[MD] Putting SOM back into the MOQ by excluding SQ, let's not do that say some of us

[David Morey]

Hi DMB

I see the distinction like this, experience is made up of SQ and DQ, sure SQ 
is elaborated as concepts which is a
form of SQ, concepts are a subset of SQ, but primary SQ is experienced prior 
to conceptualisation and language I suggest
because how else would it ever get off the ground and emerge from our 
experience otherwise? It is all real for me,
and there are patterns before conceptualisation, animals recognise food and 
mates don't they? For you, they are
only real in some sense, are you confused, what sense? Is there some 
distinction you are not explaining between
different senses of real, where is this theory of levels of reality in the 
MOQ, levels of SQ yes, levels of reality -No.
SQ has levels and I can't see how we can make any sense of experience or 
evolution if there is no pre language or pre-
conceptual forms of SQ. Was there only DQ before humans conceived of SQ? 
Well then there would be no evolution
there would be only flux! Perhaps you can explain your position, I can make 
no sense of it.

DM

-----Original Message----- 
From: david buchanan
Sent: Tuesday, April 30, 2013 11:39 PM
To: moq_discuss at moqtalk.org
Subject: Re: [MD] Putting SOM back into the MOQ by excluding SQ, let's not 
do that say some of us

D Morey said:
... Some people round here seem to have got very confused about SQ,  they 
seem to think that SQ is not experienced, that SQ is about objects and 
therefore can't be part of experience...  When you really get the MOQ you 
see that SQ is part of experience and you do not have to exclude it from 
experience and try to turn experience back into boring old SOM subjectivity. 
Once we see the SQ and DQ of primary experience we can recognise and make 
sense of the patterns that make sense of a world that exists over and above 
what we experience,...    The Dan/DMB error about SQ returns the MOQ to 
Kantian idealism, accepts the SOM division that Kant created between 
experience and the things-themselves and then thinks that if there are 
patterns these have to belong to  things-in-themselves and therefore cannot 
be experienced, so accepting the SOM division and destroying the way the MOQ 
puts DQ and SQ back together again, where MOQ recognises patterns as part of 
experience.



dmb says:
I think you're arguing against a position that nobody holds. You're arguing 
against a misconception but you're said nothing at all about the actual 
distinction in question. Pirsig and James are making a distinction between 
concepts and pure experience (or pre-conceptual experience) - but you 
mistakenly take this as a claim that concepts are not experienced or that 
static patterns cannot be experienced. Not only did I never say such a 
thing, I think that claim is absurd. To distinguish concepts from reality is 
to distinguish intellect from Quality , is to distinguish static quality 
from the undivided empirical flux of reality, is to distinguish primary, 
unsorted, as yet unconceptualized experience from secondary, sorted, 
conceptualized experience. In the MOQ there is nothing outside of experience 
and everything within experience is real in some sense. There no substance 
behind experience. There are no Kantian things-in-themselves beyond 
experience. There are no Platonic realit
ies beyond appearances. And that's the big difference between Pirsig MOST 
philosophers. Radical Empiricism rules out all such metaphysical fictions, 
all such trans-experiential entities, "trans-experiential" simply means 
"outside of experience".)

I'd be quite surprised if this explanation had any positive effect on you 
whatsoever, David. I like surprises.









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