[MD] The hard question.

[Ant McWatt]

Mark Smit stated June 5th 2012:

> Ham Priday May 30th:
>
> This analysis was in answer to Mark's question: "Why cannot the whole
> expression
> of the universe be one of learning value?"  I was trying to convince him
> that value isn't something "learned" like history or math, but rather an
> emotional response to something beyond himself.
>
> Ant McWatt commented June 4th:
>
> I think it would be better to say that value isn't a emotional response but
> is primarily experienced emotionally - at least for human beings. For a
> quantum particle, this "value response" will entail something different.
>

Mark commented:
A more relevant approach is to not create an artificial distinction
between value/experience/emotion, for this creates boundaries where
none exist.  

Ant McWatt comments:

You're getting there, Mark though Pirsig wouldn't conflate "emotion" with "Value/experience".

Moreover, the phrase of Ham's 'An emotional response to something beyond himself'
in regard to Value puts him in an SOM prison.  In my re-phrasing of his terms, I 
was just trying to show him a key to get out.  Maybe, one day, the penny will drop...


Mark continued:

In addition, to presume that value is somewhere outside,
rather than such that rises within as experience seems to be confusing
the subjective with the objective, and dismissing DQ as inadequate.
The notion of a "value response" is not in keeping with MoQ, for value
is the response.  One simply cannot explain value as something that
lies without.  

Ant McWatt comments:

It would be clearer to say here: "in the MOQ, Value comes before subjects & objects and
notions of inside & outside."

Mark continued:

This is incongruous with Quality.

Ant McWatt comments:

It would be better to say here: "This is incongruous with the MOQ"

>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> Value-sensibility is identified with a particular human being in the same
> way that consciousness is the locus of one's awareness.  Since sensibility
> is an 'essent', not an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no
> empirical location.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> That sounds like a important difference with the MOQ.  In the MOQ, I would
> suggest that this value sensibility of yours doesn't exist as biological
> patterns have a space-time location.
 
Mark commented:
It is difficult to argue a point in metaphysics using the assumptions
of another metaphysics.  That one concept exists in one and not in
another is simply based on the underlying assumptions.  

Ant McWatt comments:

Again, you're kind of getting there, Mark.  As I implied to Ham in my last post,
it's fine to argue a point between two metaphysical systems as long as you 
remember to translate the terms of one system into the other properly.  In other words, 
you don't assume the same terms (in the two different systems) entertain the same meaning.

Mark continued:

One cannot refute terminology in such cases.  As I see it, Ham argues that
sensibility gives rise to other, while Ant seems to argue that value
sensibility is a biological function.  

Ant McWatt comments:

I think it would be better to say here that "value sensibility is LARGELY a biological function".  
I'm thinking here of the hot stove example in LILA.


Mark continued:

The question should be, which one is a better descriptor of one's awareness.  This can then be
proposed in standard philosophical fashion.  

Ant McWatt comments:

"This can then be proposed in standard philosophical fashion"...  I don't know what this bit of rhetoric  
adds to the clarity of your argument, Mark.  Sounds good though.  

Mark continued:

For indeed, the response of value is what creates the biological pattern.  

Ant McWatt comments:

Mark, you're conflating Value with "value response" here.  That confuses matters rather than 
clarifies anything.


Mark continued:

It comes first and cannot be denigrated to the level of SQ.


Ant McWatt comments:

I think what Mark is trying to say here is that in the MOQ, Quality logically comes first,
static patterns such as "value sensibility" (which, let's presume, is largely a biological response to 
the Qualty Event) come second.  The definitions of terms such as "value sensibility" come third
and are then used to describe the world in which we live.  The better these descriptions are then
the better Quality of life we will consequently have.
 
>
>
>> If you're saying the mind (as it appears you are), how does
>> your system deal with the charge of relativism (between different
>> societies) or, for that matter, the various metaphysical problems
>> that Pirsig takes us through in Chapter 8 of LILA that such
>> a position entails?
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> First of all, unlike Pirsig, I don't subscribe to the view that "the world
> is composed of nothing but moral value," nor do I believe that the sense of
>
> Value is necessarily "moral" in nature.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> Ham, it's worth keeping in mind that - to keep things metaphysically
> consistent - we have an expanded view (regarding traditional Western
> notions) of "moral nature" in the MOQ following  the lines (but expanding
> much further) of the Ancient Greek  notion of arete (see HDF Kitto's "The
> Greeks").  So, for instance, if a requested flute player doesn't play to
> their best ability at a wedding, then they would be regarded as acting
> immorally as far as the MOQ is concerned.
 
Mark commented:
Often it is somewhat trivial to propose the argument of semantic
distinction for the use of a term such as morality.  For such would
imply the need to learn a special language in order to understand MoQ.
 This is clearly not needed, because by this argument, morality could
be anything the metaphysics want it to be, for sake of convenience.
We all know what morality is and to obfuscate by means of words is
deceptive.  

