[MD] Idealistic static value patterns

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Matt,
> Matt said:
>
> You're inundating me with material, so I should make you aware that
> I'm under severe time and energy constraints.  I'm a grad student in
> a program that is not philosophy, so I can't spend very much time on
> philosophical inquiry.  I say this in order to set the context for my
> inability to respond adequately.  However, the little tangent that
> sprouted in relation to my quick note is all about metaphilosophy,
> which is my favorite area of discourse.

Tuukka:
Okay. If you don't mind, I won't change my behavior. To be sure 
(ecspecially when taking into account the remainder of this message), I 
might change it, but apparently I would myself be unaware of doing so 
even if I did so.

>
>
>
> Matt said:
> Nah.  I think taking part in any -ism or following any forerunner as
> an -ian is just a matter of circumscribing an area of philosophical
> positions that makes one part of the -ism or follower of X.  Even with
> philosophers like Pirsig, who combine an adherence to mystical
> experience (which is notoriously reticent to description) with an
> anti-dogmatism (encapsulated in his attack on "philosophology"), it's
> not really much of a trick to establish a few central positions one
> must subscribe to in order to count as following his teachings.  You
> just need to know what his teachings are.  Pirsig is, after all, not a
> pure anti-dogmatist, like a Socrates (and even he had successful
> followers, which I might add is quite a trick).

Tuukka:
Dynamic Quality is undefinable, and undefinability actually can be 
defined formally. I'd post some work on this, but apparently I need to 
visit my friend who's made that work, because he's too busy to check his 
definitions unless I'm present, helping him get his mind into it.

I thought Pirsig is inconsistent. He uses "intellect" in a different 
meaning in ZMM and LILA, apparently unaware of doing so. In ZMM, 
intellect seems to actually be a synonym for classical quality.

And with his interpretations of Cartesian dualism, Pirsig does to 
mainstream philosophy what Skutvik did to MOQ. That leaves mainstream 
philosophers no option but to throw him out.

>
> Tuukka said:
> I have had quite a bit of discussions with Bo, and I have no idea
> whether it was good to ban him from MD or not. I'm active at Lila
> Squad and I think it's nice there are two different places for
> discussion. Maybe it would stifle innovation if everyone had to be at
> MD because there are no other places. I used to sympathise with Bo
> a lot, but nowadays I think I'm quite neutral to him. I don't know why
> exactly was he banned, so I can't evaluate whether the reasons were
> right.
>
> Matt said:
> It's a moot point about Bo, and second-guessing Horse is certainly not
> the discussion I wish to have.  But, suffice it to say, Bo was banned
> from posting in the MD because he didn't understand the distinction
> between his philosophy and Pirsig's philosophy.  This made every
> articulation of what he thought a form of "the MoQ says...."  This
> meant that sometimes he attributed claims to Pirsig's philosophy that
> are not there (ranging from questionable to patently false).  This
> eventually emitted into a philosophical practice that was in certain
> ways indistinguishable from misinformation.  And since the MD aims
> at honest and informative discussion, if you eventually can't convince
> a person that X-claim is patently wrong, then the only thing left is to
> force him from the room (the only claims, really, that fall under this
> clause are claims about what Pirsig says, since that's centrally what
> the MD is here for discussion of).  That's the rough form of the
> justification for why Bo was banned.

Tuukka:

Yeah, I though something like that might have been the problem.

> Matt said:
> And what's this "Lila Squad"?  Geez, how am I supposed to keep my
> links section on my website current if people don't let me know when
> they're inaugurating new Pirsig websites....

Tuukka:
Lilasquad.com is currently a bit torso, with a standard wordpress theme, 
a couple of posts and no updates for a year. But the discussion group is 
highly active:

http://groups.google.com/group/lilasquad/topics

>
> Matt said:
> I was, rather, speaking of the prerogative of people who self-identify
>
> in a conceptual grouping of some kind to revoke the license of others
>
> who also _want_ to identify in that group, but have displayed some
> kind
> of activity that the revoker thinks is impermissible for such
>
> identification.  ... However, the idea is that should a conflict like
> this
> arise, the revoker tries to argue that the illegitimate
> self-identifier
> shouldn't be taken seriously as a mouthpiece for the
> group both
> identify with.  That's how a conceptual group manages itself
> over time
> (in very broad outline, and from my own philosophical
> perspective).
>
>
> Tuukka said:
> Such people are a cancer in any group. But they are simply making a
> logical fallacy known as the No true Scotsman.
>
> Wikipedia:
> Alice: All Scotsmen enjoy haggis.
> Bob: My uncle is a Scotsman, and he doesn't like haggis!
> Alice: Well, all /true/ Scotsmen like haggis.
>
> Matt said:
> I don't think you grasped my articulation of "conceptual grouping" by
> the right handle.  After all, if there are very real consequences to
> letting people into a group (like money, in the case of political parties),
> why isn't it a good idea to have a bouncer at the door?  Alice, above,
> is acting in the manner I specified.  What makes it silly is the _kind_
> of conceptual category she's managing: Scotsman.  Sometimes such
> forms of management can be lame for _certain, specified_ kinds of
> conceptual groups (e.g., who is a "true philosopher," yet see how
> Pirsig manages that door).  But the act of managing, I take it, is not
> only not a cancer, but following a specific train of philosophical
> thought (Hegelian) a precondition for conceptual intelligibility.

Tuukka:
Yeah... I guess so. I think I lost track on what this conversation is 
about. I'm not saying all groups should be open or something like that.

