[MD] [MD} Ham's Value Rigidity?

[Ham Priday]

Hi Ant --

On Tues, 6/12/12, 12:18 PM, "Ant McWatt" <antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk> wrote:

> Ham Priday stated June 8th:
>
> I just returned from a short vacation on Chincoteague Island, VA.
>
> Ant McWatt comments:
>
> From one isle of horses to another one in the virtual world!
> Anyway, Ham, I hope you made good use of Chincoteague's
> picturesque beaches.

You've got to be joking!  Chincoteague's "beaches" are natural wildlife 
reserves accessible only by toll booth.  Our motel was a 5-mile drive from 
the bay, where my son had hired a local fisherman to give us a pontoon-boat 
tour of the lower peninsula.  Unless you're fascinated by wild ponies or a 
glimpse of the bald eagle on the shoreline, you'll come away as I did with 
only a bad sunburn.

Ham from May 30:
> I was trying to convince [Mark] that value isn't something
> "learned" like history or math, but rather an emotional response
> to something beyond himself.

Ant McWatt commented June 4th:
> I think it would be better to say that value isn't a emotional response
> but is primarily experienced emotionally - at least for human beings.
> For a quantum particle, this "value response" will entail something
> different.

Ham on June 8:
> I don't consider the movements of astral bodies or quantum
> particles to be "value responses". Physical objects behave
> according to the laws of physics.  Although such laws may have
> teleological value for humans, objects lack the sensory capacity
> to respond to value, so to call their behavior "value-driven" or
> a "response to value" corrupts the meaning of  value and
> demeans the term in my opinion.

Ant McWatt comments:
> Don't forget that these laws of physics - in the context of
> fundamental particles - is based on probability which is one end
> of an MOQ "probability-preference continuum" (as illustrated in
> Pirsig's 1995 SODV paper - found at moq.org and referenced
> in your paper about Essentialism.  Moreover, since the 1920s,
> remember that we're no longer living in a Clockwork universe
> as illustrated by Karl Popper in his text "A World of  Propensities"
> (published in 1990):
>
---cut---
>
> This comment indicates you're still stuck in an SOM prison.
> In other words, Ham, you're trapped with your old fashioned
> notions of what values should be; just like that poor old monkey
> in chapter 26 of ZMM. ...:
>
> Ham, if you ever get past your own value rigidity about how
> the term value can be used and examine the relevant literature
> (as detailed in the bibliography of my Ph.D. - which you have),\
> you will realize that the choice is basically between having an
> "expanded" understanding of the term "value" (as we have in
> the MOQ) or living with a number of intractable philosophical
> platypli (as illustrated in chapter 8 of LILA). Though it appears
> you haven't taken on board that these metaphysical problems
> can't be resolved within SOM itself (remember all those great
> philosophers who tried - and failed - over the centuries to do so!),
> at least, you realize their long-term nature.

Ant, you'll note that my concept of Value is not restricted to SOM ontology 
but is founded on an Absolute Source which overcomes the perennial problems 
you cite.  Not all the great philosophers were SOMists, by the way.  One you 
may not have heard of, Nicholas of Cusa (15th C.), for example, postulated 
an "ineffable unity" to which neither otherness nor multiplicity is opposed. 
This theory makes it possible for philosophers to define in metaphysical 
terms what is paradoxical in a relational system.

And, since you brought it up, I'd like to explore what you characterize as 
my "value rigidity" vis-a-vis Pirsig's "expanded understanding" of value. 
As you know, Value is central to my philosophy as it is in the MoQ, but with 
one important distinction: Essential Value is the realization of an 
autonomous agent rather than an independent aesthetic or moral principle of 
the universe.
As a derivative of the Source that is immanent in man's sensibility, Value 
affords the individual not only the means to create his own experiential 
reality but a transcendent connection with the Absolute Source.  I submit 
that this conception - call it a theory or hypothesis, if you will - vastly 
extends the significance of Value beyond the moralistic precept of 
Qualityism.

Ant McWatt comments:
> Ham, possibly you should be more careful in how you are using
> your terminology (for instance, it looks like you're conflating
> consciousness with value here) or we will always be talking at
> cross purposes.  Anyway, in the MOQ, space-time is a high
> quality idea that is presumed to correlate to an independent
> physical reality. (Again, as we see in the SODV paper, the MOQ
> has no fundamental argument with physical realism though,
> critically, it adds this "high quality idea" qualification to it).

