[MD] Annotations to LC

Tuukka Virtaperko mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Wed Nov 16 05:00:08 PST 2016


Djh, Adrie, dmb,



On 14-Nov-16 4:49, David Harding wrote:
> Tuukka said:
> "Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
> "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
> contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
> materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that
> can be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in
> bad ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in
> good ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer."
>
>
> Djh writes:
>
> Tuk, this is the crux of the matter.  What drives which one we should
> 'believe' is based on the Quality of the description at the time.If it's
> of high quality to assume that matter comes first - assume that. If it's of
> high quality to assume that ideas create matter - assume that. It's not
> about holding two contradictory ideas at the same time. But using one
> depending on the Quality of the description.



Tuukka:
But as a solution to the mind-matter-problem this is a rhetorical one, 
since Quality is an undefined concept. The mind-matter problem is a 
dialectical problem. Feel free to find Pirsig's MOQ to solve that 
problem for you if it was a rhetorical solution you were looking for in 
the first place. Usually, however, a dialectical solution would've been 
sought for, such as the one provided by the AMOQ.



> Adrie:
>
> So adding 'lemma' to the term makes it a sort of chapter?, in your mind?
> The diagram that comes with it does not even match with child's talk.
> But the mail you presented to Dan,dude, completely delusional.
> But you'r fun, i like you anyway, so please stay on board.



Tuukka:

Pirsig writes of a dilemma in ZAMM. A dilemma is a problem with two 
horns. A duodecalemma is a problem with twelve horns. Each of the horns 
is identified by a code specified in the diagram, such as 2a. You could 
point to a specific horn and choose to be impaled by that horn or argue 
there is no horn, but looks like you'd rather be impaled by all the 
horns at once in a heinous logical twelvesome.

http://wiki.moq.fi/images/0/03/Duodecalemma.jpg

Look, pal, I do power lifting too and it doesn't make me go all tee-hee 
at sophisticated words such as "dilemma", "duodecalemma" or "lemma".



> Tukka said"
>
> According to Pirsig, the MOQ is logically consistent. This means "matter
> precedes mind" and "mind precedes matter" result in an inconsistency,
> since if A precedes B then B doesn't precede A.
>
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> You think you've discovered a logical inconsistency here and the rest of your heinous critique is predicated on that starting point. But that's where you go wrong; right from that starting point. The claims of materialism cannot be reconciled with the claims of idealism are mutually exclusive so that you can only have one or the other but that is only true WITHIN the SOM framework on which they are both based. The MOQ begins by rejecting that framework, by rejecting SOM and the theory of truth that it entails. In the MOQ, as I've already explained, materialism and idealism are both wrong


Tuukka:
Not according to Pirsig. In LILA Pirsig writes that all schools are 
right on the mind-matter question.


> because of premise they share is wrong. Neither one of them is right because mind and matter are just concepts not the starting point of reality. The mistake that they both make is to treat these concepts as if they were the ontological structure of reality. That is a conceptual error (reification) and the MOQ rejects it. In the MOQ, mind and matter are conceptual categories that are useful f
>   or thinking about experience and the MOQ can include both of them without contradiction.


Tuukka:

Pirsig's MOQ can include both of them without contradiction, but then it 
has to also take
one of these stances:

* Materialism isn't true
* Idealism isn't good
* Falsehood is good

Not much of a solution!


>
> Also, as I've already explained, the MOQ subscribes to the Pragmatic theory of truth and under that theory truth is provisional rather than eternal and truth is plural rather than singular. The art gallery analogy, wherein many visions and many versions of the truth can exist side by side even though they might make very different claims, is a pretty good picture of this kind of Pragmatic pluralism.


Tuukka:
I know that.


>
> You're putting way too much way emphasis on the logic and way too little emphasis on understanding the concepts involved.


Tuukka:
That's just an unspecific stock objection to what I'm saying. Attempting 
to play along with that would require me to try to figure out what is it 
that you actually meant to tell me. I think you should do that work 
yourself.



> Logical rigor is not going to help anyone who is operating with a series of misconceptions.


Tuukka:
Not true. See how Gödel's incompleteness proofs affected Frege's and 
Russell's work.


>
> Tuukka asked:
>
> Aren't these Kant's things noumena, not objective patterns? ...I don't understand what would make noumena objective.
>
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> Yes, I know. It seems quite clear to me that you don't understand the philosophical concepts involved. That's what I've been saying. Short answer, the noumenal realm is "objective" because it is held to be reality as it really is (reality in itself) regardless of anyone's opinion or anyone's perception.


Tuukka:

According to the WordNet database, "noumenon" means:

"The intellectual conception of a thing as it is in itself, not as it is 
known through perception"

According to the WordNet database, the adjective "objective" means:

"1. Undistorted by emotion or personal bias; based on observable phenomena
2. [irrelevant]
3. Emphasizing or expressing things as perceived without distortion of 
personal feelings, insertion of fictional matter, or interpretation
4. Belonging to immediate experience of actual things or events"

I suppose noumena might be objective according to definition 1 if we 
base our conceptions of things an sich on observable phenomena but also 
interpret them through some intellectual model. So, according to the 
conclusion of this hasty inquiry, noumena could be objective. But 
objectivity does not necessitate belief in noumena. Hence, this entire 
sidetrack is irrelevant.



> dmb:
>
> Logic is a great tool for checking the validity of arguments and claims


Tuukka:
Not according to you. You wrote: "Logical rigor is not going to help 
anyone who is operating with a series of misconceptions."


> but you ought to put that tool down for a while and take some time to familiarize yourself with the concepts first.


Tuukka:
Which concepts?



> Tuukka said to David and Adrie:
>
> you don't believe in the existence of the Heinous Quadrilemma. How about
> this duodecalemma?
>
> http://wiki.moq.fi/images/0/03/Duodecalemma.jpg
>
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> This duodecalemma begins with the same false premise, namely that materialism and idealism cannot be reconciled within the MOQ's larger context.


Tuukka:
Materialism and idealism can be reconciled within Pirsig's MOQ but only 
rhetorically. The academic community will not be convinced by that. 
Pirsig has written LILA with the spirit that if academic philosophers 
would just let go of some silly prejudice they'd accept Pirsig's MOQ 
just like that. Now I've explained to you why this isn't going to happen.


> Again, the meaning and the status of both mind and matter is drastically altered in the MOQ but you're operating without that alteration. You're operating as if one or the other has to come first and the MOQ says they both come first but that's simply not true.


Tuukka:

Pirsig always argues rhetorically that Quality or "pure experience" 
comes first. But that is irrelevant in this context, because the inquiry 
I'm making is dialectical, not rhetorical.

In LC Pirsig argues dialectically as if mind comes first. In LILA Pirsig 
argues dialectically as if matter comes first. In ZAMM Pirsig argues 
dialectically that both come first.

So, Pirsig has basically written three books with different dialectical 
starting points. And he rhetorically combines the books as a single 
whole. That's not a dialectical solution. That's a rhetorical solution. 
Whenever one introduces rhetoric to the core content of his thesis the 
entire thesis turns rhetorical even if it were to also contain lots of 
dialectic.

The mind-matter problem is a dialectical problem. It cannot be solved 
with rhetoric.


> The MOQ says neither of them come first. The MOQ says they are both secondary additions. They are very handy concepts and they are true in that Pragmatic sense. But neither of them are primary realities. In the MOQ, reality is experience as such. Quality is the primary empirical reality from which both concepts are derived, from which ALL concepts are derived - including the laws of logic.
>


Tuukka:
This is rhetoric, not dialectic.


Regards,
Tuk

---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus




More information about the Moq_Discuss mailing list