uses the term Quality.
    The good is a static truth that is understood in any context.
    Then we can judge contextual frameworks like paintings in an art gallery.




Tuukka:
It is neither useful nor consonant with Pirsig's writing to have a 
concept of "objectivity" that is completely meaningless. When Pirsig 
criticizes logical positivism in LILA, he does not say objective quality 
does not exist. He's writing of a different thing. Scientific truths are 
objective within the framework of science, and that's all there is to 
objectivity. To be objective is a subjective choice, but once one makes 
that choice, objective things come to existence.

According to Quine's confirmation holism, everything that is objective 
is indeed also subjective. But that does not entail nothing is 
objective. This is precisely what I have been saying: that objectivity 
emerges from subjectivity, and not the other way around. But perhaps my 
earlier message gave the impression that I do not believe logos to be 
subjective. In that message, I tried to use language that is not 
obviously inconsistent with SODV, because I did not want to contradict 
people too much.

If figure 4 of SODV is interpreted as a Venn diagram, patterns of value 
are either subjective or objective, but never both. Therefore, I tried 
to use established terminology that I expected you to accept, when I 
didn't emphasize that I believe the objective emerges from the subjective.


    Tuukka earlier:
    I understand if "subjectivity" is thought of as a box, in which we can
    put anything we want, we can just put logos there and leave it at that.
    But that would be like running over ZAMM with LILA because the task to
    make them resonate seemed difficult.

    Ron earlier:
    If physics is objective, and logos is not, what is the point of saying
    Aristotle was being objective, when he defined force as something that
    keeps bodies in motion, and that Galilei was also being objective, when
    he defined force as something that causes changes in velocity and
    acceleration, but is not a requirement for motion? Were both Aristotle
    and Galilei being objective, because they were using a scientific
    method? Were their scientific methods themselves subjective?



Tuukka:
I never said logos is not objective. I said the opposite.




    Ron earlier:
    Aristotle was after clarity in meaning. He was dealing with the problem
    of relativism also. The good is what makes some things better than others
    it makes some things truer than others. Subjectivity is more like a pair of glasses
    one interprets experience through. Thats why he wrote the "meta-physics"
    you should read it some time.
    Aristotle understood that scientific observation was a subjective enterprise.
    All explanation is. The focus was on clarity in meaning, does the explanation
    accurately provide meaning to the observation, how well does it explain
    observable phenomena? How successful are it's predictions?
    Tuuka,I highly recommend doing the homework. Reasearch will
    help out tremendosly with alot of your questions.



Tuukka:
Okay, but let's first make sure you know what I'm doing in the first place.




    [Tuukka earlier]

>     It is very unclear, how theories of empirical science should have no corresponding
>     *repeated*  experience, as the whole branch of science is based on such experiences.
    Craig earlier:A distinction is needed:
    We can only talk about a particular raven because we are able to (in Strawson pere's
    terminology) "reidentify" it as the SAME raven.  For instance, that raven is flying when
    the SAME pattern (in Pirsig's terminology) occupies successively contiguous places in space.
    What makes 2 distinct patterns both ravens (birds of the same kind)?
    Because they are both the same KIND of pattern.
    Science is concerned with KINDs of patterns.  The data is the reidentified patterns;
    the theory is the generalization about those kinds of patterns.
    "If you can't generalize from the data, you can't do anything else with it either" (Pirsig)




Tuukka:
I don't have a problem with replacing "corresponding repeated 
experience" with "corresponding similar experience".


    Earlier: Ham said to All --
    So as not to be censured for disagreeing with "the Prophet of Quality", I'll begin by basing my argument on statements I support to a large degree. ...
    The tenet that Value is fundamental to existence, however, as DMB points out, must be understood conceptually if it is to be accepted as a metaphysical principle.  And the fact that the author avoided defining DQ, which is his name for Value, places it in limbo insofar as metaphysics is concerned.  We are left without an explanation of its ontological source or its epistemological relation to mankind. So the problem with the MOQ isn't that Pirsig was wrong; it's that we don't know the exact nature or dynamics of this indefinable essence.  And that's what makes it "doctrinal" (e.g., dogmatic) as opposed to a cogent metaphysical theory.   ...it seems to me that the idea of Value as DQ must be codified into a workable thesis that supports the moral and ontological principles espoused by the author.  Indeed, this may well be the challenge that confronts MOQ enthusiasts as we progress through this new century.



    dmb says earlier:
    Leaving DQ undefined is not a failure that leaves us "without an explanation of its ontological source or its epistemological relation to mankind," but a deliberate choice and it's very important to understand why he doesn't want DQ to be "codified". So, to use your own phrasing, the problem isn't that Pirsig is wrong; it's that YOU don't understand what he means. You're construing your own incomprehension as Pirsig's failure. The MOQ is anti-essentialist to the core and yet you demand to "know the exact nature or dynamics of this indefinable essence". DQ is not an essence. That's the big mistake the Plato made and that Pirsig works so hard to undo. There are two doctoral theses that have demonstrated that the MOQ is a cogent metaphysical theory to two different thesis committees from two different Universities in two different countries, not to mention my own thesis committee, which included Ron DiSanto, the co-author of the Guidebook to ZAMM. Do you suppose I and all these
      other people are simply deluded, that you see what they didn't?

