[MD] Ham's Value Rigidity?
Ant McWatt
antmcwatt at hotmail.co.uk
Fri Jun 15 09:08:18 PDT 2012
Ant McWatt previously commented:
> Ham, if you ever get past your own value rigidity about how
> the term value can be used and examine the relevant literature
> (as detailed in the bibliography of my Ph.D. - which you have),\
> you will realize that the choice is basically between having an
> "expanded" understanding of the term "value" (as we have in
> the MOQ) or living with a number of intractable philosophical
> platypli (as illustrated in chapter of LILA). Though it appears
> you haven't taken on board that these metaphysical problems
> can't be resolved within SOM itself (remember all those great
> philosophers who tried - and failed - over the centuries to do so!),
> at least, you realize their long-term nature.
Ham responded June 13th 2012:
Ant, you'll note that my concept of Value is not restricted to SOM ontology
but is founded on an Absolute Source which overcomes the perennial problems
you cite. Not all the great philosophers were SOMists, by the way. One you
may not have heard of, Nicholas of Cusa (15th C.), for example, postulated
an "ineffable unity" to which neither otherness nor multiplicity is opposed.
This theory makes it possible for philosophers to define in metaphysical
terms what is paradoxical in a relational system.
Ant McWatt comments:
Ham,
I just like teasing the philosophologists when I make those sweeping statements about "great philosophers".
Anyway, I had another look at your Essentialist essay (http://www.essentialism.net/mechanic.htm)
as it wasn't totally clear to me what you trying to convey about Nicholas of Cusa in the above paragraph.
For the benefit of the other readers of this Discussion Board, this is what it says in your paper about him:
In an
obscure essay on mysticism, Andrey Smirnov of the Department of Oriental
Philosophy at Russia's Academy of Sciences, explains how the mystics of Europe
and Islam got around the inadequacy of definitions in describing a divinity or
primary cause. "The mystics
understood the indefinableness of God in a far wider sense than did other
medieval philosophers and thinkers.
Indefinableness, as the mystics put it, traverses the limits of the
indefinable in the sense of Aristotelian logic.
For anything to be indefinable per genus et differentiam does not
exclude at all the possibility of description, and description is, of course,
stating something definite about the thing described. But the indefinableness of God in a mystical
sense comes in fact to be indefiniteness; that is, it rules out any definite
proposition about the Divine essence.
Any such proposition means a sort of limitation imposed on the Divine,
while the latter is incompatible with any limit. The ontological unlimitedness of God entails
for a mystic an epistemological indefiniteness: any assertion about God would
then be only metaphorical and would not serve as an established basis of
knowledge." [8]
Faced with these descriptive
limitations, Nicholas of Cusa [a.k.a. Cusanus, 1401-1464] developed a theory
based on the "not-other" as a symbolic connotation for God. Cusanus argues that, although God is
indefinable, it can be stated that the world is not God but is not anything
other than God. In Nicholas’ own words:
"The first principle cannot be other either than an other or than nothing
and likewise is not opposed to anything."
God is "not other", he asserts, because God is not other than
any [particular] other, even though "not-other" and "other"
[once derived] are opposed. But no other
can be opposed to God from whom it is derived.
The significance of Cusa's theory is profound. It has afforded philosophers a most valuable
metaphysical tool—namely, a definition for the ineffable Source whose
attributive nature is indefinable.
Professor Clyde Miller of Stony Brook
University's Philosophy Department has formalized Cusa's theory as a logical
proposition: "For any given non-divine X, X is not other than X, and X is
other than not X. What is unique about
the divine not other is precisely that it is not other than either X or not X
('cannot be other than'—'is not opposed to anything'). The transcendent not-other thus undercuts
both the principles of non-contradiction and of the excluded
middle." [9] The simple analogy of an
ordinary drinking glass may help us understand the Cusan not-other. The inside of the glass is not its outside,
and the outside is not its inside; yet, at the same time the glass is not other
than either of its sides. Not-other is
the coincidence of all otherness, including nothingness and contrariety.
==========================
Ant McWatt comments:
Now, keeping the above in mind, read Paul Turner's description of the tetralemma of (Mahayana) Buddhist logic:
To
put this in the context of the MOQ, conventional truth applies
to static reality and its difference from and relationship to
Dynamic Quality. As such, the positive tetralemma would be
used to express the reality of subjects, objects, and so on and
their strictly static existence whilst acknowledging their lack
of individual essence entailed by their dependence on Dynamic
Quality. Ultimate truth thus applies to the
preintellectual ‘perspective’ of Dynamic Quality. The
negative tetralemma would be used to prevent any intellectual
treatment of Dynamic Quality as a putative metaphysical
‘entity’ of which properties and attributes may be
predicated.
An
example of a positive tetralemma, in MOQ terms, is:
The
self is real (i.e., it exists in static reality along with
everything else we derive from experience)
The
self is not real (from a Dynamic perspective)
The
self is both real and not real (it is real from a static
perspective but not from a Dynamic perspective)
The
self is neither real nor not real (neither ultimately real from
a Dynamic perspective nor completely non-existent from a static
perspective)
The
negative tetralemma is a hard-nosed formulation of the
inexpressibility of Dynamic Quality. An example would be
its treatment of the proposition that "Dynamic Quality
exists in time."
"Dynamic
Quality exists in time" should not be asserted.
"Dynamic
Quality does not exist in time" should not be asserted.
