[MD] Idealistic static value patterns

[Matt Kundert]

Hi Tuukka,

You're inundating me with material, so I should make you aware that 
I'm under severe time and energy constraints.  I'm a grad student in 
a program that is not philosophy, so I can't spend very much time on 
philosophical inquiry.  I say this in order to set the context for my 
inability to respond adequately.  However, the little tangent that 
sprouted in relation to my quick note is all about metaphilosophy, 
which is my favorite area of discourse.

Tuukka said:
Hmm. Being a "Pirsigian" is, in my opinion, impossible in any highly 
coherent sense.

Matt:
Nah.  I think taking part in any -ism or following any forerunner as 
an -ian is just a matter of circumscribing an area of philosophical 
positions that makes one part of the -ism or follower of X.  Even with 
philosophers like Pirsig, who combine an adherence to mystical 
experience (which is notoriously reticent to description) with an 
anti-dogmatism (encapsulated in his attack on "philosophology"), it's 
not really much of a trick to establish a few central positions one 
must subscribe to in order to count as following his teachings.  You 
just need to know what his teachings are.  Pirsig is, after all, not a 
pure anti-dogmatist, like a Socrates (and even he had successful 
followers, which I might add is quite a trick).

Tuukka said:
I have had quite a bit of discussions with Bo, and I have no idea 
whether it was good to ban him from MD or not. I'm active at Lila 
Squad and I think it's nice there are two different places for 
discussion. Maybe it would stifle innovation if everyone had to be at 
MD because there are no other places. I used to sympathise with Bo 
a lot, but nowadays I think I'm quite neutral to him. I don't know why 
exactly was he banned, so I can't evaluate whether the reasons were 
right.

Matt:
It's a moot point about Bo, and second-guessing Horse is certainly not 
the discussion I wish to have.  But, suffice it to say, Bo was banned 
from posting in the MD because he didn't understand the distinction 
between his philosophy and Pirsig's philosophy.  This made every 
articulation of what he thought a form of "the MoQ says...."  This 
meant that sometimes he attributed claims to Pirsig's philosophy that 
are not there (ranging from questionable to patently false).  This 
eventually emitted into a philosophical practice that was in certain 
ways indistinguishable from misinformation.  And since the MD aims 
at honest and informative discussion, if you eventually can't convince 
a person that X-claim is patently wrong, then the only thing left is to 
force him from the room (the only claims, really, that fall under this 
clause are claims about what Pirsig says, since that's centrally what 
the MD is here for discussion of).  That's the rough form of the 
justification for why Bo was banned.

And what's this "Lila Squad"?  Geez, how am I supposed to keep my 
links section on my website current if people don't let me know when 
they're inaugurating new Pirsig websites....

Matt said:
I was, rather, speaking of the prerogative of people who self-identify 

in a conceptual grouping of some kind to revoke the license of others 

who also _want_ to identify in that group, but have displayed some 
kind 
of activity that the revoker thinks is impermissible for such 

identification.  ... However, the idea is that should a conflict like 
this 
arise, the revoker tries to argue that the illegitimate 
self-identifier 
shouldn't be taken seriously as a mouthpiece for the 
group both 
identify with.  That's how a conceptual group manages itself 
over time 
(in very broad outline, and from my own philosophical 
perspective).


Tuukka said:
Such people are a cancer in any group. But they are simply making a 
logical fallacy known as the No true Scotsman. 

Wikipedia:
Alice: All Scotsmen enjoy haggis.     
Bob: My uncle is a Scotsman, and he doesn't like haggis!
Alice: Well, all /true/ Scotsmen like haggis.

Matt:
I don't think you grasped my articulation of "conceptual grouping" by 
the right handle.  After all, if there are very real consequences to 
letting people into a group (like money, in the case of political parties), 
why isn't it a good idea to have a bouncer at the door?  Alice, above, 
is acting in the manner I specified.  What makes it silly is the _kind_ 
of conceptual category she's managing: Scotsman.  Sometimes such 
forms of management can be lame for _certain, specified_ kinds of 
conceptual groups (e.g., who is a "true philosopher," yet see how 
Pirsig manages that door).  But the act of managing, I take it, is not 
only not a cancer, but following a specific train of philosophical 
thought (Hegelian) a precondition for conceptual intelligibility.

