[MD] What's Personalism?

[John Carl]

Auxier's Time Will and Purpose:

--the idea of "person" comes into James' thought and vocabulary as an
existential modality which may be further qualified by particular views,
but the affirmation of this modality, the "personal", is a requirement of
ontological pluralism, and "irreducible pluralism", is the law."

    James then proceeds to distinguish the "personification" of the
modality of consciousness from anthropomorism (as Bowne often did).  James
points out that even the phenomena that are normally classed "unconscious"
are nevertheless "parts of secondary personal selves," which have poor
communication with the primary personal self, but are nevertheless,
personal, continuing: "although the size of a secondary self thus formed
will depend on the number of thoughts thus split-off from the main
consciousness, the *form  *of it tends to personality..."   (Princ. of
Psych, 227) --

Here is what makes James' and Pirsig's work so vital for today.  How to
deal with persons, as a category.  This in a age where personality is so
often a digital construct!   An age foretold by the original American
thinkers of old, who have more relevance than the sobriquet
"stuffed-shirts" bequeaths.

John





On Tue, Sep 8, 2015 at 1:13 PM, John Carl <ridgecoyote at gmail.com> wrote:

> How does it (thought) go on?  We notice immediately five important
> characteristics -
>
> 1.  Every thought tends to be part of a PERSONAL consciousness.
>
> 2.  Within each personal consciousness thought is allways changing.
>
> 3.  Within each personal conscousness thought is sensibly continuous.
>
> 4.  It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.
>
> 5.  It cares about some parts of these objects to the exclusion of
> others, and chooses from among them, all the while.
>
>  when we are discussing Personalism, we are discussing the modality of
> thought.  This is one of the most difficult philosophic tasks.  We
> know what it is, as long as we don't try and define it.   "The only
> states of consciousness that we naturally deal with are found in the
> personal consciousness, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and
> you's." James, Princ. of Psych, 225-226.
>
> He does use the term "self" as synonomous here, but that sense of the
> term is one he later rejected.  The issue here is not the existence of
> conciousness, bu its tendency to appear only in personal form.  We are
> hard-pressed to suppose, radically empirically speaking, that such
> experience ever takes another form.
>
> to be continued...
>
> John
>
> (borrowed Liberally from Auxier, and glad to provide scholarship upon
> request)
>



-- 
"finite players
play within boundaries.
Infinite players
play *with* boundaries."