"Dynamic
Quality both does and does not exist in time" should not be
asserted
"Dynamic
Quality neither does nor does not exist in time" should not
be asserted
The
negative tetralemma is purely about what can't be said about
Dynamic Quality. And, basically, nothing can be said.
But even one who is aware of that may make mistakes.
(Extract from Paul Turner's summary of the Tetralemma found at
http://robertpirsig.org/Tetralemma.htm
- this is due to be expanded on -
by Paul- during the Summer).
=======================================================
Now, it strikes me here that Professor Miller (in his formalisation of Cusa's Theory) has just re-invented the negative
tetralemma, 1700 years after the fact. I'd be interested to hear what you (or anyone else for that matter) thinks about
this similarity.
Ham continued June 13th:
And, since you brought it up, I'd like to explore what you characterize as
my "value rigidity" vis-a-vis Pirsig's "expanded understanding" of value.
Ant McWatt comments:
Well, Ham you stated (on June 8th):
> I don't consider the movements of astral bodies or quantum
> particles to be "value responses". Physical objects behave
> according to the laws of physics. Although such laws may have
> teleological value for humans, objects lack the sensory capacity
> to respond to value, so to call their behavior "value-driven" or
> a "response to value" corrupts the meaning of value and
> demeans the term in my opinion.
As such, in your Essentialist universe (as it stands now) you have one realm (the physical)
which is "value-free" and at least one other (the human) which is not. The consequence of
which is that you're led back to all the old SOM metaphysical problems (such as the
mind-matter problem) that Pirsig elucidates in Chapter 8 of LILA.
Ham continued June 13th:
As you know, Value is central to my philosophy as it is in the MoQ, but with
one important distinction: Essential Value is the realization of an
autonomous agent rather than an independent aesthetic or moral principle of
the universe.
As a derivative of the Source that is immanent in man's sensibility, Value
affords the individual not only the means to create his own experiential
reality but a transcendent connection with the Absolute Source. I submit
that this conception - call it a theory or hypothesis, if you will - vastly
extends the significance of Value beyond the moralistic precept of Qualityism.
Ant McWatt comments:
OK, as far as I'm reading you (and remember I have a Ph.D. in The MOQ; not Essentialism)
it appears that you're missing one important logical step here i.e. you're not stating that
this "idea of an individual" is just simply that; even if it's a high quality idea that (usually) works.
Moreover, by talking about a "transcedent connection", this seems to me to separate DQ from the
everyday world and return us to a sort of "God sitting on his throne" conception of the Absolute.
I just don't think that's as metaphysically consistent as the MOQ though, of course, the term
"Dynamic Quality" is used in more than one sense in the latter (including "being inspired").
-------cut---------
Ant McWatt commented:
> You're missing the point here Ham. Cultural relativism is worse
> than useless in this modern world of ours. You seem (again
> quoting from your on-line paper) concerned that the United States
> is being "terrorized by a horde of suicidal fanatics bent on
> destroying Western Civilization in the name of a deity that shows
> no regard for the value of human life." That's rather sensationalist.
> For instance, did you see any of these nuts on your recent visit to
> Chincoteague Island? I dare say you didn't and that a rather more
> detached, impartial examination of other world cultures would
> strengthen the credibility of Essentialist metaphysics.
Ham replied:
No, but I did see a lot of road signs warning that "Jesus is coming" and
advising that "He is the only way to Heaven". (Chincoteague is a
predominantly Christian town.)
Ant McWatt comments:
Well then, I hope you're giving Obama your support?!
Remember, if the Puritans think the modern world is going to hell on a hand cart,
they might decide to move to the moon this time (as things stand, the latter is relatively
socially pure and, as a bonus, there's no Indians to get in the way there either).
Ham continued:
Unlike Mr. Pirsig, I have no particular interest in anthropology and world cultures,
Ant McWatt comments:
This interest in world cultures is Northrop's not Pirsig's.
Ham continued:
...nor do I believe that this knowledge leads to greater metaphysical insight.
Ant McWatt comments:
I don't know about that. certainly, Pirsig's ideas were inspired by those from East Asia.
If he hadn't been stationed in Korea in the late 1940s, he would have never known that the world can
be seen in such a different way. I think, at worst, the studies of other cultures can give you a short cut
in your metaphysical understanding (or to take the example of Professor Miller above, your knowledge of
other types of logic!).
Ant McWatt commented previously:
> As I pointed out to Mark Smith recently, Pirsig's philosophy
> was a development of the ideas espoused by F.S.C. Northrop
> in his seminal text "The Meeting of East and West". This was
> the book read by Pirsig on his return home from Korea in the
> late 40sss and is largely concerned in how the major world
> cultures can be reconciled with each other through a detailed
> examination of their cultural norms and history. Remember,
> much of Northrop's book had been written during the Second
> World War and, as he states in its introduction, the newly
> invented Atomic bomb made it possible for the first time, for
> human beings to completely destroy themselves. This being the
> case, it was then imperative for world governments to catch-up
> with this new reality hence the need for better inter-cultural
> understanding through new organizations such as the United Nations.
>
> In fact, I believe Northrop helped established the latter.
Ham asked:
And do you think establishing the U.N. has improved inter-cultural
understanding and led to a more peaceful and secure world?
Ant McWatt's final comment:
My inclination is to say yes, on the whole, but I'm no historian as far as the UN is concerned.
However, if it eventually follows the example of the European Union (which, despite all its faults, has
secured peace between all its members since World War Two) then it certainly will do.
Best wishes,
Ant
Dr Anthony McWatt
site administrator
www.robertpirsig.org
.
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