[MD] Annotations to LC

Tue Nov 15 05:19:52 PST 2016

David, Adrie,

you don't believe in the existence of the Heinous Quadrilemma. How about 
this duodecalemma?

http://wiki.moq.fi/images/0/03/Duodecalemma.jpg

Regards,

Tuk

On 09-Nov-16 16:07, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
> I still do not agree that  there is something like a heinous quadrilemma.
> I took the liberty to re-read the whole thread.I still conclude the lack of
> evidence for the claims.
> There is an strange emptyness in your proposals.A void without a name.
>
> Taking some liberty is allowed i suppose,so i took this from
> the web .
>
>
> http://wiki.moq.fi/index.php?title=Zen_and_the_Art_of_Insanity&action=history
>
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> there are a number of issue's coming forward now; dynamic quality
> is a product originating tuukka, as is static quality,and Pirsig or
> Whitehead or
> William james never mentioned something alike.
> But it is not because i use this as an example,that it should or would
> render
> the whole analysis meaningless, it is not.
> Should i read something new here?
>
> "Tuukka's work misses a starting point"( the commenter in the artikle)
> but this is not the only facet that needs some attention.
>
> I also took the liberty to click the "view history" button on the
> right/above
> of the page.
>
> I honestly think that the review however should be reviewed by the listers
> here.
> Not to make Tuuk ridicules,but to understand.
>
> Adrie
>
>
>
>
> 2016-11-09 12:44 GMT+01:00 Tuukka Virtaperko <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>:
>
>> dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> dmb had said:
>>>> One say that "Pure experience" or Quality "logically precedes this
>>>> distinction" just as one can say sleeping logically precedes waking.
>>>>    In both cases, logic doesn't exist in that first stage but logic
>>>> does obtain when we start thinking about it or talking about it. The
>>>>    logic can also be expressed as a little argument: Since concepts
>>>> are  derived from experience, the experiential material from which
>>>> they  are derived must come before the concepts.
>>>>
>>>> Tuukka repled to dmb:
>>> Unlike Quality, "sleeping" is not an undefined concept. But you seem
>>> to imply that logic doesn't exist when people sleep. Firstly, not
>>> true. Some people have seen correct formal statements in their dreams.
>>> My high school maths teacher told me Ramanujan did this. Secondly, not
>>> relevant. Waking does not logically follow sleeping, it follows
>>> sleeping temporally.
>>>
>>> As for you little argument, well, I don't see the point. I'm fine with
>>> the idea that concepts are derived from experience and that the
>>> experiential material from which they are derived must come before the
>>> concepts. But I'm saying the concepts are not deduced from the
>>> experiential material. They also do not logically follow from it.
>>> Deduction and logic is what you do when you already have a bunch of
>>> concepts.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> dmb says:
>>>
>>> You've missed the point entirely so I'll try a more direct approach.
>>>
>>>
>>> You're saying that concepts can't logically follow from pure experience
>>> because there is no logic in pure experience. The "logic" characterizes es
>>> the RELATION BETWEEN experience and concepts but you have been mistakenly
>>> using "logic" as if it were supposed to characterize pure experience.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Logic doesn't characterize pure experience. Neither does it characterize
>> the relation between experience and concepts. Logic characterizes the
>> relation between defined concepts and other defined concepts.
>>
>>
>> dmb: The same confusion occurred in your response to the sleeping-waking
>>> analogy, wherein you tried to characterize sleep as containing logic.
>>> Again, the logic describes the RELATION BETWEEN sleep and waking, i.e. you
>>> can't wake up unless you're sleeping.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> According to Pirsig, Quality is an undefined concept. There is no
>> metaphysical restriction against defining "sleeping". Hence, even if
>> sleeping were thought to be a logical necessity of waking up it wouldn't
>> follow that Quality would be a logical necessity of, well, anything.
>>
>>
>> dmb:
>>> Understanding an idea BEFORE criticizing it is also a logical necessity,
>>> by the way.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Now I understand why you don't criticize the Metaphysics of Quality.
>>
>>
>>
>> On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote:
>>
>>> Tuk, all,
>>>
>>> I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David
>>> Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted
>>> them.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>  wrote:
>>>
>>>>> Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a
>>>>> dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
>>>> that
>>>>> is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has been
>>>>> done. The MOQ is an idea."
>>>>>
>>>>> If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
>>>> Pirsig
>>>>> doesn't get it.
>>> Dan:
>>> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
>>> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
>>>
>>> dichotomize
>>>
>>> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>> 1.
>>> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
>>> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>> 2.
>>> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
>>> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
>>>
>>>
>>> Dialetheism
>>>
>>> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
>>>
>>> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
>>> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
>>> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
>>> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
>>> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
>>> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
>>> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
>>> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
>>>
>>> Dan comments:
>>> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> What Donny actually says is:
>>
>> "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or
>> B), iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
>>
>> Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
>>
>> (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
>> B))))
>>
>> This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
>>
>> The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
>> dichotomistic distinction to itself.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> "So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of
>>>> thought.
>>>>> It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element of Mind.
>>>> But
>>>>> what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing
>>>> consciousness;
>>>>> it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM is an object,
>>>> a
>>>>> /Gegenstand/  (literally 'stands over against' consciousness). So, I
>>>> hope now
>>>>> that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different. Pirsig missed that
