[MD] The hard question.

[118]

On 6/4/12, Ant McWatt <antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk> wrote:

>
>
> Ham Priday May 30th:
>
> This analysis was in answer to Mark's question: "Why cannot the whole
> expression
> of the universe be one of learning value?"  I was trying to convince him
> that value isn't something "learned" like history or math, but rather an
> emotional response to something beyond himself.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think it would be better to say that value isn't a emotional response but
> is primarily experienced emotionally - at least for human beings. For a
> quantum particle, this "value response" will entail something different.
>
Mark comments:
A more relevant approach is to not create an artificial distinction
between value/experience/emotion, for this creates boundaries where
none exist.  In addition, to presume that value is somewhere outside,
rather than such that rises within as experience seems to be confusing
the subjective with the objective, and dismissing DQ as inadequate.
The notion of a "value response" is not in keeping with MoQ, for value
is the response.  One simply cannot explain value as something that
lies without.  This is incongruous with Quality.
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> Value-sensibility is identified with a particular human being in the same
> way that consciousness is the locus of one's awareness.  Since sensibility
> is an 'essent', not an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no
> empirical location.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> That sounds like a important difference with the MOQ.  In the MOQ, I would
> suggest that this value sensibility of yours doesn't exist as biological
> patterns have a space-time location.

Mark comments:
It is difficult to argue a point in metaphysics using the assumptions
of another metaphysics.  That one concept exists in one and not in
another is simply based on the underlying assumptions.  One cannot
refute terminology in such cases.  As I see it, Ham argues that
sensibility gives rise to other, while Ant seems to argue that value
sensibility is a biological function.  The question should be, which
one is a better descriptor of one's awareness.  This can then be
proposed in standard philosophical fashion.  For indeed, the response
of value is what creates the biological pattern.  It comes first and
cannot be denigrated to the level of SQ.

>
>
>> If you're saying the mind (as it appears you are), how does
>> your system deal with the charge of relativism (between different
>> societies) or, for that matter, the various metaphysical problems
>> that Pirsig takes us through in Chapter   of LILA that such
>> a position entails?
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> First of all, unlike Pirsig, I don't subscribe to the view that "the world
> is composed of nothing but moral value," nor do I believe that the sense of
>
> Value is necessarily "moral" in nature.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Ham, it's worth keeping in mind that - to keep things metaphysically
> consistent - we have an expanded view (regarding traditional Western
> notions) of "moral nature" in the MOQ following  the lines (but expanding
> much further) of the Ancient Greek  notion of arete (see HDF Kitto's "The
> Greeks").  So, for instance, if a requested flute player doesn't play to
> their best ability at a wedding, then they would be regarded as acting
> immorally as far as the MOQ is concerned.

Mark comments:
Often it is somewhat trivial to propose the argument of semantic
distinction for the use of a term such as morality.  For such would
imply the need to learn a special language in order to understand MoQ.
 This is clearly not needed, because by this argument, morality could
be anything the metaphysics want it to be, for sake of convenience.
We all know what morality is and to obfuscate by means of words is
deceptive.  The other issue I see with Ant's comment is that morality
is dealt with in hindsight in the examples.  Morality is an
expression, not an impression; this is clearly delineated in Lila.
Therefore such morality should be dealt with in such terms.  It is not
what things are, but what the tendency is.  This removes some of the
SOM baggage, that the argument seems to be weighed down with.
>
and Ant...
> If value is not placed as primary in a metaphysical system, you're either
> going to end-up concluding that it doesn't exist or with a logical conumdrum
> - as we see in the following:

Mark comments:
Perhaps this could be a clever argument, but value is not based on
logic, for we all know what it is.  Such logical arguments are
somewhat irrelevent.  If somebody concludes logically that value does
not exist unless conceived of as primary, they are living in some
academic tower and have not been outside lately. This is the problem
with logical proofs, that some in MoQ seem to subsist on.  We
logically cannot reach our destination according to Zeno, and, it
stand logically that value cannot exist unless it is primary.  Sounds
a bit like a paradox, since we created the concept of Value.  We can
not then place it before we create it, as the creator derived from our
creation.  One can certainly speculate as to such a thing, but such
speculation resides outside of logic, and must be arrived at by other
than intellectual means.  That being said, the directions pointed
through the symbology of the intellectual can provide a view of what
must be walked through.  It is impossible to read about Quality, just
like it is impossible to understand a country by reading a guide book.
>
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> ...value is relative to the observer, to the space/time perspective of the
> individual subject.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Yet Ham, you asserted above that "value-sensibility... is an 'essent', not
> an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no empirical location."  We
> seem to have a move here from no empirical location to an empirical
> location.  That doesn't seem to be ontologically consistent to me and is at
> least confusing!

