[MD] The Social aspect of SOM

[Hamilton Priday]

Dear John --

On Tues. Jan 26, 2014 at 1:37 PM, John Carl replied to Ham's statement:

>> Although few people are totally self-sufficient in today's society, I
>> don't see that fulfilling individual needs with goods and/or services
>> purchased by the rewards of their labor makes the Individual and society 
>>  >> a "co-dependent" entity per se.

> J:  I know you don't.  It's not on that level that they are co-dependent.
> It's at the level of definition and conceptualization - the 4th level. 
> The
> individual cannot "see" (conceive) himself except in the context of a
> society.  For the individual, the society is it's other, else which there
> is no being.
>
> No being for either.  For without a real self, an individual - a society 
> is
> not a being either.  If there is no individuality at all, then everything
> is an individual one - made of constituent parts - your essential way of
> looking at things I think?  And all this is just variants of self-other,
> subject object philosophy if we don't heed that all-important third - the
> value between the individual and the society.  That values-between is
> what the MoQ is about.

OK, I think I see the problem, John.  Basically it concerns 'selfness' vs. 
'otherness'.  These are the terms by which I designate the subject/object 
duality.  'Being' itself is a mental construct of experiential sense data, 
which means that without sensibility there is no Being -- neither objective 
(societal) nor subjective (personal).

As you see, that leaves Sensibility as the metaphysical foundation of 
Beingness.   What is sensibility, you ask?  Essentially, it's the capacity 
to realize Value.  What value does it realize?  As I have just eliminated 
everything else in existence, by logical necessity sensibility must be the 
individual's valuistic realization of the essential Source.  And there you 
have the essentialist paradigm of reality.

John:
> What is tiresome to me, are those who conclude from the significance of
> valuation, that it completely negates it's creations - the individual and
> his society.  They are positive creations, not negates.  NOT (not this, 
> not
> that)  something, not nothing and a distinction arising from betterness.
>
> To assert that there is no self is to undo all that good value.

I understand.  But what you don't understand is that realizing relational 
values does not negate Essential Value; it negates the otherness of the 
being perceived.  This is how we enter it into consciousness as a thing, a 
person, an object, a system, a society, or whatever.  Those valuistic 
precepts of being are retained in the conscious mind of the self (a negate) 
which, in effect, negates their otherness while "creating" (affirming) the 
'values-between' as they apply to Essence.   (This amounts to a "double 
negation", which is admittedly a mind teaser, but so is the whole mystery of 
creation!)

Ham. previously:
> Nor do I believe, as Andre apparently  does, that "There is a moral code
> that establishes the supremacy of social order over biological life ...
> [and] moral codes over the social order."  In other words, I don't believe
> in a world that is moral by divine or executive fiat.  For, if that were
> so, there would be no quest for moral virtue, no human need to
> discriminate between the good, the bad, and the indifferent.

> J:  Well there I think Andre is right and you are wrong.  Moral virtue
> *is*a quest because reality *is* a moral order.  The fact that morality
> includes bad and indifferent, must be a good thing, because it plainly is. 
>  > The problem of evil is practically unsolvable unless we accept that 
> those > evils instruct us in the wisdom of our struggle for the good.  I 
> hate to get > into that subject, it's one that Royce and James struggled 
> bitterly over
> and I can't imagine what to add to their arguments.

What I object to is the "dictates" inference of "supremacy of social order 
over biology."  There is no such supremacy, and certainly no "moral order" 
which we are obliged to follow.  Aside from the laws of Nature, which are 
how we define intelligent design, man is free to choose his values and 
subscribe to whatever morality system strikes his fancy.  The very purpose 
of our existence is to realize and select those sensible values which 
represent our finite perspective of Absolute Essence.

Ham:
> If this is Pirsig's vision of the universe, he is sorely mistaken.  It is
> my belief that we exist in an amoral universe, and that man is granted
> value sensibility for the specific purpose of realizing and defining
> Essential Value in relational terms.

John:
> Granted by whom?  It must be some kind of higher moral authority doing
> the granting, Ham, so how can you assert so assuredly that our universe
> is amoral?  I don't get the reasoning behind that conclusion one bit.

Take a good guess, John.  Man is his own "moral authority", so I resent the 
inference that the absolute Source of our existence is "some higher moral 
authority".   Created beings are negates of this uncreated Source, which 
makes their existence transitional as opposed to ultimate or eternal.
Unfortunately, Mr. Pirsig chose to avoid defining his DQ as the primary 
source, thus making the MoQ a less significant thesis, and the individual a 
less meaningful entity. than they might have been.

Hopefully the points I've elaborated above will help to resolve some of the 
inconsistencies in your SOM definition (viz-a-viz "Philosophical Realism"?)

Essentially yours,
Ham