>>>> little
>>>>> point.
>>>>> [108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no
>>>>> reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis.
>>>>> I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence
>>>>> (Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you
>>>>> destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion."
>>>>>
>>>>> Then why call bodies objects in the first place?
>>> Dan:
>>> Pirsig is replying to a post that introduces 'body.'
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> A native English speaker would be accustomed to thinking of material
>> things as "objects". In Finnish we have a different word for that, so my
>> normal meaning of "object" ("objekti" in Finnish) is something like "the
>> object of a sentence" or "JavaScript-object" or "mathematical object". This
>> probably explains why Pirsig's use of the word "object" is so
>> counterintuitive for me.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>>>> object.'
>>>>> [111] RMP: Object: n.
>>>>> Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>> vision or
>>>>> touch; a material thing.
>>>>>    1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>>>>    2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>>    3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>> substantive
>>>>> following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>>    4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>>    (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>> The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological
>>>>> patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>>>> 'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>>> that
>>>>> in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>>> between
>>>>> them is meaningless."
>>>>>
>>>>> If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of
>>>>> attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>>>>
>>>>> Why is there no Definition #5?
>>> Dan:
>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>>
>>> Object: n.
>>>
>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>>
>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>>
>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>
>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>>
>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>
>>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>
>>> The “objects” in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>>> patterns. The “objects” Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>>
>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
>> The distinction is very sharp."
>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist
>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>>
>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
>> things, but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
>> physical objects.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> "Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>>>> experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel
>>>> gives a
>>>>> strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>>>>
>>>>> Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>>>> deduction?
>>> Dan:
>>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
>> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains why
>> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
>> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ doesn't
>> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
>> deduction.
>>
>>
>>
>>>>> At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
>>>> to
>>>>> sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
>>>> shark.
>>>>> But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and the
>>>>> profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
>>> Dan:
>>> Prove it.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of
>> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
>> important contribution to process philosophy.
>>
>>
>>
>>> "Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
>>>> Quality of being reality?
>>>> [135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
>>>> the
>>>> SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
>>>> assertion
>>>> that values are unreal."
>>>>
>>>> I agree.
>>>>
>>>> "Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
>>>> Mostly
>>>> for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
>>>> dilemmas.
>>>> It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize
>>>> dilemmas.
>>>> [143]
>>>> RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
>>>> cite
>>>> the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can
>>>> two
>>>> opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own
>>>> choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S.
>>>> Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context for
>>>> understanding."
>>>>
>>>> Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained
>>>> how to
>>>> correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given
>>>> situation.
>>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Not sure what you are objecting to here.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
>> "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
>> contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
>> materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that
>> can be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in
>> bad ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in
>> good ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer.
>>
>>
>>
>>> "Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
>>>> RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
>>>> arbitrary.
>>>> If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ, even
>>>> though he personally prefers four levels."
>>>>
>>>> What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
>>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous
>> Quadrilemma.
>>
>>
>>
>>> That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
>>>> potency
>>>> of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls
>>> apart.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> "Q&A [4]
>>>> Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
>>>> should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
>>>> on
>>>> the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them
>>>> entirely to
>>>> help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid
>>>> of
>>>> them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper
>>>> two
>>>> levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw
>>>> that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply
>>>> distinguishing between biological and social levels.
>>>> If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
>>>> modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
>>>> latter
>>>> ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has
>>>> caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at
>>>> present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase
>>>> values
>>>> and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt
>>>> of
>>>> the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ.
>>>> At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be