Mark comments:
Ant appears to confusing terminology here.  Ham is using the term
relative as "pertaining to", while Ant is using such term to provide
comparison, or relative position.  It is not hard to understand what
Ham is presenting.  Perhaps this clears up some of the confusion that
Ant is experiencing, and with this explanation he can respond more
formally than trying to find a logical defect.
>
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> That means what is valued -- whether it is morality, aesthetics, or truth --
> will differ from one culture or society to another.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think this statement confirms my charge of cultural relativism which makes
> Essentialism redundant in this modern world.
>
> From Northrop's cultural assessment (in "The Meeting of East and West" and
> "Logic of the Sciences & Humanities") of the modern world (which more or
> less still holds) you can see - for the sake of long term world security and
> survival - that for any future metaphysical system to be of any use it has
> to be able to incorporate all the different norms and value judgments of all
> the primary global cultures.  Otherwise, we're not going to understand where
> we all coming from dispassionately.  And, of course, thats just a start for
> world peace....

Mark comments:
This argument is using the premise of survival being the definitive
statement for Value, that is, the ends justify the premises.  This is
akin to the "fittest" argument.  The argument of "usefulness only if
as mixture" suggests that there should be a tendency towards the mean.
 This flies straight in the face of "betterness" and is against
Pirsig's contention of freedom having higher value than socialism.
Indeed, if Pirsig wanted "to just get along", he would not have been
dismisive of science or subject object metaphysics.   I am not exactly
sure why world peace is brought into the argument except maybe as a
sound bite.  He must mention global warming later on...:-)  Cultural
relativism is completely in line with what Pirsig writes as is shown
by his cultural examples.  This can be found in Lila, for those
interested.
>
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> I don't claim valuism to be an "empirical" view as Pirsig claims for his
> brand of "qualityism", and I never
> understood how subject/object experience qualifies as a "metaphysics".
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Well, historically, someone somewhere decided that dividing experience into
> subjects and objects was a good way of looking at the world.  I don't think
> SOM is some kind of kantian hard wiring of the brain that we have when we
> are born as Buddhist philosophy would have got off the ground if it was.
> Pirsig is questioning whether that division is actually fundamental and,
> further, if not, then what is the best way of dividing reality (presuming
> that's how you are using the term "experience" here).

Mark comments:
The notion of a conspiracy for subject object differentiation seems a
bit far fetched and silly.  The reason that S/O survives is that it is
better than any other metaphysics at this point, and has withstood the
test of time.  Buddhist throught operates by SO intellectual
awareness.  Therefore, I do not quite understand this argument.  It is
entirely through SOM objectivism that the intellect seeks
enlightenment.  One must understand the principles in order to surpass
them.

Fundamental is best shown by what continues to be useful.  Drinking
water to stay alive is fundamental.  We must go out and find the water
and put it in our mouths and swallow.  This is the traditional subject
object approach to existence.  One cannot dismiss such a thing as
wrong.

There is also another conundrum here: we are treating reality as an
object in order to be able to divide it.  One good way to get away
from SOM is to not think that way, for there is nothing to devide, and
there are no pieces.  Using SOM to destroy SOM will not work.  It is
like the war to end all wars.  Pirsig clearly explains what is meant
by an "alternative to SOM.  This too can be found in Lila.  Often one
can find things that one did not see in their first reading.
>
>
> [Mark]:
>> DQ is not an absolute source in the Essence-like way.  It is not a
>> sum total of all being.  It is more like a pallet of colors that are
>> mixing in combinations to create colors.  It is like the sum total of
>> all your knowledge and experience mixing to form coherent thoughts;
>> it is what thoughts are made of.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
>> I'm glad someone cleared all that up then... DQ isn't like a pallet of
>> anything.  It isn't helpful to conflate it with intellectual static
>> patterns
>> either!

Mark comments:
No, and DQ has got nothing to do with trains. Did you send Pirsig that
memo?  I guess it was a mistake on his part.  Glad you cleared that up
for him.  One problem with an SOM approach is to consider words as
literal and binding.  Fortunately rhetoric does not work that way.
For each paragraph in Lila is to establish a crack of disbelief.  It
is not to create a binding credo.