Matt said:
So, in my little parenthetical, I was merely making light of the fact 
that some participants in the MD have made claims that, in these 
terms I've specified, I should have my charter as a Pirsigian revoked.

Tuukka said:
Okay. I don't know what that's about. I figure that because I can take 
a logical, systematic approach towards this, I do not need to think 
about which group I belong to.

Matt:
You seem to be evoking a little bit of the individualist rhetoric of "why 
on earth do we need to think about what group we're part of?"  Such 
that identifying with a group is secondary to this tougher, more 
important thing called the "logical, systematic approach."  However, 
I don't think thinking works like that (what I called "Hegelianism" 
before).  At best, logical-system and historical-genealogy are on all 
fours with each other.  I can most quickly make the point by saying 
that a snobby groupist might reply to your point, "well, I figure I can 
take a historical approach and not be so unconsciously repetitive or 
insular."

Tuukka said:
Also, I think that if we are concerned of elevating Pirsig's personal 
authority, or his function as an icon or an archetype, we should 
approach him like I do - that is, in a way that disregards the social 
gaming and focuses on the philosophy. Being right is not even the 
point. I think it's nice when some other people than me are right, or 
when someone helps me in correcting my mistake.

Matt:
I think, at their best, almost all MD participants do approach Pirsig as 
you do, which is to say someone whose claims they test in experience.  
At their best, no one treats Pirsig as a God, just as (roughly) the 
smartest philosopher they know.  But I would argue (and have at 
greater length in "Pirsig Institutionalized" in the moq.org Essay 
Forum) there is no distinction in kind between what you call "social 
gaming" and "philosophy."  Philosophy and "getting things right" is a 
social activity.  We should, of course, make a distinction between 
what Pirsig calls "ego-climbers" and people who selflessly climb 
Mount Philosophy for the sake betterness.  But even this is a lot 
harder to tell than one might think, and I certainly wouldn't use the 
criterion of people who "think about which group I belong to," as you 
put it, and those who don't.  As a means of firming my point, I would 
suggest that there is a performative contradiction in your claim that 
"being right is not even the point" that you immediately make plain
in your next sentence: for correcting a mistake is based entirely on 
the premise that being right is the point.  (You meant, I assume, 
"being _always_ right" is not the point, which is true, but the way you 
actually stated things helps elicit the philosophical point I wish to 
make.)

Tuukka said:
I don't know about that, but I'm currently busy enough working on 
the core of what this philosophical venture is supposed to be. So I'd 
just harm myself by trying to participate in that game, and I don't 
even know how that should be done. "I'm an eclectic Pirsigian who 
is inclined to essentialism. Let's see how many there are of us, and 
then vote what is true." That would be silly.

Matt:
It would be silly, but it is also not a good representation of the kind of 
conceptual-game scorekeeping I was lamely articulating.  Truth is not 
about taking a vote.  That's been effective argument against 
consensus-style theories of truth that not many have actually tried 
articulating.  (Many have assumed that pragmatist theories are 
versions of this, but I don't think they are.)  The best way to make the 
point is to say that when you say "I don't even know how that should 
be done," you're actually _practically_ wrong because you are 
implicitly already doing it, participating in the game.  Wilfrid Sellars 
called the game I'm talking about "the game of giving and asking for 
reasons."  It's otherwise known as "rationality."  Rationality is a social 
game.  Claims, assertions, positions, and reasons are all moves in a 
game, and everyone is keeping their own score.  The trick to 
understanding this "game" is to understand that, broadly speaking, 
it's best not to start by thinking that the name of the game is _to win_.  
That'd be like saying that the nature of playing make-believe with your 
friends is to win.  Doesn't make sense.  The nature of the game is to 
make sure that you and everyone else is _consistent_.  (There are 
derivative versions of this basic game that, however, do call for 
winners and losers.  Physics, for example.)

Matt