[MD] Annotations to LC

Tue Nov 15 06:59:23 PST 2016

Long time ago i did some powerlifting,in the booming days of
Decadurabolin, deca, decastacks, dianabol, diana,bol etc...
One of the stacks was named in a bit of a hurry as' duodeca'.
it became a brand on its own. the name was later adopted by the
game-builders, processor developers( core name) ,and even the music
industry.
But the old deca was best, along with sustanon.

It happens also with other names.Like creatine.

So adding 'lemma' to the term makes it a sort of chapter?, in your mind?
The diagram that comes with it does not even match with child's talk.
But the mail you presented to Dan,dude, completely delusional.
But you'r fun, i like you anyway, so please stay on board.

Yours sincerely
Adrie

2016-11-15 14:19 GMT+01:00 Tuukka Virtaperko <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>:

> David, Adrie,
>
> you don't believe in the existence of the Heinous Quadrilemma. How about
> this duodecalemma?
>
> http://wiki.moq.fi/images/0/03/Duodecalemma.jpg
>
> Regards,
>
> Tuk
>
>
>
>
>
> On 09-Nov-16 16:07, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>
>> I still do not agree that  there is something like a heinous quadrilemma.
>> I took the liberty to re-read the whole thread.I still conclude the lack
>> of
>> evidence for the claims.
>> There is an strange emptyness in your proposals.A void without a name.
>>
>> Taking some liberty is allowed i suppose,so i took this from
>> the web .
>>
>>
>> http://wiki.moq.fi/index.php?title=Zen_and_the_Art_of_Insani
>> ty&action=history
>>
>> -------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> there are a number of issue's coming forward now; dynamic quality
>> is a product originating tuukka, as is static quality,and Pirsig or
>> Whitehead or
>> William james never mentioned something alike.
>> But it is not because i use this as an example,that it should or would
>> render
>> the whole analysis meaningless, it is not.
>> Should i read something new here?
>>
>> "Tuukka's work misses a starting point"( the commenter in the artikle)
>> but this is not the only facet that needs some attention.
>>
>> I also took the liberty to click the "view history" button on the
>> right/above
>> of the page.
>>
>> I honestly think that the review however should be reviewed by the listers
>> here.
>> Not to make Tuuk ridicules,but to understand.
>>
>> Adrie
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2016-11-09 12:44 GMT+01:00 Tuukka Virtaperko <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>:
>>
>> dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> dmb had said:
>>>>
>>>>> One say that "Pure experience" or Quality "logically precedes this
>>>>> distinction" just as one can say sleeping logically precedes waking.
>>>>>    In both cases, logic doesn't exist in that first stage but logic
>>>>> does obtain when we start thinking about it or talking about it. The
>>>>>    logic can also be expressed as a little argument: Since concepts
>>>>> are  derived from experience, the experiential material from which
>>>>> they  are derived must come before the concepts.
>>>>>
>>>>> Tuukka repled to dmb:
>>>>>
>>>> Unlike Quality, "sleeping" is not an undefined concept. But you seem
>>>> to imply that logic doesn't exist when people sleep. Firstly, not
>>>> true. Some people have seen correct formal statements in their dreams.
>>>> My high school maths teacher told me Ramanujan did this. Secondly, not
>>>> relevant. Waking does not logically follow sleeping, it follows
>>>> sleeping temporally.
>>>>
>>>> As for you little argument, well, I don't see the point. I'm fine with
>>>> the idea that concepts are derived from experience and that the
>>>> experiential material from which they are derived must come before the
>>>> concepts. But I'm saying the concepts are not deduced from the
>>>> experiential material. They also do not logically follow from it.
>>>> Deduction and logic is what you do when you already have a bunch of
>>>> concepts.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> dmb says:
>>>>
>>>> You've missed the point entirely so I'll try a more direct approach.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You're saying that concepts can't logically follow from pure experience
>>>> because there is no logic in pure experience. The "logic" characterizes
>>>> es
>>>> the RELATION BETWEEN experience and concepts but you have been
>>>> mistakenly
>>>> using "logic" as if it were supposed to characterize pure experience.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Logic doesn't characterize pure experience. Neither does it characterize
>>> the relation between experience and concepts. Logic characterizes the
>>> relation between defined concepts and other defined concepts.
>>>
>>>
>>> dmb: The same confusion occurred in your response to the sleeping-waking
>>>
>>>> analogy, wherein you tried to characterize sleep as containing logic.
>>>> Again, the logic describes the RELATION BETWEEN sleep and waking, i.e.
>>>> you
>>>> can't wake up unless you're sleeping.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> According to Pirsig, Quality is an undefined concept. There is no
>>> metaphysical restriction against defining "sleeping". Hence, even if
>>> sleeping were thought to be a logical necessity of waking up it wouldn't
>>> follow that Quality would be a logical necessity of, well, anything.
>>>
>>>
>>> dmb:
>>>
>>>> Understanding an idea BEFORE criticizing it is also a logical necessity,
>>>> by the way.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Now I understand why you don't criticize the Metaphysics of Quality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote:
>>>
>>> Tuk, all,
>>>>
>>>> I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David
>>>> Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted
>>>> them.
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>>>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you