>
> Ham asked May 30th:
>
> Let me ask you this, Ant, now that I have your attention: If the terms DQ
> and SQ didn't exist, how would you define the Value that Pirsig equates with
> Quality?  For if the universe is "composed of value" as Pirsig says, it
> would have to be parceled out on some fashion for humans to realize.
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Firstly, the trick is having an undefined element such as DQ within a
> metaphysics.  We've been discussing "expanded rationality" here and, in one
> sense, Pirsig's work with the MOQ is just that.  It pushes rationality as
> far as it can go.

Mark comments: (In kind partly to Ant's dismissive attitude in his
previous comment to Mark)
It does not appear that Ant understands the question here.  In
response to the inquiry of how the term Value equates with Quality,
Ant begins by claiming that he is at the limits of his rational
understanding.  Rationality is not something that can be pushed, it is
something that grows towards the heavens.  There are many who can
present rationality beyond what seems to be a limit for some.
>
> Moreover, as G.E. Moore indicates, there are at least three different
> understandings (or definitions) of the term "definition".
>
> 'When we say, as Webster says, The definition of horse is A hoofed quadruped
> of the genus Equus, we may, in fact, mean three different things:
>
> (1) We may mean merely When I say horse, you are to understand that I am
> talking about a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus. This might be called
> the arbitrary
> verbal definition: and I do not mean that good is indefinable in that sense.
>
>
>
> (2) We may mean, as Webster ought to mean: When most English people say
> horse, they mean a hoofed quadruped of the genus Equus. This may be
> called the verbal definition proper, and I do not say that good is
> indefinable
> in this sense either; for it is certainly possible to discover how people
> use a
> word: otherwise, we could never have known that good may be translated by
> gut in German and by bon in French.
>
>
> But (3) we may, when we define horse, mean something much more important.
> We may mean that a certain object, which we all of us know, is composed in a
> certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc., etc., all of
> them arranged in definite relations to one another. It is in this sense that
> I deny good to be definable. I say that it is not composed of any parts, which we
> can substitute for it in our minds when we are thinking of it. We might think
> just as clearly and correctly about a horse, if we thought of all its parts and
> their arrangement instead of thinking of the whole: we could, I say, think
> how a horse differed from a donkey just as well, just as truly, in this way, as
> now we do, only not so easily; but there is nothing whatsoever which we could
> substitute for good; and that is what I mean, when I say that good is indefinable.'
>
> (G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, 1903, Chapter 1)
>
>
> Possibly, the term "Dynamic Quality" can be considered (2) a "verbal
> definition proper" (because it is possible to discover how
> people use the term) while the MOQ (as explained by Pirsig's two books) is a
> type of (3) a definition of the Good as defined by Moore's third definition
> of definition!

Mark comments (still somewhat annoyed with Ant's deception):
Then to further obfuscate and avoid the question, Ant dwells on what
definitions are, by using meta-definitions.  It is quite clear, that
definitions are used in language so that we can communicate with
words.  If one says "good" we know what that means, therefore it is
defined.  In the same way, we all know what quality is, and thus it is
defined.  If one asks "Are you teaching Quality"? we know what that
person means.  There is nothing evil or encapsulating about a
definition until one gets into the halls of academic philosophy, or
one is in the practice of law.  In such cases definitions are used to
confuse and win an argument.  This is a peculiar problem amongst the
intellectual who have come to believe that words are more than they
are.  Words are tools for communication, and not simply the binding
grammar of a contract.  This fear of words comes with the trade and as
such academic philosophers can speak amongst themselves about things
they deem to be important, completely forgetting the purpose for
words.

In the end, Ant does not answer the question, although he gives the
impression that he has, which has little value.

To make up for this, I will do my best to answer it and anyone is
welcome to disagree on a philosophical basis.  As always you are also
welcome to insult and attempt to intimidate me since that seems to be
a favored response by many.

Value, as Ham construes it, is a proprietary function of Man.  As
such, Man is the conduit through which Value is formed by the negation
of other.  Quality, as the metaphysics goes, is not a function of man,
but is the singular event of each timeless moment which sustains the
universe.  "There hows 'bout thet definition?  If yoo'se dohn lak it
thin step thinkin 'bout Quality, for that be a sin too, y'all".
>
> I think if were seeking to improve on the MOQ, you'd take a close look at
> Northrop's books with the caveat that much of his own metaphysical writing
> is cumbersome and, in my opinion, unnecessarily detailed in places.

Mark comments (now totally frustrated with what he is reading):
I don't get this, who is seeking to improve MoQ in this statement, and
what is "Northrop's books".  This is left hanging.  I could say that
all is mentioned in the Tora too.  The first four parts are the names
of God.  What else do you need?  You may not find that equally as
helpful.
>
> You could also have "unconceptualised Quality" and "conceptualised
> Quality".  As we know, Pirsig further divides "conceptualised Quality" into
> four levels of cosmological evolution.  I really can't think of a better,
> universal and impartial way of doing this - for all sentient beings; for all
> time.

