[MD] The hard question.

[Horse]

Excellent post Ant. Wry, witty and educational - more please. :)

Horse

On 05/06/2012 16:33, Ant McWatt wrote:
> Mark Smit stated June 5th 2012:
>
>> Ham Priday May 30th:
>>
>> This analysis was in answer to Mark's question: "Why cannot the whole
>> expression
>> of the universe be one of learning value?"  I was trying to convince him
>> that value isn't something "learned" like history or math, but rather an
>> emotional response to something beyond himself.
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented June 4th:
>>
>> I think it would be better to say that value isn't a emotional response but
>> is primarily experienced emotionally - at least for human beings. For a
>> quantum particle, this "value response" will entail something different.
>>
> Mark commented:
> A more relevant approach is to not create an artificial distinction
> between value/experience/emotion, for this creates boundaries where
> none exist.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> You're getting there, Mark though Pirsig wouldn't conflate "emotion" with "Value/experience".
>
> Moreover, the phrase of Ham's 'An emotional response to something beyond himself'
> in regard to Value puts him in an SOM prison.  In my re-phrasing of his terms, I
> was just trying to show him a key to get out.  Maybe, one day, the penny will drop...
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> In addition, to presume that value is somewhere outside,
> rather than such that rises within as experience seems to be confusing
> the subjective with the objective, and dismissing DQ as inadequate.
> The notion of a "value response" is not in keeping with MoQ, for value
> is the response.  One simply cannot explain value as something that
> lies without.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> It would be clearer to say here: "in the MOQ, Value comes before subjects&  objects and
> notions of inside&  outside."
>
> Mark continued:
>
> This is incongruous with Quality.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> It would be better to say here: "This is incongruous with the MOQ"
>
>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>>
>> Value-sensibility is identified with a particular human being in the same
>> way that consciousness is the locus of one's awareness.  Since sensibility
>> is an 'essent', not an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no
>> empirical location.
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>>
>> That sounds like a important difference with the MOQ.  In the MOQ, I would
>> suggest that this value sensibility of yours doesn't exist as biological
>> patterns have a space-time location.
>
> Mark commented:
> It is difficult to argue a point in metaphysics using the assumptions
> of another metaphysics.  That one concept exists in one and not in
> another is simply based on the underlying assumptions.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Again, you're kind of getting there, Mark.  As I implied to Ham in my last post,
> it's fine to argue a point between two metaphysical systems as long as you
> remember to translate the terms of one system into the other properly.  In other words,
> you don't assume the same terms (in the two different systems) entertain the same meaning.
>
> Mark continued:
>
> One cannot refute terminology in such cases.  As I see it, Ham argues that
> sensibility gives rise to other, while Ant seems to argue that value
> sensibility is a biological function.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think it would be better to say here that "value sensibility is LARGELY a biological function".
> I'm thinking here of the hot stove example in LILA.
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> The question should be, which one is a better descriptor of one's awareness.  This can then be
> proposed in standard philosophical fashion.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> "This can then be proposed in standard philosophical fashion"...  I don't know what this bit of rhetoric
> adds to the clarity of your argument, Mark.  Sounds good though.
>
> Mark continued:
>
> For indeed, the response of value is what creates the biological pattern.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Mark, you're conflating Value with "value response" here.  That confuses matters rather than
> clarifies anything.
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> It comes first and cannot be denigrated to the level of SQ.
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think what Mark is trying to say here is that in the MOQ, Quality logically comes first,
> static patterns such as "value sensibility" (which, let's presume, is largely a biological response to
> the Qualty Event) come second.  The definitions of terms such as "value sensibility" come third
> and are then used to describe the world in which we live.  The better these descriptions are then
> the better Quality of life we will consequently have.
>
>>
>>> If you're saying the mind (as it appears you are), how does
>>> your system deal with the charge of relativism (between different
>>> societies) or, for that matter, the various metaphysical problems
>>> that Pirsig takes us through in Chapter 8 of LILA that such
>>> a position entails?
>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>>
>> First of all, unlike Pirsig, I don't subscribe to the view that "the world
>> is composed of nothing but moral value," nor do I believe that the sense of
>>
>> Value is necessarily "moral" in nature.
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>>
>> Ham, it's worth keeping in mind that - to keep things metaphysically
>> consistent - we have an expanded view (regarding traditional Western
>> notions) of "moral nature" in the MOQ following  the lines (but expanding
>> much further) of the Ancient Greek  notion of arete (see HDF Kitto's "The
>> Greeks").  So, for instance, if a requested flute player doesn't play to
>> their best ability at a wedding, then they would be regarded as acting
>> immorally as far as the MOQ is concerned.
>
> Mark commented:
> Often it is somewhat trivial to propose the argument of semantic
> distinction for the use of a term such as morality.  For such would
> imply the need to learn a special language in order to understand MoQ.