>
> Matt said:
> So, in my little parenthetical, I was merely making light of the fact
> that some participants in the MD have made claims that, in these
> terms I've specified, I should have my charter as a Pirsigian revoked.
>
> Tuukka said:
> Okay. I don't know what that's about. I figure that because I can take
> a logical, systematic approach towards this, I do not need to think
> about which group I belong to.
>
> Matt said:
> You seem to be evoking a little bit of the individualist rhetoric of "why
> on earth do we need to think about what group we're part of?"  Such
> that identifying with a group is secondary to this tougher, more
> important thing called the "logical, systematic approach."  However,
> I don't think thinking works like that (what I called "Hegelianism"
> before).  At best, logical-system and historical-genealogy are on all
> fours with each other.  I can most quickly make the point by saying
> that a snobby groupist might reply to your point, "well, I figure I can
> take a historical approach and not be so unconsciously repetitive or
> insular."

Tuukka:
Well I shouldn't maybe speak of things I have nothing to say about. I 
surely will participate in the social game, but I am unaware of doing 
anything specific while I'm doing so. I mean, I can also breathe without 
thinking about it. But I've got nothing to tell you about my breathing.

>
> Tuukka said:
> Also, I think that if we are concerned of elevating Pirsig's personal
> authority, or his function as an icon or an archetype, we should
> approach him like I do - that is, in a way that disregards the social
> gaming and focuses on the philosophy. Being right is not even the
> point. I think it's nice when some other people than me are right, or
> when someone helps me in correcting my mistake.
>
> Matt said:
> I think, at their best, almost all MD participants do approach Pirsig as
> you do, which is to say someone whose claims they test in experience.
> At their best, no one treats Pirsig as a God, just as (roughly) the
> smartest philosopher they know.  But I would argue (and have at
> greater length in "Pirsig Institutionalized" in the moq.org Essay
> Forum) there is no distinction in kind between what you call "social
> gaming" and "philosophy."  Philosophy and "getting things right" is a
> social activity.  We should, of course, make a distinction between
> what Pirsig calls "ego-climbers" and people who selflessly climb
> Mount Philosophy for the sake betterness.  But even this is a lot
> harder to tell than one might think, and I certainly wouldn't use the
> criterion of people who "think about which group I belong to," as you
> put it, and those who don't.  As a means of firming my point, I would
> suggest that there is a performative contradiction in your claim that
> "being right is not even the point" that you immediately make plain
> in your next sentence: for correcting a mistake is based entirely on
> the premise that being right is the point.  (You meant, I assume,
> "being _always_ right" is not the point, which is true, but the way you
> actually stated things helps elicit the philosophical point I wish to
> make.)
>
> Tuukka said:
> I don't know about that, but I'm currently busy enough working on
> the core of what this philosophical venture is supposed to be. So I'd
> just harm myself by trying to participate in that game, and I don't
> even know how that should be done. "I'm an eclectic Pirsigian who
> is inclined to essentialism. Let's see how many there are of us, and
> then vote what is true." That would be silly.
>
> Matt said:
> It would be silly, but it is also not a good representation of the kind of
> conceptual-game scorekeeping I was lamely articulating.  Truth is not
> about taking a vote.  That's been effective argument against
> consensus-style theories of truth that not many have actually tried
> articulating.  (Many have assumed that pragmatist theories are
> versions of this, but I don't think they are.)  The best way to make the
> point is to say that when you say "I don't even know how that should
> be done," you're actually _practically_ wrong because you are
> implicitly already doing it, participating in the game.  Wilfrid Sellars
> called the game I'm talking about "the game of giving and asking for
> reasons."  It's otherwise known as "rationality."  Rationality is a social
> game.  Claims, assertions, positions, and reasons are all moves in a
> game, and everyone is keeping their own score.  The trick to
> understanding this "game" is to understand that, broadly speaking,
> it's best not to start by thinking that the name of the game is _to win_.
> That'd be like saying that the nature of playing make-believe with your
> friends is to win.  Doesn't make sense.  The nature of the game is to
> make sure that you and everyone else is _consistent_.  (There are
> derivative versions of this basic game that, however, do call for
> winners and losers.  Physics, for example.)

Tuukka:
Yeah, well, everything that's not Dynamic Quality is just a game. But 
you're saying rationality is a social game. If so, how can it be used to 
take a metatheoretic approach to social entities?

I mean, World War 2 was not a metatheoretical approach to war. It was a 
war. Both sides had armies, and both armies fought on the conceptually 
same level. So that was social. But when rationality dictates social 
affairs, rationality resides as a different level than the social 
gaming. And if a Nazi deserts on grounds that there is no rational 
reason to expect Germany to win Soviet Union, he's no longer fighting 
the same war as most of his countrymen.

Like I said, sure, I'm participating in the game. But I don't say "I 
know how I breathe" because that sounds silly. If I said so, people 
would be confused instead of thinking, that I'm just telling them I know 
what breathing feels like, and that I'm able to make myself breathe by 
means of conscious effort, even though I do so also without conscious 
effort. The question that would arise from such a claim would be: "Why 
is this person telling us that? Does he think we don't expect him to be 
a normal human?"

I mean, maybe Skutvik didn't know how to play the social game here at 
MD. But it's probably a pointless thing to discuss with him. Because if 
you said to Skutvik: "I'd like to discuss your inability to play the 
social game on MD", I think he'd think you're a fool or something like 
that. He probably thinks others didn't play the game right. So why 
should we discuss the game? We both will think we are playing the game 
right, and we don't know that our conceptions of "right playing" differ 
before they actually do so. Or do you expect there to be a certain 
difference, based on what you already know about me?

Rationality is a game, and all games are about victory. But rationality 
is a fun game, because if I win, you win too. So it is about winning. 
Because if you attain a greater consistent whole of information, you 
win, and everyone else wins too. And if someone else does so, everyone 
again wins.

-Tuukka