[MD] The hard question.

[Ham Priday]

Greetings Ant, Mark, Horse, et al --

I just returned from a short vacation on Chincoteague Island, VA, to find a 
lively discussion of my ontology going on here with Mark as moderator.  It 
would appear that the best way to get attention on the MD is to be absent 
for a few days!

Now that I'm back, I'd like to respond to some of Ant's comments (which will 
relieve Mark of having to act as my surrogate).

On 6/4/12, Ant McWatt <antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
> I think it would be better to say that value isn't a emotional response
> but is primarily experienced emotionally - at least for human beings.
> For a quantum particle, this "value response" will entail something
> different.
>
> Mark comments:
> A more relevant approach is to not create an artificial distinction
> between value/experience/emotion, for this creates boundaries
> where none exist.  In addition, to presume that value is somewhere
> outside, rather than such that rises within as experience seems
> to be confusing the subjective with the objective, and dismissing
> DQ as inadequate.  The notion of a "value response" is not in
> keeping with MoQ, for value is the response.  One simply cannot
> explain value as something that lies without.  This is incongruous
> with Quality.

Also, gentlemen, I don't consider the movements of astral bodies or quantum 
particles to be "value responses".  Physical objects behave according to the 
laws of physics.  Although such laws may have teleological value for humans, 
objects lack the sensory capacity to respond to value, so to call their 
behavior "value-driven" or a "response to value" corrupts the meaning of 
value and demeans the term in my opinion.
>
> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
> Value-sensibility is identified with a particular human being in the
> same way that consciousness is the locus of one's awareness.
> Since sensibility is an 'essent', not an 'existent' like the physical
> body, it has no empirical location.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
> That sounds like a important difference with the MOQ.
> In the MOQ, I would suggest that this value sensibility of yours
> doesn't exist as biological patterns have a space-time location.
>
>> Ant McWatt, earlier:
>> Yet Ham, you asserted above that "value-sensibility... is an
>> 'essent', not an 'existent' like the physical body, it has no empirical
>> location."  We seem to have a move here from no empirical
>> location to an empirical location.  That doesn't seem to be
>> ontologically consistent to me and is at least confusing!
>
> Mark comments:
> Ant appears to confusing terminology here.  Ham is using the term
> relative as "pertaining to", while Ant is using such term to provide
> comparison, or relative position.  It is not hard to understand what
> Ham is presenting.  Perhaps this clears up some of the confusion that
> Ant is experiencing, and with this explanation he can respond more
> formally than trying to find a logical defect.

This hang-up on space/time location is an unnecessary obstacle to reaching 
some consensus here.  Does consciousness or value have spacial coordinates 
in your view?  Beauty and magnificence have value to us, are identified with 
us, yet are not limited to the objects that represent them in experience.  I 
don't understand why your epistemology depends on physical or biological 
location.

Mark's interpretation makes more sense to me:
> As I see it, Ham argues that sensibility gives rise to other,
> while Ant seems to argue that value sensibility is a biological
> function.  The question should be, which one is a better
> descriptor of one's awareness.  This can then be proposed
> in standard philosophical fashion.  For indeed, the response
> of value is what creates the biological pattern.  It comes first
> and cannot be denigrated to the level of SQ.

Incidentally, the notion of "levels" itself suggests relational difference 
or contrariety which is not intrinsic to Essence, nor would I expect it to 
apply to DQ.  This is why I find the idea of DQ moving to betterness 
problematic, for it suggests that the source of existence is a variable 
rather than absolute.

>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>> ...Value is relative to the observer, to the space/time
>> perspective of the individual subject.
>> That means what is valued -- whether it is morality, aesthetics,
>> or truth -- will differ from one culture or society to another.
>>
>> Ant McWatt comments:
>> I think this statement confirms my charge of cultural relativism
>> which makes Essentialism redundant in this modern world.

The modern world, like the ancient world which preceded it, is a relational 
system, and human beings relate to each other in the same fashion.  That the 
source of this system - whether you call it God, Quality, or Essence - is 
posited as unconditional or non-relative does not make it a redundant or 
invalid concept.  On the contrary, the ontology of a pluralistic, relational 
universe is strengthened by an absolute source as its fundamental principle.

I appreciate your thoughtful comments, gentlemen, as well as the opportunity 
to put the philosophy of Essence into proper perspective as it relates to 
Value.  I also hope these comments will help to resolve some of our 
differences.

Essentially speaking,
Ham