Consciousness is the individual's cognitive impression of what 
value-sensibility creates through experience, so it is difficult to separate 
these human faculties.  But it is you who are stressing the dimensional 
aspects of physical reality as opposed to the greater metaphysical potential 
of Value.  As such, I find your criticism of Essentialism as "redundant", 
"old-fashioned" and "rigid" oddly inappropriate.

Ham continued:
> Incidentally, the notion of "levels" itself suggests relational
> difference or contrariety which is not intrinsic to Essence,
> nor would I expect it to apply to DQ. This is why I find the
> idea of DQ "moving to betterness" problematic, for it suggests
> that the source of existence is a variable rather than absolute.

Ant McWatt comments:
> As far as I understand it, Pirsig is careful to assert that it is only
> static patterns of quality "moving to [an undefined] betterness".
> Dynamic Quality doesn't move anywhere.

Well, thanks for clearing that up.

>> Ham Priday continued May 30th:
>> ...Value is relative to the observer, to the space/time
>> perspective of the individual subject. That means what is
>> valued -- whether it is morality, aesthetics, or truth -- will
>> differ from one culture or society to another.
>>
>> Ant McWatt commented:
>> I think this statement confirms my charge of cultural relativism
>> which makes Essentialism redundant in this modern world.

Ham responded June 8th:
> The modern world, like the ancient world which preceded it,
> is a relational system, and human beings relate to each other
> in the same fashion. That the source of this system - whether
> you call it God, Quality, or Essence - is posited as unconditional
> or non-relative does not make it redundant or invalid. On the
> contrary, the ontology of a pluralistic, relational universe is
> strengthened by an absolute source as its fundamental principle.

Ant McWatt comments:
> You're missing the point here Ham. Cultural relativism is worse
> than useless in this modern world of ours. You seem (again
> quoting from your on-line paper) concerned that the United States
> is being "terrorized by a horde of suicidal fanatics bent on
> destroying Western Civilization in the name of a deity that shows
> no regard for the value of human life." That's rather sensationalist.
> For instance, did you see any of these nuts on your recent visit to
> Chincoteague Island? I dare say you didn't and that a rather more
> detached, impartial examination of other world cultures would
> strengthen the credibility of Essentialist metaphysics.

No, but I did see a lot of road signs warning that "Jesus is coming" and 
advising that "He is the only way to Heaven".  (Chincoteague is a 
predominantly Christian town.)  Unlike Mr. Pirsig, I have no particular 
interest in anthropology and world cultures, nor do I believe that this 
knowledge leads to greater metaphysical insight.

> As I pointed out to Mark Smith recently, Pirsig's philosophy
> was a development of the ideas espoused by F.S.C. Northrop
> in his seminal text "The Meeting of East and West". This was
> the book read by Pirsig on his return home from Korea in the
> late 1940s and is largely concerned in how the major world
> cultures can be reconciled with each other through a detailed
> examination of their cultural norms and history. Remember,
> much of Northrop's book had been written during the Second
> World War and, as he states in its introduction, the newly
> invented Atomic bomb made it possible for the first time, for
> human beings to completely destroy themselves. This being the
> case, it was then imperative for world governments to catch-up
> with this new reality hence the need for better inter-cultural
> understanding through new organizations such as the United Nations.
>
> In fact, I believe Northrop helped established the latter.

And do you think establishing the U.N. has improved inter-cultural 
understanding and led to a more peaceful and secure world?

Ant McWatt's final comment:
> My pleasure, Ham. I will finally add here that your metaphysical
> system would be much improved if you finally dropped these
> redundant notions of subjects and objects and replaced them
> with the MOQ's four static levels of value patterns. As you have
> been an occasional poster here for nearly ten years, I'm sure
> you will now have some idea of how such a modification could
> work despite your value rigidity. Now such a project might be
> of interest to fans of Pirsig's work and, as such, sell a few books!

I appreciate your advice, Ant, although I don't see how an ontology of 
arbitrary levels gives us a better perspective of reality than living in an 
SOM prison.  From what I can see, the fans don't put much stock in 
metaphysical reality.

Cheers,
Ham