[MD] The Social aspect of SOM

[Hamilton Priday]

John --

> Hi Ham,
>
> Pardon the slow response; it got busy around here.

So I gather.

I am somewhat perplexed by your statement that " The individual cannot 'see' 
(conceive) himself except in the context of a society."  Do you really 
believe that?  Does an individual isolated on the proverbial desert island 
not conceive himself?  Does he not perceive that he is a self existing in an 
otherness of land, ocean, and trees?  (I suggest you rethink that concept.)

>> 'Being' itself is a mental construct of experiential sense data,
>> which means that without sensibility there is no Being -- neither
>> objective (societal) nor subjective (personal).

John:
> Ok, I get you there - the fallacy of Descartes - he postulates thinking
> without sensing, which is illogical and proves being then through
> thinking.  An absurdity!

As a metaphysical "proof". yes.  But Descartes was trying to establish what 
he knew beyond all uncertainty.  It turned out to be that HE alone was the 
subject of all that he experienced.   And that conclusion paved the way for 
Donald Hoffman and others to posit a "conscious reality".

But inasmuch as consciousness is vulnerable in several respects, I have 
opted to regard consciousness as an organic mode of Sensibility -- an 
attribute of the Absolute Source which cannot be denied.  For without 
sensibility EVERYTHING is in doubt.  And that includes the "proofs" of 
science which are all based on sensibly derived evidence.

Previously:
>> As you see, that leaves Sensibility as the metaphysical foundation of
>> Beingness.  ... And there you have the essentialist paradigm of reality.

John:
> I come to the conclusion that while Sensibility is the foundation for
> Beingness, Beingness is also the foundation for Sensibility - they are
> codependent.  This was just mentioned in response to Craig - Bob Lanza's
> theory of the Biocentric Universe makes the most sense to me so far,
> cosmologically speaking.

Interesting that you should mention Lanza, since I've just replaced his "New 
Theory of the Universe" to make room for Schroeder's "Science Reveals the 
Ultimate Truth" on my archives list.  But Lanza does support my ontology, as 
you will readily see from this paragraph:

"Without perception, there is in effect no reality.  Nothing has existence 
unless you, I, or some living creature perceives it, and how it is perceived 
further influences that reality.  Even time itself is not exempted from 
biocentrism.  Our sense of the forward motion of time is really the result 
of an infinite number of decisions that only seem to be a smooth continuous 
path. At each moment we are at the edge of a paradox known as The Arrow, 
first described 2,500 years ago by the philosopher Zeno of Elea.  Starting 
logically with the premise that nothing can be in two places at once, he 
reasoned that an arrow is only in one place during any given instance of its 
flight.  But if it is in only one place, it must be at rest. The arrow must 
then be at rest at every moment of its flight.  Logically, motion is 
impossible.  But is motion impossible?  Or rather, is this analogy proof 
that the forward motion of time is not a feature of the external world but a 
projection of something within us?  Time is not an absolute reality but an 
aspect of our consciousness."   -- Robert Lanza:  'A New Theory of the 
Universe'

Ham, previously:
>> What you don't understand is that realizing relational values does not
>> negate Essential Value; it negates the otherness of the being perceived. 
>>  >> This is how we enter it into consciousness as a thing, a person, an
>> object, a system, a society, or whatever.

John:
> Ok, I think I get you there.  It negates the *absolute* otherness.
> There is a relative otherness that is useful and creative, don't you 
> think?

Yes, sensibility negates the being of the otherness experienced, allowing us 
to conceptualize an object by its relative value to us.  In the process of 
experiencing we acquire the finite value of the thing, system or person so 
conceptualized.  In that sense, WE are the "creators" of our own reality.

John:
> Well there I think Andre is right and you are wrong.  Moral virtue
> *is*a quest because reality *is* a moral order.  The fact that morality
> includes bad and indifferent, must be a good thing, because it plainly
> is.  The problem of evil is practically unsolvable unless we accept that
> those evils instruct us in the wisdom of our struggle for the good.  I
> hate to get into that subject, it's one that Royce and James struggled
> bitterly over and I can't imagine what to add to their arguments.

John, there is no need to struggle.  Morality is what we ourselves make of 
experience, emotionally and rationally.  If it is useful, satisfying, 
logical, and edifying, we call it "good".   If it is harmful, distasteful, 
destructive, or impractical, we call it "bad".   Anything else is at some 
intermediate place on your value scale.  There's your morality in a 
nutshell.

John:
> Hmmm.  That makes sense.  Does your Absolute Essence equate to Total
> Experience?  If not, why?  And if so, it seems you and the MoQ ought to
> be reconcilable.

When you say "total experience", you are referring to the collective 
experience of all (living) individuals.  But experience, per se, has nothing 
to do with Absolute Essence, because experience is finite and 
differentiated, whereas absolute Sensibility is not.

John, I once thought the MoQ and Essentialism could be reconciled.  Alas, 
Pirsig's philosophy has lately been treated as a doctrine that can only be 
"understood" in the words of its author.  This leaves little opportunity for 
"unorthodox" ideas such as mine to add the insight needed.  I depend on the 
intellect of persons such as yourself to make the transition, if it is at 
all possible.

Thanks for your contribution, John.

Essentially speaking,
Ham