>   This is clearly not needed, because by this argument, morality could
> be anything the metaphysics want it to be, for sake of convenience.
> We all know what morality is and to obfuscate by means of words is
> deceptive.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> That's an intriguing way of looking at things, Mark.  Anyway, to be clear, I was just
> alerting to Ham the fact that the MOQ uses the term "morality" in a wider context than he would find
> in a traditional school text concerned with  Western metaphysics.  For instance, everything in the
> MOQ is considered a form of morality rather than conventional notions of virtue which are usually
> limited to human behaviour on the social and intellectual levels e.g. telling the truth;
> or volunteering at your local Obama 2012 office.  In fact, let's conflate the two!
> You'll be pleased to hear that Obama's team have a Truth Team whose webpage can be visited here:
>
> http://www.barackobama.com/truth-team/?source=tt-home-btn
>
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> The other issue I see with Ant's comment is that morality
> is dealt with in hindsight in the examples.
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Every intellectual statement is based on hindsight.
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> Morality is an expression, not an impression; this is clearly delineated in Lila.
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Mark, you'd love my Bill Hicks impression.  My English accent gets in the way a bit
> but I do get the... Essence of the man...
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> Therefore such morality should be dealt with in such terms.  It is not
> what things are, but what the tendency is.  This removes some of the
> SOM baggage, that the argument seems to be weighed down with.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think what Mark meant to say here is the MOQ asserts that everything (from an amoeba to
> a Van Gogh painting) is an individual moral order of some sort and that these moral orders can be sorted
> in a hierarchy using the cosmological theory of evolution i.e. the history of the universe
> from the Big Bang (if that indeed happened) to now.
>
> What Mark should have asked me previously is what is the implications (if any) for the MOQ
> if the "Steady State Theory of the Universe" becomes in fashion again...
>
>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>> If value is not placed as primary in a metaphysical system, you're either
>> going to end-up concluding that it doesn't exist or with a logical conumdrum
>> - as we see in the following:
>
> Mark commented:
> Perhaps this could be a clever argument, but value is not based on
> logic, for we all know what it is.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> But the MOQ is built on logic and, of course, that is the context I was talking within!
>
> Mark continued:
>
> Such logical arguments are somewhat irrelevent.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> So working out - logically -the best norms and value judgments is irrelevant?  Interesting.
>
> Looks like you're on the wrong Discussion Board Mark.  You really need to be on "Nihilist Discuss"
> but, sadly, it's never been set-up because... no-one cared enough to do so!
>
> Mark continued:
>
> If somebody concludes logically that value does
> not exist unless conceived of as primary, they are living in some
> academic tower and have not been outside lately.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think what Mark was trying to say here is that Pirsig tried a number of ways to fit values in a
> coherent, logical framework.  He eventually concluded that the only - logical - solution was to
> place them first in a metaphysical system. This is the system we know and love today as "the
> Metaphysics of Quality" (or MOQ).
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> This is the problem with logical proofs, that some in MoQ seem to subsist on.  We
> logically cannot reach our destination according to Zeno, and, it
> stands logically that value cannot exist unless it is primary.  Sounds
> a bit like a paradox, since we created the concept of Value.  We can
> not then place it before we create it,
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Mark, you're conflating Value with the concept of Value here... which is a bit naughty.
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> ...as the creator derived from our
> creation.  One can certainly speculate as to such a thing, but such
> speculation resides outside of logic, and must be arrived at by other
> than intellectual means.  That being said, the directions pointed
> through the symbology of the intellectual can provide a view of what
> must be walked through.  It is impossible to read about Quality, just
> like it is impossible to understand a country by reading a guide book.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> You know, I'll save that paragraph. It's a good piece of rhetoric which might be useful for class.
>
>
>>
>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>>
>> ...value is relative to the observer, to the space/time perspective of the
>> individual subject.
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>>
>> Yet Ham, you asserted above that "value-sensibility... is an 'essent', not
>> an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no empirical location."  We
>> seem to have a move here from no empirical location to an empirical
>> location.  That doesn't seem to be ontologically consistent to me and is at
>> least confusing!
>
> Mark commented:
> Ant appears to confusing terminology here.  Ham is using the term
> relative as "pertaining to",
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Mark, remember Ham's assertion here is also qualified by the phrase "to the space/time perspective of the individual subject".
>
> Mark continued:
>
> while Ant is using such term to provide
> comparison, or relative position.  It is not hard to understand what
> Ham is presenting.  Perhaps this clears up some of the confusion that
> Ant is experiencing,
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> No, I'm afraid not. However, I  am looking forward for Ham's response on this particular point though.
>
> Mark continued:
>
> and with this explanation he can respond more
> formally than trying to find a logical defect.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> No, we wouldn't want to be doing philosophy now...
