[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Ant McWatt]

Tuukka Stated April 22nd:


> Ant earlier:
>
> Tuukka earlier: Pirsig himself does not devalue the ZAMM as much as I am now expected
> to. In LILA he states, that although the ZAMM way of perceiving reality
> is correct, he is just going to use a different approach in this book.
>
> Ant earlier: I'd like to see that quote about this "different approach" - in context.
> I don't believe it exists or, if it does, you've misconstrued something.
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Okay. From chapter eight of LILA:
>
> "There's a principle in physics that if a thing can't be
> distinguished from anything else it doesn't exist. To this the
> Metaphysics of Quality adds a second principle: if a thing has no
> value it isn't distinguished from anything else. Then, putting the
> two together, a thing that has no value does not exist. The thing
> has not created the value. The value has created the thing. When it
> is seen that value is the front edge of experience, there is no
> problem for empiricists here. It simply restates the empiricists'
> belief that experience is the starting point of all reality. The
> only problem is for a subject-object metaphysics that calls itself
> empiricism."
>
> "This may sound as though a purpose of the Metaphysics of Quality is
> to trash all subject-object thought but that's not true. Unlike
> subject-object metaphysics the Metaphysics of Quality does not
> insist on a single exclusive truth. If subjects and objects are held
> to be the ultimate reality then we're permitted only one
> construction of things that which corresponds to the "objective"
> world and all other constructions are unreal. But if Quality or
> excellence is seen as the ultimate reality then it becomes possible
> for more than one set of truths to exist. Then one doesn't seek the
> absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the highest quality intellectual
> explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any
> guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as
> useful until something better comes along. One can then examine
> intellectual realities the same way he examines paintings in an art
> gallery, not with an effort to find out which one is the "real"
> painting, but simply to enjoy and keep those that are of value.
> There are many sets of intellectual reality in existence and we can
> perceive some to have more quality than others, but that we do so
> is, in part, the result of our history and current patterns of values."
>
> "Or, using another analogy, saying that a Metaphysics of Quality is
> false and a subject-object metaphysics is true is like saying that
> rectangular coordinates are true and polar coordinates are false. A
> map with the North Pole at the center is confusing at first, but
> it's every bit as correct as a Mercator map. In the Arctic it's the
> only map to have. Both are simply intellectual patterns for
> interpreting reality and one can only say that in some circumstances
> rectangular coordinates provide a better, simpler interpretations."
>
>
>
> Here, Pirsig advices against dogmatism. And from chapter nine:
>
> "Phaedrus has spent an enormous amount of time following what turned
> out to be lousy openings. A particularily large amount of this time
> had been spent trying to lay down a dirst line of division between
> the classic and romantic aspects of the universe he'd emphasized in
> his first book. In that book his purpose had been to show that
> Quality could unite the two. But the fact that Quality was the best
> way of niting the two was no guarantee that the reverse was true --
> that the classic-romantic split was the best way of dividing
> Quality. It wasn't. For example, American Indian mysticism is the
> same platypus in a world divided primarily into classic and romantic
> patterns as under a subject-object division. When an American Indian
> goes into isolation and fasts in order to achieve a vision, the
> vision he seeks is not a romantic understanding of the surface
> beauty of the world. Neither is it a vision of the world's classic
> intellectual form. It is something else. Since this whole
> metaphysics had started with an attempt to explain Indian mysticism
> Phaedrus finally abandoned this classic-romantic split as a choice
> for a primary division of the Metaphysics of Quality."
>
>
>
> The ZAMM way of perceiving reality can be thought of as inappropriate in
> the sense that it has the romantic-classic split as the primary division
> of the Metaphysics of Quality. That opening does not work for the
> purpose of explaining American Indian mysticism. This does not entail
> the SOQ are inappropriate, because in the SOQ, the Dynamic-static
> division is fundamental. But unlike LILA, the SOQ does not simply omit
> the romantic-classic split. Instead, it expresses that split as a
> secondary division of the MOQ by splitting static quality to romantic
> and classic quality. The absence of Dynamic Quality is the greatest
> shortcoming of ZAMM, but it does not prevent attaching ZAMM's MOQ to
> LILA's MOQ as a module.


Ant comments:

Maybe not but have you ever thought why Pirsig did not do a similar exercise himself?

You see if you were going to "shoehorn" romantic and classic quality into the MOQ (of LILA), I think the static patterns would be considered as forms of classic quality while romantic quality correlates to the Dynamic.  You then read Pirsig's examples in LILA of American Indian mysticism and the Zuni brujo and then realise the static-Dynamic split is, more or less, a refinement of the 
classic-romantic division of ZMM. 

Having said this, I do like the (1960s) notions of hip and square personalities found in ZMM; the "classic" square personality correlating to someone dominated by intellectual patterns while the "romantic" hip personality is someone dominated by aesthetics i.e. the Dynamic.  But again , where does the mystic personality fit into this classic-romantic division or someone (following the goal suggested by ZMM) who tries to reconcile the classic and romantic together?


> Ant earlier:
>
> Tuukka earlier: He presents the approaches as interchangeable, just like polar
> coordinates and rectangular coordinates are interchangeable. Neither one
> is a "proto-map": both are proper maps.
>
> Ant earlier: No, that's well, well off line. At the beginning of LILA we see how Rigel gets the better
> of Phaedrus because the latter doesn't have an "MOQ catechism" (for want of a better word)
> to refer to. Much of LILA is devoted to introducing and building up such a catechism.
>
> Regarding the example of polar and rectangular coordinates (in Chapter 8 of LILA), you're
> ignoring the important point just beforehand about seeking the "highest quality intellectual
> explanation":
>
> 'One doesn't seek the absolute "Truth." One seeks instead the highest quality
> intellectual explanation of things with the knowledge that if the past is any
> guide to the future this explanation must be taken provisionally; as useful
> until something better comes along.'
>
> LILA contains a better MOQ than ZMM. To ignore this critical fact is
> just going to undermine the intellectual value of your SOQ.
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Okay, you are right in that LILA's MOQ is better than ZAMM's MOQ, and in
> that sense, they are not "interchangeable". Sorry that I expressed
> myself badly. 


Ant comments:

Tuukka, I think that was a little more than expressing yourself badly. You clearly stated: "In LILA [Pirsig] states, that although the ZAMM way of perceiving reality is correct, he is just going to use a different approach in this book."

As we can see in the above quotes that you cited (from Chapter 8 of LILA), Pirsig simply doesn't say that.  It gives the  impression that you were consciously misleading the reader in order to justify your pet project for how it stands now instead of actually re-assessing exactly what you're doing (regarding the SOQ) and why you're doing it.     

Or am I just getting cynical in my old age?!

Ant



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