[MD] The Social aspect of SOM

[John Carl]

Dear Ham,



On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Hamilton Priday <hampday1 at verizon.net>wrote:

>
> John --
>
> I'm trying to understand your dilemma, if that's the proper term,
> concerning the relation of the individual to his society.  I guess I've
> never looked at society (or government, for that matter) as a benefactor or
> 'Giant' in the Pirsigian sense.
>

You say that the social system depends on individuals, which is a de facto
> truth.  It is also true that the individual, unless he or she is a recluse
> or adventurer, is dependent on some "concrete" things -- food, water,
> power, etc. -- that the social system provides.


J:

Not to mention the fact that all human life depends upon a society of at
least two, heh-heh.


Ham:


>  Although few people are totally self-sufficient in today's society, I
> don't see that fulfilling individual needs through goods and/or services
> purchased by the rewards of their labor makes the Individual and society a
> "co-dependent" entity per se.
>
>

J:  I know you don't.  It's not on that level that they are co-dependent.
It's at the level of definition and conceptualization - the 4th level.  The
individual cannot "see" (conceive) himself except in the context of a
society.  For the individual, the society is it's other, else which there
is no being.

No being for either.  For without a real self, an individual - a society is
not a being either.  If there is no individuality at all, then everything
is an individual one - made of constituent parts - your essential way of
looking at things I think?  And all this is just variants of self-other,
subject object philosophy if we don't heed that all-important third - the
value between the individual and the society.  That values-between is what
the MoQ is about.

What is tiresome to me, are those who conclude from the significance of
valuation, that it completely negates it's creations - the individual and
his society.  They are positive creations, not negates.  NOT (not this, not
that)  something, not nothing and a distinction arising from betterness.

To assert that there is no self is to undo all that good value.

Ham:


> Nor do I believe, as Andre apparently  does, that "There is a moral code
> that establishes the supremacy of social order over biological life ...
> [and] moral codes over the social order."  In other words, I don't believe
> in a world that is moral by divine or executive fiat.  For, if that were
> so, there would be no quest for moral virtue, no human need to discriminate
> between the good, the bad, and the indifferent.
>


J:  Well there I think Andre is right and you are wrong.  Moral virtue
*is*a quest because reality
*is* a moral order.  The fact that morality includes bad and indifferent,
must be a good thing, because it plainly is.  The problem of evil is
practically unsolvable unless we accept that those evils instruct us in the
wisdom of our struggle for the good.  I hate to get into that subject, it's
one that Royce and James struggled bitterly over and I can't imagine what
to add to their arguments.


 Ham:


> If this is Pirsig's vision of the universe, he is sorely mistaken.  It is
> my belief that we exist in an amoral universe, and that man is granted
> value sensibility for the specific purpose of realizing and defining
> Essential Value in relational terms.
>
>
J:  Granted by whom?  It must be some kind of higher moral authority doing
the granting, Ham, so how can you assert so assuredly that our universe is
amoral?  I don't get the reasoning behind that conclusion one bit.

I'll be quite happy to hear it.

Cordially,

John

PS:  I'm eager to hear your opinion upon my definition of SOM/comparison
with Philosophical Realism.