[MD] Annotations to LC

Adrie Kintziger parser666 at gmail.com
Wed Nov 9 06:07:23 PST 2016


I still do not agree that  there is something like a heinous quadrilemma.
I took the liberty to re-read the whole thread.I still conclude the lack of
evidence for the claims.
There is an strange emptyness in your proposals.A void without a name.

Taking some liberty is allowed i suppose,so i took this from
the web .


http://wiki.moq.fi/index.php?title=Zen_and_the_Art_of_Insanity&action=history

-------------------------------------------------------------------

there are a number of issue's coming forward now; dynamic quality
is a product originating tuukka, as is static quality,and Pirsig or
Whitehead or
William james never mentioned something alike.
But it is not because i use this as an example,that it should or would
render
the whole analysis meaningless, it is not.
Should i read something new here?

"Tuukka's work misses a starting point"( the commenter in the artikle)
but this is not the only facet that needs some attention.

I also took the liberty to click the "view history" button on the
right/above
of the page.

I honestly think that the review however should be reviewed by the listers
here.
Not to make Tuuk ridicules,but to understand.

Adrie




2016-11-09 12:44 GMT+01:00 Tuukka Virtaperko <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>:

> dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all,
>
>
>
>
>> dmb had said:
>>>
>>> One say that "Pure experience" or Quality "logically precedes this
>>> distinction" just as one can say sleeping logically precedes waking.
>>>   In both cases, logic doesn't exist in that first stage but logic
>>> does obtain when we start thinking about it or talking about it. The
>>>   logic can also be expressed as a little argument: Since concepts
>>> are  derived from experience, the experiential material from which
>>> they  are derived must come before the concepts.
>>>
>>> Tuukka repled to dmb:
>>
>> Unlike Quality, "sleeping" is not an undefined concept. But you seem
>> to imply that logic doesn't exist when people sleep. Firstly, not
>> true. Some people have seen correct formal statements in their dreams.
>> My high school maths teacher told me Ramanujan did this. Secondly, not
>> relevant. Waking does not logically follow sleeping, it follows
>> sleeping temporally.
>>
>> As for you little argument, well, I don't see the point. I'm fine with
>> the idea that concepts are derived from experience and that the
>> experiential material from which they are derived must come before the
>> concepts. But I'm saying the concepts are not deduced from the
>> experiential material. They also do not logically follow from it.
>> Deduction and logic is what you do when you already have a bunch of
>> concepts.
>>
>>
>>
>> dmb says:
>>
>> You've missed the point entirely so I'll try a more direct approach.
>>
>>
>> You're saying that concepts can't logically follow from pure experience
>> because there is no logic in pure experience. The "logic" characterizes es
>> the RELATION BETWEEN experience and concepts but you have been mistakenly
>> using "logic" as if it were supposed to characterize pure experience.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Logic doesn't characterize pure experience. Neither does it characterize
> the relation between experience and concepts. Logic characterizes the
> relation between defined concepts and other defined concepts.
>
>
> dmb: The same confusion occurred in your response to the sleeping-waking
>> analogy, wherein you tried to characterize sleep as containing logic.
>> Again, the logic describes the RELATION BETWEEN sleep and waking, i.e. you
>> can't wake up unless you're sleeping.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> According to Pirsig, Quality is an undefined concept. There is no
> metaphysical restriction against defining "sleeping". Hence, even if
> sleeping were thought to be a logical necessity of waking up it wouldn't
> follow that Quality would be a logical necessity of, well, anything.
>
>
> dmb:
>> Understanding an idea BEFORE criticizing it is also a logical necessity,
>> by the way.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Now I understand why you don't criticize the Metaphysics of Quality.
>
>
>
> On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote:
>
>> Tuk, all,
>>
>> I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David
>> Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted
>> them.
>>
>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>  wrote:
>>
>>> >Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
>>> >
>>> >
>>> >"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a
>>> >dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
>>> that
>>> >is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has been
>>> >done. The MOQ is an idea."
>>> >
>>> >If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
>>> Pirsig
>>> >doesn't get it.
>>>
>> Dan:
>> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
>> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
>>
>> dichotomize
>>
>> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>> 1.
>> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
>> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>> 2.
>> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
>> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
>>
>>
>> Dialetheism
>>
>> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
>>
>> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
>> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
>> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
>> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
>> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
>> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
>> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
>> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
>>
>> Dan comments:
>> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> What Donny actually says is:
>
> "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or
> B), iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
>
> Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
>
> (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
> B))))
>
> This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
>
> The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
> dichotomistic distinction to itself.
>
>
>
>> >
>>> >"So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of
>>> thought.
>>> >It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element of Mind.
>>> But
>>> >what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing
>>> consciousness;
>>> >it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM is an object,
>>> a
>>> >/Gegenstand/  (literally 'stands over against' consciousness). So, I
>>> hope now
>>> >that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different. Pirsig missed that
>>> little
>>> >point.
>>> >[108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no