>
>
>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>>
>> That means what is valued -- whether it is morality, aesthetics, or truth --
>> will differ from one culture or society to another.
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>>
>> I think this statement confirms my charge of cultural relativism which makes
>> Essentialism redundant in this modern world.
>>
>>  From Northrop's cultural assessment (in "The Meeting of East and West" and
>> "Logic of the Sciences&  Humanities") of the modern world (which more or
>> less still holds) you can see - for the sake of long term world security and
>> survival - that for any future metaphysical system to be of any use it has
>> to be able to incorporate all the different norms and value judgments of all
>> the primary global cultures.  Otherwise, we're not going to understand where
>> we all coming from dispassionately.  And, of course, thats just a start for
>> world peace....
>
> Mark commented:
> This argument is using the premise of survival being the definitive
> statement for Value, that is, the ends justify the premises.  This is
> akin to the "fittest" argument.  The argument of "usefulness only if
> as mixture" suggests that there should be a tendency towards the mean.
>   This flies straight in the face of "betterness" and is against
> Pirsig's contention of freedom having higher value than socialism.
> Indeed, if Pirsig wanted "to just get along", he would not have been
> dismisive of science or subject object metaphysics.   I am not exactly
> sure why world peace is brought into the argument except maybe as a
> sound bite.  He must mention global warming later on...:-)  Cultural
> relativism is completely in line with what Pirsig writes as is shown
> by his cultural examples.  This can be found in Lila, for those
> interested.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> I think what Mark meant to say is that, in LILA, Pirsig uses the MOQ to take an impartial examination
> of the advantages and disadvantages of Soviet style socialism and American capitalism.  For instance,
> Socialism is largely an intellectual pursuit (which is an improvement than a "might makes right"
> type of monarchy) but also disadvantageous compared to capitalism because the latter, in its use of free markets,
> is more open to Dynamic Quality.
>
> How anyone could (sincerely) think the MOQ (which grades everything in a moral hierarchy)
> supports cultural relativism is beyond me.
>
>
> Mark commented:
>
> I am not exactly sure why world peace is brought into the argument except maybe as a
> sound bite.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Pirsig's philosophy was a development of the ideas espoused by F.S.C. Northrop in his
> seminal text "The Meeting of East and West" published in 1947 (by Macmillan).  (Remember that
> this was the book read by Pirsig on his return home from Korea in the late 1940s).  Much of
> Northrop's book had been written during the Second World War and, as he states in its
> introduction, the newly invented Atomic bomb made it possible for the first time,
> for human beings to completely destroy themselves.  This being the case, it was then imperative
> for world governments to catch-up with this new reality hence the need for better
> inter-cultural understanding through new organizations such as the United Nations.
>
> The question of Values eventually found Pirsig again while he was teaching English and this
> resultant work (the Metaphysics of Quality) can be - in turn - slotted back in Northrop's
> work hence making the latter clearer and more precise.
>
>>
>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>>
>> I don't claim valuism to be an "empirical" view as Pirsig claims for his
>> brand of "qualityism", and I never
>> understood how subject/object experience qualifies as a "metaphysics".
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>>
>> Well, historically, someone somewhere decided that dividing experience into
>> subjects and objects was a good way of looking at the world.  I don't think
>> SOM is some kind of Kantian hard wiring of the brain that we have when we
>> are born as Buddhist philosophy would NOT have got off the ground if it was.
>> Pirsig is questioning whether that division is actually fundamental and,
>> further, if not, then what is the best way of dividing reality (presuming
>> that's how you are using the term "experience" here).
>
> Mark commented:
> The notion of a conspiracy for subject object differentiation seems a
> bit far fetched and silly.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> That's analogous to stating that its far fetched and silly to consider that
> there must have been a first person to think that using a computer to solve mathematical
> equations was a good idea.
>
> As regards conspiracy, do you know that some people think the 1969 "moon landing" was actually staged in Nevada?
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> The reason that S/O survives is that it is
> better than any other metaphysics at this point, and has withstood the
> test of time.  Buddhist throught operates by SO intellectual
> awareness. Therefore, I do not quite understand this argument.  It is
> entirely through SOM objectivism that the intellect seeks
> enlightenment.  One must understand the principles in order to surpass them.
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> Mark, you should send this paragraph to Bodvar.  You'll have a friend for life.
>
>
> Mark continued:
>
> Fundamental is best shown by what continues to be useful.  Drinking
> water to stay alive is fundamental.  We must go out and find the water
> and put it in our mouths and swallow.  This is the traditional subject
> object approach to existence.  One cannot dismiss such a thing as
> wrong... [ad nauseum].
>
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> OK, Mark that's enough nonsense (I know you call it rhetoric...) for one day.  I hope, at least, someone somewhere gets some benefit from my responses here to you and, of course, I look forward to hearing from Ham regarding these issues at some point.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Ant
>
>
> .
>
>
>
>
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