Ant McWatt comments:

That's an intriguing way of looking at things, Mark.  Anyway, to be clear, I was just 
alerting to Ham the fact that the MOQ uses the term "morality" in a wider context than he would find
in a traditional school text concerned with  Western metaphysics.  For instance, everything in the 
MOQ is considered a form of morality rather than conventional notions of virtue which are usually 
limited to human behaviour on the social and intellectual levels e.g. telling the truth;
or volunteering at your local Obama 2012 office.  In fact, let's conflate the two!
You'll be pleased to hear that Obama's team have a Truth Team whose webpage can be visited here:

http://www.barackobama.com/truth-team/?source=tt-home-btn



Mark continued:

The other issue I see with Ant's comment is that morality
is dealt with in hindsight in the examples.  


Ant McWatt comments:

Every intellectual statement is based on hindsight.


Mark continued:

Morality is an expression, not an impression; this is clearly delineated in Lila.


Ant McWatt comments:

Mark, you'd love my Bill Hicks impression.  My English accent gets in the way a bit 
but I do get the... Essence of the man...  


Mark continued:

Therefore such morality should be dealt with in such terms.  It is not
what things are, but what the tendency is.  This removes some of the
SOM baggage, that the argument seems to be weighed down with.

Ant McWatt comments:

I think what Mark meant to say here is the MOQ asserts that everything (from an amoeba to
a Van Gogh painting) is an individual moral order of some sort and that these moral orders can be sorted 
in a hierarchy using the cosmological theory of evolution i.e. the history of the universe 
from the Big Bang (if that indeed happened) to now.

What Mark should have asked me previously is what is the implications (if any) for the MOQ 
if the "Steady State Theory of the Universe" becomes in fashion again...


>
> Ant McWatt commented:
> If value is not placed as primary in a metaphysical system, you're either
> going to end-up concluding that it doesn't exist or with a logical conumdrum
> - as we see in the following:
 
Mark commented:
Perhaps this could be a clever argument, but value is not based on
logic, for we all know what it is.  

Ant McWatt comments:

But the MOQ is built on logic and, of course, that is the context I was talking within!

Mark continued:

Such logical arguments are somewhat irrelevent.  

Ant McWatt comments:

So working out - logically -the best norms and value judgments is irrelevant?  Interesting.

Looks like you're on the wrong Discussion Board Mark.  You really need to be on "Nihilist Discuss" 
but, sadly, it's never been set-up because... no-one cared enough to do so!

Mark continued:

If somebody concludes logically that value does
not exist unless conceived of as primary, they are living in some
academic tower and have not been outside lately. 

Ant McWatt comments:

I think what Mark was trying to say here is that Pirsig tried a number of ways to fit values in a 
coherent, logical framework.  He eventually concluded that the only - logical - solution was to 
place them first in a metaphysical system. This is the system we know and love today as "the 
Metaphysics of Quality" (or MOQ).


Mark continued:

This is the problem with logical proofs, that some in MoQ seem to subsist on.  We
logically cannot reach our destination according to Zeno, and, it
stands logically that value cannot exist unless it is primary.  Sounds
a bit like a paradox, since we created the concept of Value.  We can
not then place it before we create it, 


Ant McWatt comments:

Mark, you're conflating Value with the concept of Value here... which is a bit naughty.


Mark continued:

...as the creator derived from our
creation.  One can certainly speculate as to such a thing, but such
speculation resides outside of logic, and must be arrived at by other
than intellectual means.  That being said, the directions pointed
through the symbology of the intellectual can provide a view of what
must be walked through.  It is impossible to read about Quality, just
like it is impossible to understand a country by reading a guide book.

Ant McWatt comments:

You know, I'll save that paragraph. It's a good piece of rhetoric which might be useful for class.


>
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> ...value is relative to the observer, to the space/time perspective of the
> individual subject.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> Yet Ham, you asserted above that "value-sensibility... is an 'essent', not
> an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no empirical location."  We
> seem to have a move here from no empirical location to an empirical
> location.  That doesn't seem to be ontologically consistent to me and is at
> least confusing!
 
Mark commented:
Ant appears to confusing terminology here.  Ham is using the term
relative as "pertaining to", 

Ant McWatt comments:

Mark, remember Ham's assertion here is also qualified by the phrase "to the space/time perspective of the individual subject".

Mark continued:

while Ant is using such term to provide
comparison, or relative position.  It is not hard to understand what
Ham is presenting.  Perhaps this clears up some of the confusion that
Ant is experiencing, 

Ant McWatt comments:

No, I'm afraid not. However, I  am looking forward for Ham's response on this particular point though.

Mark continued:

and with this explanation he can respond more
formally than trying to find a logical defect.

Ant McWatt comments:

No, we wouldn't want to be doing philosophy now...


