[MD] The Social aspect of SOM

[John Carl]

Hi Ham,

Pardon the slow response; it got busy around here.


>  J:  I know you don't.  It's not on that level that they are co-dependent.
>> It's at the level of definition and conceptualization - the 4th level. The
>> individual cannot "see" (conceive) himself except in the context of a
>> society.  For the individual, the society is it's other, else which there
>> is no being.
>>
>> No being for either.  For without a real self, an individual - a society
>> is
>> not a being either.  If there is no individuality at all, then everything
>> is an individual one - made of constituent parts - your essential way of
>> looking at things I think?  And all this is just variants of self-other,
>> subject object philosophy if we don't heed that all-important third - the
>> value between the individual and the society.  That values-between is
>> what the MoQ is about.
>>
>
> OK, I think I see the problem, John.  Basically it concerns 'selfness' vs.
> 'otherness'.  These are the terms by which I designate the subject/object
> duality.  'Being' itself is a mental construct of experiential sense data,
> which means that without sensibility there is no Being -- neither objective
> (societal) nor subjective (personal).
>


John:  Ok, I get you there - the fallacy of Descartes - he postulates
thinking without sensing, which is illogical and proves being then through
thinking. An absurdity!


Ham:


> As you see, that leaves Sensibility as the metaphysical foundation of
> Beingness.   What is sensibility, you ask?  Essentially, it's the capacity
> to realize Value.  What value does it realize?  As I have just eliminated
> everything else in existence, by logical necessity sensibility must be the
> individual's valuistic realization of the essential Source.  And there you
> have the essentialist paradigm of reality.
>
>
John:

I come to the conclusion that while Sensibility is the foundation for
Beingness, Beingness is also the foundation for Sensibility - they are
codependent.  This was just mentioned in response to Craig - Bob Lanza's
theory of the Biocentric Universe makes the most sense to me so far,
cosmologically speaking.



> John:
>
>  What is tiresome to me, are those who conclude from the significance of
>> valuation, that it completely negates it's creations - the individual and
>> his society.  They are positive creations, not negates.  NOT (not this,
>> not
>> that)  something, not nothing and a distinction arising from betterness.
>>
>> To assert that there is no self is to undo all that good value.
>>
>
> I understand.  But what you don't understand is that realizing relational
> values does not negate Essential Value; it negates the otherness of the
> being perceived.  This is how we enter it into consciousness as a thing, a
> person, an object, a system, a society, or whatever.



John:  Ok, I think I get you there.  It negates the *absolute* otherness.
There is a relative otherness that is useful and creative, don't you think?

Ham:



> Those valuistic precepts of being are retained in the conscious mind of
> the self (a negate) which, in effect, negates their otherness while
> "creating" (affirming) the 'values-between' as they apply to Essence.
> (This amounts to a "double negation", which is admittedly a mind teaser,
> but so is the whole mystery of creation!)
>
> Ham. previously:
>
>  Nor do I believe, as Andre apparently  does, that "There is a moral code
>> that establishes the supremacy of social order over biological life ...
>> [and] moral codes over the social order."  In other words, I don't believe
>> in a world that is moral by divine or executive fiat.  For, if that were
>> so, there would be no quest for moral virtue, no human need to
>> discriminate between the good, the bad, and the indifferent.
>>
>
>  J:  Well there I think Andre is right and you are wrong.  Moral virtue
>> *is*a quest because reality *is* a moral order.  The fact that morality
>>
>> includes bad and indifferent, must be a good thing, because it plainly
>> is.  > The problem of evil is practically unsolvable unless we accept that
>> those > evils instruct us in the wisdom of our struggle for the good.  I
>> hate to get > into that subject, it's one that Royce and James struggled
>> bitterly over
>> and I can't imagine what to add to their arguments.
>>
>
>
Ham:


> What I object to is the "dictates" inference of "supremacy of social order
> over biology."  There is no such supremacy, and certainly no "moral order"
> which we are obliged to follow.  Aside from the laws of Nature, which are
> how we define intelligent design, man is free to choose his values and
> subscribe to whatever morality system strikes his fancy.  The very purpose
> of our existence is to realize and select those sensible values which
> represent our finite perspective of Absolute Essence.
>
>
John:  Hmmm.  That makes sense.  Does your Absolute Essence equate to Total
Experience?  If not, why?  And if so, it seems you and the MoQ ought to be
reconcilable.



>
> Ham:
>
>> If this is Pirsig's vision of the universe, he is sorely mistaken.  It is
>> my belief that we exist in an amoral universe, and that man is granted
>> value sensibility for the specific purpose of realizing and defining
>> Essential Value in relational terms.
>>
>
> John:
>
>  Granted by whom?  It must be some kind of higher moral authority doing
>> the granting, Ham, so how can you assert so assuredly that our universe
>> is amoral?  I don't get the reasoning behind that conclusion one bit.
>>
>
> Take a good guess, John.  Man is his own "moral authority",


John:  Oops!  I take it back.

Ham:


> so I resent the inference that the absolute Source of our existence is
> "some higher moral authority".   Created beings are negates of this
> uncreated Source, which makes their existence transitional as opposed to
> ultimate or eternal.
> Unfortunately, Mr. Pirsig chose to avoid defining his DQ as the primary
> source, thus making the MoQ a less significant thesis, and the individual a
> less meaningful entity. than they might have been.
>
> Hopefully the points I've elaborated above will help to resolve some of
> the inconsistencies in your SOM definition (viz-a-viz "Philosophical
> Realism"?)
>


John:  Sadly, no. I can't quite follow you there.   And it wasn't actually
my definition, it was whomsoever published the wikipedia entry.   But
thanks sincerely for the effort Ham.

Always a pleasure,

John