[MD] A problem with the MOQ.

[Ham Priday]

Hi Tuukka --

[Ham, previously]:
> I don't see why the emotions -- love, desire, awe, joy, etc. --
> are assigned to a social level inasmuch as they constitute our
> most intimate personal feelings. Sure, we can enjoy or despise
> something "collectively".  But feelings are subjective; they are 
> proprietary to the individual self.  And this is true of all value 
> sensibility.

 [Tuukka responds]:
> If you want to know why emotions are assigned to the social
> level, please see this: http://www.moq.fi/sets-of-quality/the-subjective/ 
> . > It portrays the subjective side of emotions. The objective side of 
> emotions are the emotions we are culturally expected to feel,
> such as obedience for a king, reverence for a hero, contempt
> towards a blasphemer, and so on. Intuitive perceptions of social
> status are based on emotion, and even in isolation we reflect
> on our relationship to other people. That is the reason why some
> of our emotions are intimate and private. We specifically don't
> want all people to know them - so the social component is
> obvious. They are not socially neutral, but secrets. No thing
> that is known to everyone is a secret.

This compulsion to parse all experience and assign it to levels of quality 
is a dead end from the start, in my opinion.  We don't construct philosophy 
from 'numbers and sets' or comprehend it as a finished gigsaw puzzle.

You speak of the "objective side" of emotions as those "we are expected" to 
feel.  I don't know if conditioned behavior qualifies as "emotional", but 
that's really what you have defined here.  Behavior is not an emotion. 
Epistemologically all emotions are felt subjectively or, as I said before, 
"proprietary to the self", whether "other people know them" or not.  So that 
classifying some emotions as "objective" has no logical justification.

You've also categorized Quality as having "Romantic" and "Classic" 
subdivisions.  Can you explain the difference to me?  Better yet, can you 
offer any reason why positing such a division would enhance our 
understanding of philosophy, or human relations, for that matter?

It would seem more important to realize that Quality = Value, as Mr. Pirsig 
formulated it, and that it does not exist until someone actually senses it. 
I have made use of this realization by defining the core self as 
"value-sensibility".  This sensibility enables conscious subjects to be the 
agents of Value in a multiplistic universe.  Since the contingencies "Value" 
and "Sensibility" are both derivatives of Essence, my premise takes the 
mystery out of this world of appearances, our proprietary experience of it, 
and how we relate to the objective otherness called existence.

Please note that I haven't attempted to defined the essential Source; I've 
simply named it Essence and suggested that it is the absolute unity of all 
that is.  (I include Difference and Contrariety as the primary characterics 
of existential reality which Essence transcends by negating nothingness.)

So, let me turn the table and invite you to read my thesis at 
www.essentialism.net/mechanic/htm.  See if it doesn't clear up some problems 
with the MOQ, as well as providing the fundamentals its author decided to 
omit.  If you'll do that for me, Tuukka, I shall be most happy to answer any 
questions you may have.  (Should you be uncomfortable discussing this on the 
MD, please feel free to contact me off line.)

Sincerely,
Ham