>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> That means what is valued -- whether it is morality, aesthetics, or truth --
> will differ from one culture or society to another.
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> I think this statement confirms my charge of cultural relativism which makes
> Essentialism redundant in this modern world.
>
> From Northrop's cultural assessment (in "The Meeting of East and West" and
> "Logic of the Sciences & Humanities") of the modern world (which more or
> less still holds) you can see - for the sake of long term world security and
> survival - that for any future metaphysical system to be of any use it has
> to be able to incorporate all the different norms and value judgments of all
> the primary global cultures.  Otherwise, we're not going to understand where
> we all coming from dispassionately.  And, of course, thats just a start for
> world peace....
 
Mark commented:
This argument is using the premise of survival being the definitive
statement for Value, that is, the ends justify the premises.  This is
akin to the "fittest" argument.  The argument of "usefulness only if
as mixture" suggests that there should be a tendency towards the mean.
 This flies straight in the face of "betterness" and is against
Pirsig's contention of freedom having higher value than socialism.
Indeed, if Pirsig wanted "to just get along", he would not have been
dismisive of science or subject object metaphysics.   I am not exactly
sure why world peace is brought into the argument except maybe as a
sound bite.  He must mention global warming later on...:-)  Cultural
relativism is completely in line with what Pirsig writes as is shown
by his cultural examples.  This can be found in Lila, for those
interested.

Ant McWatt comments:

I think what Mark meant to say is that, in LILA, Pirsig uses the MOQ to take an impartial examination
of the advantages and disadvantages of Soviet style socialism and American capitalism.  For instance, 
Socialism is largely an intellectual pursuit (which is an improvement than a "might makes right" 
type of monarchy) but also disadvantageous compared to capitalism because the latter, in its use of free markets, 
is more open to Dynamic Quality. 

How anyone could (sincerely) think the MOQ (which grades everything in a moral hierarchy)
supports cultural relativism is beyond me.


Mark commented:

I am not exactly sure why world peace is brought into the argument except maybe as a
sound bite.

Ant McWatt comments:

Pirsig's philosophy was a development of the ideas espoused by F.S.C. Northrop in his 
seminal text "The Meeting of East and West" published in 1947 (by Macmillan).  (Remember that 
this was the book read by Pirsig on his return home from Korea in the late 1940s).  Much of 
Northrop's book had been written during the Second World War and, as he states in its 
introduction, the newly invented Atomic bomb made it possible for the first time, 
for human beings to completely destroy themselves.  This being the case, it was then imperative 
for world governments to catch-up with this new reality hence the need for better 
inter-cultural understanding through new organizations such as the United Nations.

The question of Values eventually found Pirsig again while he was teaching English and this
resultant work (the Metaphysics of Quality) can be - in turn - slotted back in Northrop's 
work hence making the latter clearer and more precise.

>
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>
> I don't claim valuism to be an "empirical" view as Pirsig claims for his
> brand of "qualityism", and I never
> understood how subject/object experience qualifies as a "metaphysics".
>
> Ant McWatt commented:
>
> Well, historically, someone somewhere decided that dividing experience into
> subjects and objects was a good way of looking at the world.  I don't think
> SOM is some kind of Kantian hard wiring of the brain that we have when we
> are born as Buddhist philosophy would NOT have got off the ground if it was.
> Pirsig is questioning whether that division is actually fundamental and,
> further, if not, then what is the best way of dividing reality (presuming
> that's how you are using the term "experience" here).
 
Mark commented:
The notion of a conspiracy for subject object differentiation seems a
bit far fetched and silly.  

Ant McWatt comments:

That's analogous to stating that its far fetched and silly to consider that 
there must have been a first person to think that using a computer to solve mathematical 
equations was a good idea. 

As regards conspiracy, do you know that some people think the 1969 "moon landing" was actually staged in Nevada?


Mark continued:

The reason that S/O survives is that it is
better than any other metaphysics at this point, and has withstood the
test of time.  Buddhist throught operates by SO intellectual
awareness. Therefore, I do not quite understand this argument.  It is
entirely through SOM objectivism that the intellect seeks
enlightenment.  One must understand the principles in order to surpass them.


Ant McWatt comments:

Mark, you should send this paragraph to Bodvar.  You'll have a friend for life.


Mark continued:

Fundamental is best shown by what continues to be useful.  Drinking
water to stay alive is fundamental.  We must go out and find the water
and put it in our mouths and swallow.  This is the traditional subject
object approach to existence.  One cannot dismiss such a thing as
wrong... [ad nauseum].


Ant McWatt comments:

OK, Mark that's enough nonsense (I know you call it rhetoric...) for one day.  I hope, at least, someone somewhere gets some benefit from my responses here to you and, of course, I look forward to hearing from Ham regarding these issues at some point.

Best wishes,

Ant


.