[MD] Sociability Re-examined

[ARLO JAMES BENSINGER JR]

[Craig, previously]
Perhaps we should look for examples of social immorality:

I promise to meet you, but don't meet up.
We agree to meet, but I don't meet up.
I intend to meet you (but don't promise to) & I realize you recognize my intention, but don't meet up.
You expect me to meet you and I realize this, but I don't meet up.
I intend to meet you, but don't meet up.

Which of these are humans but not animals capable of?
Which of these are 3rd level & which are merely 2nd level?

[Arlo had replied]
For Tomasello, and others following the socio-cultural tradition, all of these are social.

[Craig]
Yes, but what about my questions?

[Arlo]
Well, this directly answers your second question, all of these are 3rd level (social) activities. As to the first, I think I answered that as well, although I apologize if that was unclear.

[Arlo previously]
They all derive from semiotically-mediated activity. Even the ones that are not outright 'verbal' above require some manner of language to enable the activity. 

[Arlo continues]
All of these evidence enough necessary semiotic mediation as to make them exclusively human activities. As for something I might point to as an example of primitive social (mediated, purposeful, semiotic, agenic activity) displayed by a non-human species would be something like a primate directing the attention of another primate to a stick, and that primate picks up and hands the stick to the first primate. In this case, although it is semiotically-mediated, the mediation is primitive enough so as not to require sophisticated language use. In your examples, 'intent' that is able to formulate 'in the future' requires a necessary complex enough code as to render 'in the future' intelligible. So although the primates in this example must share attention (biological), and must extend that into a mediated exchange of intentional activity (social), it is something that pales in comparison to the social activity enabled by complex semiosis.