>>> >reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis.
>>> >I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence
>>> >(Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you
>>> >destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion."
>>> >
>>> >Then why call bodies objects in the first place?
>>>
>> Dan:
>> Pirsig is replying to a post that introduces 'body.'
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> A native English speaker would be accustomed to thinking of material
> things as "objects". In Finnish we have a different word for that, so my
> normal meaning of "object" ("objekti" in Finnish) is something like "the
> object of a sentence" or "JavaScript-object" or "mathematical object". This
> probably explains why Pirsig's use of the word "object" is so
> counterintuitive for me.
>
>
>
>
>> >
>>> >"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>> >object.'
>>> >[111] RMP: Object: n.
>>> >Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>> vision or
>>> >touch; a material thing.
>>> >   1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>> >   2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>> >   3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>> >affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>> substantive
>>> >following and governed by a preposition.
>>> >   4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>> >   (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>> >The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological
>>> >patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>> >'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>> that
>>> >in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>> between
>>> >them is meaningless."
>>> >
>>> >If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of
>>> >attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>> >
>>> >Why is there no Definition #5?
>>>
>> Dan:
>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>
>> Object: n.
>>
>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>
>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>
>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>
>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>
>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>
>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>
>> The “objects” in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>> patterns. The “objects” Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>
> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
> The distinction is very sharp."
> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist
> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>
> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
> things, but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
> physical objects.
>
>
>
>>
>> >
>>> >"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>> >experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel
>>> gives a
>>> >strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>> >
>>> >Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>> >deduction?
>>>
>> Dan:
>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains why
> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ doesn't
> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
> deduction.
>
>
>
>> >
>>> >At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
>>> to
>>> >sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
>>> shark.
>>> >But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and the
>>> >profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
>>>
>> Dan:
>> Prove it.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of
> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
> important contribution to process philosophy.
>
>
>
>> "Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
>>> Quality of being reality?
>>> [135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
>>> the
>>> SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
>>> assertion
>>> that values are unreal."
>>>
>>> I agree.
>>>
>>> "Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
>>> Mostly
>>> for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
>>> dilemmas.
>>> It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize
>>> dilemmas.
>>> [143]
>>> RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
>>> cite
>>> the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can
>>> two
>>> opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own
>>> choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S.
>>> Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context for
>>> understanding."
>>>
>>> Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained
>>> how to
>>> correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given
>>> situation.
>>>
>> Dan:
>> Not sure what you are objecting to here.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
> "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
> contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
> materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that
> can be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in
> bad ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in
> good ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer.
>
>
>
>> "Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
>>> RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
>>> arbitrary.
>>> If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ, even
>>> though he personally prefers four levels."
>>>
>>> What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
>>>
>> Dan:
>> Yes.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous
> Quadrilemma.
>
>
>
>> That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
>>> potency
>>> of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>>
>> Dan:
>> How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls
>> apart.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ.
>
>
>
>
>> "Q&A [4]
>>> Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
>>> should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
>>> on
>>> the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them
>>> entirely to
>>> help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid
>>> of
>>> them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper
>>> two
>>> levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw
>>> that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply
>>> distinguishing between biological and social levels.
>>> If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
>>> modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
>>> latter
>>> ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has
>>> caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at
>>> present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase
>>> values
>>> and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt
>>> of
>>> the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ.