    That level of arrogance would be astonishing and shocking even if it were somewhat justified, which it isn't.




Tuukka:
Bear in mind that I haven't defined DQ - only a reason why it can't be 
defined.



    Mark earlier (as an empirical scientist):
    Data has no pattern until it is subjected to a theory.  It is the
    theory which provides the pattern.  One cannot generalize from data.
    One can only generalize from theory, the data is completely neutral
    and could care less about the theory.  The generalization of theory to
    other data puts new data within the rules of the theory.  If the data
    can be conformed to such rules, it supports the theory.

    This use of data and theory can be applied to DQ and SQ as follows:
    DQ is the data, SQ is the theory.  Depending on what theory we have,
    DQ can appear very differently as SQ.  It is this difference in theory
    which provides the fuel to the different religions and philosophies
    and camps within a field of science.  However, this difference has no
    effect on the DQ which gave rise to the SQ.   DQ (data) is not
    different for each interpretation, it is only the interpretation which
    is different.  The same set of data can give rise (and does) to a
    great many theories.  So if Pirsig is right, "we can't do anything
    with it".  That sort of thing is called "data manipulation" and is
    frowned on in science.  Wish the same were true in politics.

    End of lesson in science.


    Craig earlier:
    Quite the opposite...the data couldn't care less about the theory.
    Your science lesson was bereft of examples, so let's consider one:
    snow-flake formation.
    Under certain weather conditions, water particles crystalize
    into a six-armed pattern (no 2 alike.)  We may come up with ever more
    sophisticated and successful theories about why they do this,
    but the water particles couldn't care less about our theories,
    they form their patterns despite us.
    Craig

    Mark earlier:
    Hi Craig,
    Yes you are right couldn't care less.  My mistake, but the rest stands.

    Thanks for the correction in my grammar.  I liked your example.



Tuukka:
It seems somehow mentally very Western that you are having this 
disagreement. I would most respectfully like to remark, that I find 
neither position correct except according to itself. If you were going 
to *use* these declarative statements for something, one might turn out 
better than the other, but discussing which one of them is correct - 
even when no plans to apply either one have been presented - makes no 
sense to me.

    Ham earlier:
    If the MOQ were so vulnerable that it would self-destruct on
    definition, it would be useless as a working philosophy.  I can
    understand the inability to define an unknown.
    Yet Pirsig insists that everybody knows what Quality is, so it can't
    be an unknown.  Moreover, what defines a philosophy is the ontology
    on which it is structured and which gives it meaning both within and
    outside of the definable (empirical) realm.


Tuukka:
I agree that an undefinable MOQ would not be very useful for me, at least.


    Ham earlier:
    There is no need to "pre-determine what will be considered good in
    the future", nor should that be the purpose of philosophy.


Tuukka:
I somewhat agree.



    Ham earlier:
    When you hang a philosophy on events in time, you restrict the
    concept to temporal experience, which amounts to naturalism, the
    'logical positivism' that Pirsig despised.  Simply calling things
    "patterns" does not eliminate subjects and objects; instead it
    deprives subjects of the agency needed to appreciate Value in a
    relational context.


Tuukka:
Restricting philosophy to temporal events in time can be a brilliant way 
to intuitively illustrate the content of one's theory. However, from a 
metaphysical point of view, the temporal interpretation is not necessary.



    Ant earlier:

    Tuukka earlier: Pirsig himself does not devalue the ZAMM as much as I am now expected
    to. In LILA he states, that although the ZAMM way of perceiving reality
    is correct, he is just going to use a different approach in this book.

    Ant earlier: I'd like to see that quote about this "different approach" - in context.
    I don't believe it exists or, if it does, you've misconstrued something.




Tuukka:

Okay. From chapter eight of LILA:

    There's a principle in physics that if a thing can't be
    distinguished from anything else it doesn't exist. To this the
    Metaphysics of Quality adds a second principle: if a thing has no
    value it isn't distinguished from anything else. Then, putting the
    two together, a thing that has no value does not exist. The thing
    has not created the value. The value has created the thing. When it
    is seen that value is the front edge of experience, there is no
    problem for empiricists here. It simply restates the empiricists'
    belief that experience is the starting point of all reality. The
    only problem is for a subject-object metaphysics that calls itself
    empiricism.