>>>>>> have a
>>>>>> dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
>>>>>>
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>> is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has
>>>>>> been
>>>>>> done. The MOQ is an idea."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
>>>>>>
>>>>> Pirsig
>>>>>
>>>>>> doesn't get it.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
>>>> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
>>>>
>>>> dichotomize
>>>>
>>>> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>>> 1.
>>>> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
>>>> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>>> 2.
>>>> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
>>>> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dialetheism
>>>>
>>>> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
>>>>
>>>> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
>>>> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
>>>> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
>>>> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
>>>> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
>>>> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
>>>> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
>>>> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
>>>>
>>>> Dan comments:
>>>> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> What Donny actually says is:
>>>
>>> "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or
>>> B), iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
>>>
>>> Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
>>>
>>> (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
>>> B))))
>>>
>>> This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
>>>
>>> The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
>>> dichotomistic distinction to itself.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "So, Mind/Body distinction (MBd) is clearly a thought or system of
>>>>>>
>>>>> thought.
>>>>>
>>>>>> It is not spatially extended; MBd has no body. It's an element of
>>>>>> Mind.
>>>>>>
>>>>> But
>>>>>
>>>>>> what about SOM (knower/known)? It's obviously not a knowing
>>>>>>
>>>>> consciousness;
>>>>>
>>>>>> it's something (namely an idea) we know/are aware of. SOM is an
>>>>>> object,
>>>>>>
>>>>> a
>>>>>
>>>>>> /Gegenstand/  (literally 'stands over against' consciousness). So, I
>>>>>>
>>>>> hope now
>>>>>
>>>>>> that it's clear that SOM and MBd are different. Pirsig missed that
>>>>>>
>>>>> little
>>>>>
>>>>>> point.
>>>>>> [108] RMP: No, both the SOM and MBd are sets of ideas, and there is no
>>>>>> reason to make a big distinction between them on this basis.
>>>>>> I think the confusion here is between the 'object' of a sentence
>>>>>> (Gegenstand) and a physical object. When you call ideas 'objects' you
>>>>>> destroy the normal meaning of those terms and introduce confusion."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then why call bodies objects in the first place?
>>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> Pirsig is replying to a post that introduces 'body.'
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> A native English speaker would be accustomed to thinking of material
>>> things as "objects". In Finnish we have a different word for that, so my
>>> normal meaning of "object" ("objekti" in Finnish) is something like "the
>>> object of a sentence" or "JavaScript-object" or "mathematical object".
>>> This
>>> probably explains why Pirsig's use of the word "object" is so
>>> counterintuitive for me.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>>>>> object.'
>>>>>> [111] RMP: Object: n.
>>>>>> Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>>>>
>>>>> vision or
>>>>>
>>>>>> touch; a material thing.
>>>>>>    1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>>>>>    2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>>>    3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>>>>
>>>>> substantive
>>>>>
>>>>>> following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>>>    4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>>>    (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>>> The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>>>> biological
>>>>>> patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>>>>> 'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>>>>>
>>>>> that
>>>>>
>>>>>> in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>>>>>
>>>>> between
>>>>>
>>>>>> them is meaningless."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus
>>>>>> of
>>>>>> attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Why is there no Definition #5?
>>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>>>
>>>> Object: n.
>>>>
>>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>>>
>>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>>>
>>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>
>>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>
>>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>
>>>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>
>>>> The “objects” in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>>>> patterns. The “objects” Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>>>
>>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
>>> The distinction is very sharp."
>>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They
>>> exist
>>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
>>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
>>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
>>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>>>
>>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
>>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
>>> things, but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
>>> physical objects.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>>>>> experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel
