[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Andre, Ham,

>
> Andre:
> Hi Tuukka and Anthony, if I may join in for a minute. I think the 
> DQ/sq division is an improvement on the classic/romantic division. 
> Static quality does not divide into classic/romantic precisely because 
> of the DQ reference. In this case the (American Indian) mysticism. 
> This 'mysticism' part adds greater understanding to the static 
> evolutions that are occurring.

Tuukka:
If the Internet is an improvement from the phone, it does not follow 
that the Internet and the phone may not co-exist.

>
> Andre:
>
> That's why, should you maintain classic and romantic 'as subdivisions' 
> of static quality you WILL ruin it...because of their 'regressive' 
> nature. It is not the same because static quality IS MORE INCLUSIVE 
> and therefore of higher quality than classic-romantic. Imho.

Tuukka:
You have a big box, labeled "static quality" (DQ is not a box). You put 
in two small boxes, of which one is labeled "classic quality" and the 
other "romantic quality". In what way does this ruin the big box?


> Andre:
> And, may I add, it suggests something more to one's 'personality' than 
> just the 'hip' and 'square' 'types'. Time to move on from 
> ethnocentrism to globalism?
>

Tuukka:
You know, often times people speak to me as if I were some complete 
dolt. I don't know why. The SOQ does not intend to compete with the Big 
Five personality assessment questionnaire, which measures five 
personality traits, of which four have been found to correlate with the 
shape and size of specific regions of the brain. There's a lot more to 
personality assessment than "hip" or "square", and it's not my fault 
that Pirsig happened to create a metaphysics, which could be used for 
making such classifications - and of which a critic could consequently 
strive to argue, that that was the sole purpose the metaphysical system 
was created for. It's not. Metaphysics is not a branch of psychology. 
Psychology already exists, so there is no need for Pirsig or me to 
re-invent that branch of science.


Tuukka earlier:
> The SOQ includes love, desire and awe in the social level, and
> treats most emotions as the romantic quality equivalent of the
> social level. They also manifest in the subjective consideration
> level. The aesthetic level is the 16th and highest level of the
> standard formulation of SOQ.

Ham:
You have an inventive mind, Tuukka, which sparks my curiosity. I glanced 
at your SOQ thesis, but the mathematical formulas were beyond my level 
of expertise. Actually, I have enough trouble with the four levels of 
the MOQ hierarchy. For example, I don't see why the emotions -- love, 
desire, awe, joy, etc. -- are assigned to a social level inasmuch as 
they constitute our most intimate personal feelings. Sure, we can enjoy 
or despise something "collectively". But feelings are subjective; they 
are proprietary to the individual self. And this is true of all value 
sensibility.


Tuukka:
If you want to know why emotions are assigned to the social level, 
please see this: http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/the-subjective/ . It 
portrays the subjective side of emotions. The objective side of emotions 
are the emotions we are culturally expected to feel, such as obedience 
for a king, reverence for a hero, contempt towards a blasphemer, and so 
on. Intuitive perceptions of social status are based on emotion, and 
even in isolation we reflect on our relationship to other people. That 
is the reason why some of our emotions are intimate and private. We 
specifically don't want all people to know them - so the social 
component is obvious. They are not socially neutral, but secrets. No 
thing that is known to everyone is a secret.


Tuukka earlier:
> To say that DQ is a paradox or an enigma is rather Western.
> I don't think it must always be treated as a difficult concept.
Ham:
Yet we must know WHAT IT IS if it is to be formulated as a concept. If 
we can't experience it, define it, or relate to it, there is nothing to 
conceptualize.
Of course we can dream something up in our imagination. But this is a 
fantasy, not a concept.


Tuukka:
Like I've said, Dynamic Quality is a nonrelativizably used predicate. 
What does that mean?

Let us call concepts “predicates”. Predicates can be determined to be 
used relativizably or nonrelativizably. A nonrelativizably used 
predicate is used as if it were to not belong to any particular theory. 
For example, let us form a concept, whose intension is: “a number whose 
successor is 0″.

If the predicate “a number whose successor is 0″ is used relativizably, 
its usage is such, that in some way or the other, it’s clear to us, in 
what context should we place it. If the context is the theory of natural 
numbers, we determine the predicate to have an empty extension, because 
that theory does not contain negative numbers. But if the context is the 
theory of integers, we determine the extension of the predicate to be 
the number -1.

However, if the predicate is used nonrelativizably, we do not know, 
which theory should be used as context. As a result, we might end up 
making one argument as if “a number whose successor is 0″ refers to -1, 
and another argument as if “a number whose successor is 0″ refers to 
nothing, and treat them as if they were to belong to the same theory. 
Consequently, we might argue that theory to be inconsistent, even if it 
weren’t.

If a nonrelativizably used predicate is introduced to a theory, the 
result is superficially similar to that theory being inconsistent. But 
on a closer look, something different takes place.

In an inconsistent theory, the statement “The Moon is made of cheese” is 
both true and false, and relativizable proof can be presented for that. 
But if a nonrelativizably used predicate is introduced to a theory, this 
rarely grants us a serious opportunity to claim, that it is both true 
and false that the Moon is made of cheese. If it did, our entire 
conception of reality should apparently be broken when we encounter a 
nonrelativizably used predicate.

Because we are sane even though we have encountered nonrelativizably 
used predicates, they cannot be argued to break our conception of 
reality by turning it completely inconsistent. Even if they do turn it 
inconsistent, they seem to do that only to a nonrelativizable extent.

Dynamic Quality cannot be defined, because no concept is Dynamic Quality 
by virtue of its definition, but instead, by virtue of the way in which 
it is used.


Tuukka earlier:

> Like Pirsig says in LILA, any thing is identified by its properties. 
> Since any thing is, according to the MOQ, Quality, there will
> never be anything Quality would not be supposed to refer to,
> and Quality is thus a nonrelativizably used predicate. The true
> purpose of the concept of Quality is rhetoric: it is intended to
> convey the impression, that it's inappropriate to perceive the
> MOQ as an extension of any traditional Western ontology,
> such as materialism or idealism. The statement "everything is
> Quality" is intended to clear the reader's mind of arbitrary 
> .conceptions, not to convey much metaphysical content per se.

Ham:

You've provided an apologist's argument for Pirsig's thesis, and I can't 
fault that analysis. At the same time, if everything is Quality, then 
Quality is the source or "essential" reality, which means that existence 
(man's reality) is a
a fictional facsimile. I could buy that ontology except for the fact 
that Quality is a relational phenomenon which cannot exist without 
subjective awareness of an objective otherness. In other words, Quality 
(Value) is contingent upon pluralistic existence and NOT an independent 
"essence".

That, folks, is my main problem with the MOQ. I appreciate your 
objection to the "evolutionary" aspect of Pirsig's philosophy, Tuukka, 
which does indeed "make metaphyhsics a branch of history". But it also 
branches from the flaw I've outlined above. For the concept of an 
absolute Quality (whether interpreted as Excellence, Goodness or 
Morality) simply doesn't pass muster as a logical thesis.

And, for Mark's benefit, this is why, for me at least, existential 
reality has to be a reduction or 'negation' of Essence.


Tuukka:
As Quality is a nonrelativizably used predicate, it cannot be argued to 
have the property of being fictional. It cannot be argued to have other 
properties, either. Argumentation is not science - it is a craft - and 
the statement "Everything is Quality" is a perfectly fine way to deter 
people from believing the MOQ is supposed to be yet another instance of 
physicalism, or something silly like that.

Best regards,
Tuukka