    This may sound as though a purpose of the Metaphysics of Quality is
    to trash all subject-object thought but that's not true. Unlike
    subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality does not
    insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held
    to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one
    construction of things that which corresponds to the "objective"
    world and all other constructions are unreal. But if Quality or
    excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible
    for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the
    absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual
    explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any
    guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as
    useful until something better comes along. One can then examine
    intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings in an art
    gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the "real"
    painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value.
    There are many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can
    perceive some to have more quality than others, but that we do so
    is, in part, the result of our history and current patterns of values.

    Or, using another analogy, saying that a Metaphysics of Quality is
    false and a subject-object metaphysics is true is like saying that
    rectangular coordinates are true and polar coordinates are false. A
    map with the North Pole at the center is confusing at first, but
    it's every bit as correct as a Mercator map. In the Arctic it's the
    only map to have. Both are simply intellectual patterns for
    interpreting reality and one can only say that in some circumstances
    rectangular coordinates provide a better, simpler interpretations.

Here, Pirsig advices against dogmatism. And from chapter nine:

    Phaedrus has spent an enormous amount of time following what turned
    out to be lousy openings. A particularily large amount of this time
    had been spent trying to lay down a dirst line of division between
    the classic and romantic aspects of the universe he'd emphasized in
    his first book. In that book his purpose had been to show that
    Quality could unite the two. But the fact that Quality was the best
    way of niting the two was no guarantee that the reverse was true --
    that the classic-romantic split was the best way of dividing
    Quality. It wasn't. For example, American Indian mysticism is the
    same platypus in a world divided primarily into classic and romantic
    patterns as under a subject-object division. When an American Indian
    goes into isolation and fasts in order to achieve a vision, the
    vision he seeks is not a romantic understanding of the surface
    beauty of the world. Neither is it a vision of the world's classic
    intellectual form. It is something else. Since this whole
    metaphysics had started with an attempt to explain Indian mysticism
    Phaedrus finally abandoned this classic-romantic split as a choice
    for a primary division of the Metaphysics of Quality.

The ZAMM way of perceiving reality can be thought of as inappropriate in 
the sense that it has the romantic-classic split as the primary division 
of the Metaphysics of Quality. That opening does not work for the 
purpose of explaining American Indian mysticism. This does not entail 
the SOQ are inappropriate, because in the SOQ, the Dynamic-static 
division is fundamental. But unlike LILA, the SOQ does not simply omit 
the romantic-classic split. Instead, it expresses that split as a 
secondary division of the MOQ by splitting static quality to romantic 
and classic quality. The absence of Dynamic Quality is the greatest 
shortcoming of ZAMM, but it does not prevent attaching ZAMM's MOQ to 
LILA's MOQ as a module.



Ant earlier:

    Tuukka earlier: He presents the approaches as interchangeable, just like polar
    coordinates and rectangular coordinates are interchangeable. Neither one
    is a "proto-map": both are proper maps.

    Ant earlier: No, that's well, well off line.  At the beginning of LILA we see how Rigel gets the better
    of Phaedrus because the latter doesn't have an "MOQ catechism" (for want of a better word)
    to refer to.  Much of LILA is devoted to introducing and building up such a catechism.

    Regarding the example of polar and rectangular coordinates (in Chapter 8 of LILA), you're
    ignoring the important point just beforehand about seeking the "highest quality intellectual
    explanation":

    'One doesn't seek the absolute "Truth."  One seeks instead the highest quality
    intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any
    guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful
    until something better comes along.'

      LILA contains a better MOQ than ZMM.  To ignore this critical fact is

    just going to undermine the intellectual value of your SOQ.




Tuukka:

Okay, you are right in that LILA's MOQ is better than ZAMM's MOQ, and in 
that sense, they are not "interchangeable". Sorry that I expressed 
myself badly. What I meant to say (and what can be clearly seen from the 
citations, which I recapped now that you asked for them) is that Pirsig 
wants the Dynamic-static split to be the *primary* split of the MOQ. The 
SOQ adds the romantic-classic split as a secondary split to LILA's MOQ, 
and Pirsig hasn't written anything that would be an obstacle for that.


Ant earlier:

I have nothing to add to what Ron stated about these two paragraphs yesterday.
I'm glad he made the effort with you to go through them.



Tuukka:
Please see my response to Ron in the top of this message.



    Best wishes to all,
    Tuukka