Mark comments:
We are all seeking to improve MoQ and release it from bureaucratic
chains that have been fashioned around it.

It is a shame that some cannot think of a better way for doing this
than set theory.  There are plenty of other ways that have been used
for this particular problem thoughout history, all it takes is some
outside reading.  However, given that limitation, perhaps somebody
else can think of one or two.  Thank you for your admission of being
stumped by this one, it is genial of you.  There is plenty of time to
move forward and explore.
>
> And, of course, certain people have tinkered with the ends of the MOQ
> evolutionary spectrum.  For instance, Doug Renselle suggested that you could
> have another level under the inorganic. I guess if you wanted to divide the
> inorganic, you could do that by dividing it beween macro elements that can
> be described by Newtonian mechanics and micro elements that are better
> described by quantum mechanics.  Again, that further distinction might be
> useful for a physics conference while for a social science
> conference rather redundant.

Mark comments (in a humble attempt to bring Ham back from the brink of
that above):
The MoQ presentation of levels is an analogy, they not real, but
simply the formulation of constellations.  One can always create
extensions to analogies, but that is what they are.  The "scientific
method" is far from the only method.   If a better way comes along for
each individual to agree on and express his/her relationship with
Quality then we move on; but let's stop dealing with MoQ and its
offspring as if they are something more than our expression.  We have
an awareness and we use words to express it.  All of this comes from
us and does not lie outside of us.  To conceive that something truly
exists outside is committing the First Cardinal Sin of MoQ, which is
to profess that concepts are more than they are.  Everybody knows
this.  Don't fall into that trap, it is degenerate.

>
> And, of course, at the other end of the MOQ evolutionary spectrum, we have
> the "code of Art"...

Mark comments (now very confused):
I don't get this, on one end is the description of mechanistic levels,
and on the other end is the code of Art?  Are you saying that the code
of art evolves into levels? Do you mean like species differentiation?
A spectrum is the range of colors that make up white.  Does this mean
that the entire spectrum of evolution makes something fundamental?
Perhaps it would be easier (in line with Northrop -who ever that is)
for Ant to give us an example of an evolutionary spectrum, or even a
definition so that we can all understand what that means as he is
using it, and continue this line of reasoning he has presented.

> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> Yes, that's true as an overall objective.  However, in order to grasp an
> author's ontology sufficiently to make a comparison, the fundamental terms
> must be understood as the author intends them.  Mixing the metaphor and
> terminology of two theorists (as Mark was doing) only compounds the
> confusion.  There's enough of that already in this forum.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> OK, I see your concern here.  That returns us to Northrop's warning about
> clearly defining your metaphysical terms and not to presume that the same
> word is describing the same phenomena in two different systems.
> Having said that, on this forum, it should be the responsibility of the
> person introducing non-MOQ terms and philosophies to "translate" them properly.
> And, if "translation" is not possible, explain why!

Mark comments (condescendingly):
Well, that is not what Ham meant, but I am getting too tired to explain it.


However, I completely agree that it is sometimes frustrating for me
the way some are misconstruing terminology and concepts in this forum.
  The use of "relative" as was misconstrued in a response above is one
such example.  All the necessary terms are set out in ZAMM and Lila,
as examples for usage.  Each term depends on the context that it is
used within.  A single word or even sentence can mean different things
depending on the intent of the author.

I have a few humble suggestions:

One should write in complete paragraphs if one is putting forward a
philosophical argument, and minimize quotes by using one's own words.
A statement is not given more credence if Jesus Christ, or whomever
you want, said it.  A more complete presentation of idea is necessary
since we can not hear the intonations or see the facial expressions of
the author as the words come out.  Correspondence by letter is nothing
like a conversation over a beer.  A certain degree in sophistication
in gramatical structure and paragraph formation would also help.
Perhaps we will see an improvement if people stop and think before
they simply react.  If we want to tweeeet, we should open a forum on
Twitter.  This may be easier for some.  Finally, the compete post
should be read and understood before beginning to respond.

And more...  Arguments should be presented which directly address the
thread they are seeking to expand on.  Insults and intimidation should
be avoided, for this detracts from the conversation.  Any discussion
should attempt to be constructive, and if something is not agreed on,
an alternative should be presented.

On the other hand, if one is here for the social contact provided by
the forum, then anything goes.  It is not hard to tell which is which.
>
>
Hope this helps,
With best intentions,
Mark
>
>
>
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