>>>>>>
>>>>> gives a
>>>>>
>>>>>> strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>>>>> deduction?
>>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
>>> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains
>>> why
>>> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
>>> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ
>>> doesn't
>>> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
>>> deduction.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
>>>>>>
>>>>> to
>>>>>
>>>>>> sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
>>>>>>
>>>>> shark.
>>>>>
>>>>>> But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> Prove it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development
>>> of
>>> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
>>> important contribution to process philosophy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
>>>>
>>>>> Quality of being reality?
>>>>> [135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
>>>>> the
>>>>> SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
>>>>> assertion
>>>>> that values are unreal."
>>>>>
>>>>> I agree.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
>>>>> Mostly
>>>>> for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
>>>>> dilemmas.
>>>>> It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize
>>>>> dilemmas.
>>>>> [143]
>>>>> RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
>>>>> cite
>>>>> the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can
>>>>> two
>>>>> opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own
>>>>> choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S.
>>>>> Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context
>>>>> for
>>>>> understanding."
>>>>>
>>>>> Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained
>>>>> how to
>>>>> correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given
>>>>> situation.
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> Not sure what you are objecting to here.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
>>> "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
>>> contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
>>> materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that
>>> can be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe
>>> in
>>> bad ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe
>>> in
>>> good ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
>>>>
>>>>> RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
>>>>> arbitrary.
>>>>> If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ,
>>>>> even
>>>>> though he personally prefers four levels."
>>>>>
>>>>> What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> Yes.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous
>>> Quadrilemma.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
>>>>
>>>>> potency
>>>>> of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls
>>>> apart.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Q&A [4]
>>>>
>>>>> Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
>>>>> should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was
>>>>> concentrating
>>>>> on
>>>>> the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them
>>>>> entirely to
>>>>> help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid
>>>>> of
>>>>> them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper
>>>>> two
>>>>> levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I
>>>>> saw
>>>>> that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply
>>>>> distinguishing between biological and social levels.
>>>>> If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
>>>>> modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
>>>>> latter
>>>>> ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has
>>>>> caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at
>>>>> present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase
>>>>> values
>>>>> and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt
>>>>> of
>>>>> the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ.
>>>>> At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to
>>>>> be
>>>>> dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
>>>>> expressions of independent scientific reality."
>>>>>
>>>>> Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
>>>>> he
>>>>> reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
>>>>> logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other
>>>>> kind of
>>>>> changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the
>>> MOQ. Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ
>>> correctly... "
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> "Q&A [4]
>>>>
>>>>> RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
>>>>> important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
>>>>> materialist
>>>>> system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist
>>>>> system
>>>>> matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one
>>>>> meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are
>>>>> levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can
>>>>> coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger
>>>>> reality.
>>>>> The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
>>>>> composed
>>>>> of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely
>>>>> high
>>>>> quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so.
>>>>> But
>>>>> the
>>>>> MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is
>>>>> still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent
>>>>> scientific
>>>>> material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific
>>>>> discoveries
>>>>> come in."
>>>>>
>>>>> Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>>>> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a
>>>>> taxonomic
>>>>> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual
