[MD] Contradiction and incoherence

[MarshaV]

On Mar 31, 2012, at 3:09 AM, 118 <ununoctiums at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Mar 30, 2012 at 11:44 PM, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Mar 30, 2012, at 5:56 PM, 118 <ununoctiums at gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> On 3/29/12, MarshaV <valkyr at att.net> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Mar 30, 2012, at 1:39 AM, 118 <ununoctiums at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>>>> Mark:
>>>>>>> This is why I asked if you had a different way for presenting Quality,
>>>>>>> which starts with the premise that DQ and sq cannot be distinguished.
>>>>>>> It is an honest question.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Marsha:
>>>>>> I think the mirage analogy works well.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Mark:
>>>>> Me too.
>>>> 
>>>> Marsha:
>>>> Great!
>>> 
>>> Mark:
>>> Perfect!  Although I can see why "cold is not other than hot" also
>>> lends itself to some enlightenment, so I understand your original
>>> point of view.  First, however, we must say that cold is different
>>> from hot for it to work.
>>> 
>> 
>> Marsha:
>> Bob, an experienced desert traveler, sees the mirage as a mirage and assures Bill, a neophyte, that there is no danger from the puddle on the road.  Isn't the idea to understand that these static patterns should not bind, or blind, us whether intellectual level patterns or biological patterns.  Then one merely needs to recognize patterns, and to determine, to the best of one's ability, what it values and whether it is useful or not in the present case.  I think it better to make such determinations when one is free from fear and dependence.
> 
> Mark:
> 
> Bob: "Bill what do you see?"
> Bill: "I see water"
> Bob: "That is just a mirage"
> Bill: "Yes, but it is a mirage of water"
> Bob: "You are right, it does suggest water, it makes me thirsty"
> 
> Mirages are always of something real, even though the mirages
> themselves are not the real thing.  That thing is simply misplaced.
> Therefore, if we claim that what we experience is a mirage, what is it
> then a mirage of?  The intellectual patterns must be a mirage of
> something.  What is that something?  If one is free from the mirage,
> then one is missing the whole thing.  Why would one ignore the whole
> thing?
> 
> Bill: "How can it make you thirsty if it is just a mirage"
> Bob: "It reminds me of water"
> Bill: "So you are remembering something real?"
> Bob: "Of course, what do you think a mirage is?"
> Bill: "Now I am getting thirsty too, show me the water."
> Bob: "Which one?"
> 
> If we forget what the mirage is of, then we cannot see a mirage.  But
> we do remember.  There is nothing to be free of except that which IS.
> If it IS, then we can be free of it.  It makes no difference how
> useful it is, for it is always pointing to something.  Nobody has ever
> seen a mirage of an emerald fire breathing elephant, that is a
> hallucination.
> 
> Perhaps Marsha, what you are saying is that static patterns are
> hallucinations. That is even beyond solipsism.  I think what you are
> saying, however, is to not be fooled by misdirection.  Let us go look
> for that thing that is doing the misdirecting.


Marsha:
The analogy is not about thirst, so first I suggest you learn how to read and listen. 
 
 "Among the many similes for conventional truth that litter Madhyamaka texts, the most fruitful is that of the mirage. Conventional truth is false, Candrakirti tells us, because it is deceptive.  Candrakirti spells this out in terms of a mirage. A mirage appears to be water, but is in fact empty of water—it is deceptive, and in that sense, a false appearance. On the other hand, a mirage is not nothing: it is a real mirage, just not real water. 

"The analogy must be spelled out with care to avoid the extreme of nihilism. A mirage appears to be water, but is only a mirage; the inexperienced highway traveler mistakes it for water, and for him it is deceptive, a false appearance of water; the experienced traveler sees it for what it is—a real mirage, empty of water. Just so, conventional phenomena appear to ordinary, deluded beings to be inherently existent, whereas in fact they are merely conventionally real, empty of that inherent existence; to the åryas, on the other hand, they appear to be merely conventionally true, hence to be empty. For us, they are deceptive, false appearances; for them, they are simply real conventional truths. 

"We can update the analogy to make the point more plainly. Imagine three travelers along a hot desert highway. Alice is an experienced desert traveler; Bill is a neophyte; Charlie is wearing polarizing sunglasses. Bill points to a mirage up ahead and warns against a puddle on the road; Alice sees the mirage as a mirage and assures him that there is no danger. Charlie sees nothing at all, and wonders what they are talking about. If the mirage were entirely false—if there were no truth about it at all, Charlie would be the most authoritative of the three (and Buddhas would know nothing of the real world). But that is wrong. Just as Bill is deceived in believing that there is water on the road, Charlie is incapable of seeing the mirage at all, and so fails to know what Alice knows—that there is a real mirage on the road, which appears to some to be water, but which is not. There is a truth about the mirage, despite the fact that it is deceptive, and Alice is authoritative with respect to it precisely because she sees it as it is, not as it appears to the uninitiated."


 (Garfield, Jay L., 'MOONSHADOWS: Taking Conventional Truth Seriously', pp. 29-30)