>>>> dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
>>>> expressions of independent scientific reality."
>>>>
>>>> Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
>>>> he
>>>> reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
>>>> logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other
>>>> kind of
>>>> changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway.
>>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the
>> MOQ. Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ correctly... "
>>
>>
>>
>>> "Q&A [4]
>>>> RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
>>>> important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
>>>> materialist
>>>> system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist
>>>> system
>>>> matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one
>>>> meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are
>>>> levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can
>>>> coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger
>>>> reality.
>>>> The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
>>>> composed
>>>> of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely
>>>> high
>>>> quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But
>>>> the
>>>> MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is
>>>> still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent scientific
>>>> material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific
>>>> discoveries
>>>> come in."
>>>>
>>>> Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>>> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
>>>> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual box
>>>> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>>>> MOQ
>>>> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>>>> put
>>>> the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> No idea what you are saying here.
>>>
>>>
>> Tuukka:
>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of sand.
>>
>>
>> On 08-Nov-16 0:26, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>>
>>> Maybe this can be of help to further avoid the munchausen trilemma.
>>>
>>> I arrived at my in a dynamical way(smiley)
>>>
>>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/imagine/201003/einstein
>>> -creative-thinking-music-and-the-intuitive-art-scientific-imagination
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> The Münchhausen trilemma is a pretty fundamental objection towards the
>> possibility of any kind of knowledge. I don't find it particular to the MOQ
>> or the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>
>>
>>
>> On 08-Nov-16 11:36, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>>
>>> Sorry for the intrusion,but only a fast respons...
>>>
>>> what kept my eye,earlier this week when i was reading russel's paradox
>>> on the web,was the striking similarity between the paradox and what tuuk
>>> is
>>> saying here
>>>
>>> snip
>>>    "Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>>    Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
>>>    declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual
>>> box
>>>    that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>>> MOQ
>>>    but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>>> put
>>>    the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>> Dan:
>>> No idea what you are saying here"
>>> ---------------------------------------------------
>>> The russel paradox is on the web.but its is math,and mixing math with
>>> words
>>> ends up in woods. Always.
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> Rusell's paradox points out an inconsistency in naive set theory: there
>> can't be a set of all sets. But Russell's paradox doesn't apply to the MOQ
>> because the MOQ contains itself at a stage that precedes logic. The MOQ
>> does also contain itself as an intellectual idea, but this is more of a
>> projection of the MOQ into Pirsig's theory of static value patterns than
>> the real MOQ.
>>
>> Furthermore, there are potentially consistent variants of set theory that
>> permit the set of all sets. The most notable of them is probably New
>> Foundations by Quine. I'd like to understand more about them. They might
>> render Russell's paradox even more inapplicable to the MOQ. In order to
>> employ them one would apparently have to denote Quality by a variable, but
>> this could be possible in some many-valued logic. However, that would be a
>> lot of work and it wouldn't seem to defuse the Heinous Quadrilemma. I am
>> also somehow opposed to the idea of denoting Quality by a variable although
>> I'm not sure why.
>>
>> In any case, this consistency issue highlights a curious fact. In LILA
>> Pirsig writes:
>>
>> "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience,
>> and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these."
>>
>> It's funny that due to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, normal arithmetic
>> isn't known to be consistent. Only weak systems of arithmetic such as
>> Presburger arithmetic are provably consistent. But Presburger arithmetic
>> doesn't allow multiplication by variables. This basically excludes
>> Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and a great deal of science. Does
>> Pirsig intend to restrict truth to weak systems such as Presburger
>> arithmetic? Probably not. What he means with "logical consistency" is
>> probably something like: "hasn't been proven inconsistent" (for systems)
>> and: "proven as a theorem of a system that hasn't been proven inconsistent"
>> (for theorems).
>>
>> As for your opinion that mixing math with words always ends up in woods -
>> not for Einstein. I cite the article you linked in your previous post:
>>
>> "Einstein only employed words or other symbols (presumably mathematical)
>> -- in what he explicitly called a secondary translation step -- after he
>> was able to solve his problems through the formal manipulation of
>> internally imagined images, feelings, and architectures. 'I very rarely
>> think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in
>> words afterwards,' he wrote (Wertheimer, 1959, 213; Pais, 1982)."
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 07-Nov-16 10:02, David Harding wrote:
>>
>>> Tuk wrote:
>>> Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first
>>> post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier
>>> message at the end of that post.
>>>
>>> djh responds:
>>> Yes I am listening. You've concluded that the MOQ is low quality due to
>>> the
>>> Quadrilemma.  The Quadrilema in your mind is a foregone conclusion and so
>>> you've already moved on from it. So you're starting for a point that the
>>> MOQ is low quality. If that is your starting point then why should we
>>> bother to discuss the MOQ with you?
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Because someone could write an academic article about the Quadrilemma and
>> send it to a philosophical journal. If the article were to pass peer-review
>> it would be published. I thought you'd have a motive to be prepared for
>> this. I could help you.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> Tuk
>>
>>
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