>>>>> box
>>>>> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>>>>> MOQ
>>>>> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>>>>> put
>>>>> the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>> No idea what you are saying here.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Tuukka:
>>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
>>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of
>>> sand.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08-Nov-16 0:26, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>>>
>>> Maybe this can be of help to further avoid the munchausen trilemma.
>>>>
>>>> I arrived at my in a dynamical way(smiley)
>>>>
>>>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/imagine/201003/einstein
>>>> -creative-thinking-music-and-the-intuitive-art-scientific-imagination
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> The Münchhausen trilemma is a pretty fundamental objection towards the
>>> possibility of any kind of knowledge. I don't find it particular to the
>>> MOQ
>>> or the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 08-Nov-16 11:36, Adrie Kintziger wrote:
>>>
>>> Sorry for the intrusion,but only a fast respons...
>>>>
>>>> what kept my eye,earlier this week when i was reading russel's paradox
>>>> on the web,was the striking similarity between the paradox and what tuuk
>>>> is
>>>> saying here
>>>>
>>>> snip
>>>>    "Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the
>>>> Heinous
>>>>    Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a
>>>> taxonomic
>>>>    declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual
>>>> box
>>>>    that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain
>>>> the
>>>> MOQ
>>>>    but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So,
>>>> why
>>>> put
>>>>    the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>>> Dan:
>>>> No idea what you are saying here"
>>>> ---------------------------------------------------
>>>> The russel paradox is on the web.but its is math,and mixing math with
>>>> words
>>>> ends up in woods. Always.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> Rusell's paradox points out an inconsistency in naive set theory: there
>>> can't be a set of all sets. But Russell's paradox doesn't apply to the
>>> MOQ
>>> because the MOQ contains itself at a stage that precedes logic. The MOQ
>>> does also contain itself as an intellectual idea, but this is more of a
>>> projection of the MOQ into Pirsig's theory of static value patterns than
>>> the real MOQ.
>>>
>>> Furthermore, there are potentially consistent variants of set theory that
>>> permit the set of all sets. The most notable of them is probably New
>>> Foundations by Quine. I'd like to understand more about them. They might
>>> render Russell's paradox even more inapplicable to the MOQ. In order to
>>> employ them one would apparently have to denote Quality by a variable,
>>> but
>>> this could be possible in some many-valued logic. However, that would be
>>> a
>>> lot of work and it wouldn't seem to defuse the Heinous Quadrilemma. I am
>>> also somehow opposed to the idea of denoting Quality by a variable
>>> although
>>> I'm not sure why.
>>>
>>> In any case, this consistency issue highlights a curious fact. In LILA
>>> Pirsig writes:
>>>
>>> "The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience,
>>> and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these."
>>>
>>> It's funny that due to Gödel's incompleteness theorems, normal arithmetic
>>> isn't known to be consistent. Only weak systems of arithmetic such as
>>> Presburger arithmetic are provably consistent. But Presburger arithmetic
>>> doesn't allow multiplication by variables. This basically excludes
>>> Newtonian mechanics and quantum physics and a great deal of science. Does
>>> Pirsig intend to restrict truth to weak systems such as Presburger
>>> arithmetic? Probably not. What he means with "logical consistency" is
>>> probably something like: "hasn't been proven inconsistent" (for systems)
>>> and: "proven as a theorem of a system that hasn't been proven
>>> inconsistent"
>>> (for theorems).
>>>
>>> As for your opinion that mixing math with words always ends up in woods -
>>> not for Einstein. I cite the article you linked in your previous post:
>>>
>>> "Einstein only employed words or other symbols (presumably mathematical)
>>> -- in what he explicitly called a secondary translation step -- after he
>>> was able to solve his problems through the formal manipulation of
>>> internally imagined images, feelings, and architectures. 'I very rarely
>>> think in words at all. A thought comes, and I may try to express it in
>>> words afterwards,' he wrote (Wertheimer, 1959, 213; Pais, 1982)."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 07-Nov-16 10:02, David Harding wrote:
>>>
>>> Tuk wrote:
>>>> Pay attention! My starting points are what Pirsig wrote. See the first
>>>> post titled "The Heinous Quadrilemma". Also see the cited earlier
>>>> message at the end of that post.
>>>>
>>>> djh responds:
>>>> Yes I am listening. You've concluded that the MOQ is low quality due to
>>>> the
>>>> Quadrilemma.  The Quadrilema in your mind is a foregone conclusion and
>>>> so
>>>> you've already moved on from it. So you're starting for a point that the
>>>> MOQ is low quality. If that is your starting point then why should we
>>>> bother to discuss the MOQ with you?
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Because someone could write an academic article about the Quadrilemma and
>>> send it to a philosophical journal. If the article were to pass
>>> peer-review
>>> it would be published. I thought you'd have a motive to be prepared for
>>> this. I could help you.
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>> Tuk
>>>
>>>
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>>
>>
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