>>> At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be
>>> dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
>>> expressions of independent scientific reality."
>>>
>>> Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
>>> he
>>> reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
>>> logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other
>>> kind of
>>> changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway.
>>>
>> Dan:
>> Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the
> MOQ. Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ correctly... "
>
>
>
>> "Q&A [4]
>>> RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
>>> important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
>>> materialist
>>> system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist
>>> system
>>> matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one
>>> meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are
>>> levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can
>>> coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger
>>> reality.
>>> The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
>>> composed
>>> of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely
>>> high
>>> quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But
>>> the
>>> MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is
>>> still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent scientific
>>> material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific
>>> discoveries
>>> come in."
>>>
>>> Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
>>> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual box
>>> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>>> MOQ
>>> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>>> put
>>> the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>>
>> Dan:
>> No idea what you are saying here.
>>
>>
>
> Tuukka:
> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of sand.
>
>
> On 08-Nov-16 0:26, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>
>> Maybe this can be of help to further avoid the munchausen trilemma.
>>
>> I arrived at my in a dynamical way(smiley)
>>
>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/imagine/201003/einstein
>> -creative-thinking-music-and-the-intuitive-art-scientific-imagination
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> The Münchhausen trilemma is a pretty fundamental objection towards the
> possibility of any kind of knowledge. I don't find it particular to the MOQ
> or the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>
>
>
> On 08-Nov-16 11:36, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>
>> Sorry for the intrusion,but only a fast respons...
>>
>> what kept my eye,earlier this week when i was reading russel's paradox
>> on the web,was the striking similarity between the paradox and what tuuk
>> is
>> saying here
>>
>> snip
>>   "Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>   Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
>>   declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual
>> box
>>   that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>> MOQ
>>   but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>> put
>>   the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>> Dan:
>> No idea what you are saying here"
>> ---------------------------------------------------
>> The russel paradox is on the web.but its is math,and mixing math with
>> words
>> ends up in woods. Always.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Rusell's paradox points out an inconsistency in naive set theory: there
> can't be a set of all sets. But Russell's paradox doesn't apply to the MOQ
> because the MOQ contains itself at a stage that precedes logic. The MOQ
> does also contain itself as an intellectual idea, but this is more of a
> projection of the MOQ into Pirsig's theory of static value patterns than
> the real MOQ.
>
> Furthermore, there are potentially consistent variants of set theory that
> permit the set of all sets. The most notable of them is probably New
> Foundations by Quine. I'd like to understand more about them. They might
> render Russell's paradox even more inapplicable to the MOQ. In order to
> employ them one would apparently have to denote Quality by a variable, but
> this could be possible in some many-valued logic. However, that would be a
> lot of work and it wouldn't seem to defuse the Heinous Quadrilemma. I am
> also somehow opposed to the idea of denoting Quality by a variable although
> I'm not sure why.
>
> In any case, this consistency issue highlights a curious fact. In LILA
> Pirsig writes:
>
> "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience,
> and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these."
>
> It's funny that due to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, normal arithmetic
> isn't known to be consistent. Only weak systems of arithmetic such as
> Presburger arithmetic are provably consistent. But Presburger arithmetic
> doesn't allow multiplication by variables. This basically excludes
> Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and a great deal of science. Does
> Pirsig intend to restrict truth to weak systems such as Presburger
> arithmetic? Probably not. What he means with "logical consistency" is
> probably something like: "hasn't been proven inconsistent" (for systems)
> and: "proven as a theorem of a system that hasn't been proven inconsistent"
> (for theorems).
>
> As for your opinion that mixing math with words always ends up in woods -
> not for Einstein. I cite the article you linked in your previous post:
>
> "Einstein only employed words or other symbols (presumably mathematical)
> -- in what he explicitly called a secondary translation step -- after he
> was able to solve his problems through the formal manipulation of
> internally imagined images, feelings, and architectures. 'I very rarely
> think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in
> words afterwards,' he wrote (Wertheimer, 1959, 213; Pais, 1982)."
>
>
>
>
> On 07-Nov-16 10:02, David Harding wrote:
>
>> Tuk wrote:
>> Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first
>> post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier
>> message at the end of that post.
>>
>> djh responds:
>> Yes I am listening. You've concluded that the MOQ is low quality due to
>> the
>> Quadrilemma.  The Quadrilema in your mind is a foregone conclusion and so
>> you've already moved on from it. So you're starting for a point that the
>> MOQ is low quality. If that is your starting point then why should we
>> bother to discuss the MOQ with you?
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Because someone could write an academic article about the Quadrilemma and
> send it to a philosophical journal. If the article were to pass peer-review
> it would be published. I thought you'd have a motive to be prepared for
> this. I could help you.
>
>
> Regards,
> Tuk
>
>
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