[MD] The Analytic Metaphysics of Quality

Adrie Kintziger parser666 at gmail.com
Thu Nov 17 11:17:41 PST 2016


When reading this, 'it' arrived at me in a dynamical matter.

lets examine the example.

tuukka;quote

"1 + 1 = 2 and 1 + 1 = 0 both have equal
lingual quality. But the former has more theoretical quality than the
latter."
------------------------------------------------------------------
Adrie
This caught my attention for several reasons.It  is a bit of a clever
remark,
but the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
1+1 =2 and 1+1=0 do not carry water by their lingual quality or specific
theoretical quality.
they are only concepts, and conventions.Invented by humans to be used by
humans,;.in as such we can alter their value,meaning ,appearence,and their
place in the hierargy of math, science,natural numbers,physiks, etc.
Take the humans away,...and they become completely meaningless.
One can simply tell to a heron or duck that 1+1 =pi or 666 or 999 and it
will not blink an eye or give a quacck.It will Heron or duck about its own
business.

It looks as if  this is a bit of mindfucking or wordfucking,but it is not.
I took it as a point of entry to point to something else.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
quote Tuukka

"Then a summary of Turing's solution to the halting problem."

Let us construct a theory of Turing machines that manipulate symbols
on a strip of tape according to certain rules. The halting problem
means the question that, given a certain input, does a Turing machine
halt or continue to run forever. Let's assume that the halting problem
has a solution, that is, there's a Turing machine P(x) that, upon
being given x as input, will tell whether x is the code of such a
Turing machine that will halt or not. In the former case it will
output 1 and in the latter case it will output 0 and halt. Let's then
code a Turing machine T(x) that runs P(x) for a given input and will
get stuck in an endless loop upon receiving 1 but will otherwise halt.
Now let's run T(x) so that the input is the code of T(x). If T(x)
halts, it must have received 0 from P(x), which means it will not
halt. P(X) doesn't therefore work as intended. But if T(x) doesn't
halt it must have received 1 from P(x) which means that it will halt.
In this case, too, P(x) doesn't work correctly. Therefore the Turing
machine P(x) doesn't exist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Adrie's comment.

If you take something to cut copy and paste it, or to rewrite it to avoid
of being accused of cut/copy/paste it from wiki or Reddit, you should
understand your
own article that you are presenting.
Turing invented the turing machine , ad subsequently discovered the halting
problem.


But as you write, in your example, in the formulae, "certain rules" and
again
"certain input" in your openingsalinea,the machine becomes meanigless, as
it does not state,...:=> endless or infinite and finite.This makes your
model void,
hempty,adding nothing to nottingness.

But really , no, "doesn't" work correctly and "px does't exist" =balony from
the shitshelf.
The turing machine is "undecided" and endless, and infinite at the same
time.
it can contain all sets of truths.Check all sets of thruths,but does not
know the truth.

to give another example, if one is to run the Turing machine and the
halting problem in  a closed loop together with division by zero or divide
by zero,
it will prove to be the same model,running endlessly along the rivers of
natural numbers,indefinete loop, infinity , until it runs up against a
division by zero error,, or conflicts with pi altogether. The machine will
halt somewere probably
but it will probably take about the age of the universe.
To be honest , Tuukka, you should learn about the division by zero problem
before you come to the halting problem.

But i can see some other strange entanglement.

I made a searchstring from some of the terms you are using here, like
axiom,Godel,Turing, halting problem, Godel's analogy etc, and kept the
order,even for the famous Peano .........

and guess what, i found most of the article you presented here on a reddit
page from three years ago, but also found it on recent reddit entry's.Made
by others.
Funny.The proof of the pudding is in the eating;---burps!


https://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/1d7zsp/the_incompleteness_and_the_halting_problem_proofs/

pfff.
This multilevel solution of yours,in the above presentation,does it shelter
completely under the umbrella of inorganic/organic/ biological/intellectual?
and if so,DOES it add levels that were absent in the train of the above
sentence,or were they already there?;;;
wich is most complete and elegant with as less as possible symbols, tokens
or
subdivisions?The basic formulae or your near infinite loop?

Thinking about it, Pirsig himself mentioned objective to correspond with
inorganic/organic and subjective to correspond with biological and
intellectual.
But adding that the need for objective or subjective is absent in the moq.
I think it was in a mail converstion with Henry Gurr.You can find a lot of
Explanations Pirsig himself makes on Henry's site.The site does not navigate
easy.
So conclusive, i prefer the elegant model.Not yours.

btw what if P(x) is a prime number?

Yours eternally
Adrie
















2016-11-15 14:04 GMT+01:00 <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>:

> Dan, all,
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>>> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development
>>> of
>>> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
>>> important contribution to process philosophy.
>>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Nice. Hey though. I just searched Amazon and came up empty.
>>
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
>
> The edition has sold out and, furthermore, as a summary of my research
> and development "Zen and the Art of Insanity" is obsolete. There is a
> wiki on the web about my work but that's also obsolete. I can
> summarize the current state of my research here.
>
> Though I always wanted to develop my own metaphysical system it took
> years to find a way to create something that's an improvement to
> the metaphysical ideas we already know. The development of my own
> theory, the Analytic Metaphysics of Quality, began when I realized a
> logically elegant possibility in which the subject matter of ZAMM and
> LILA could be combined into a coherent whole that is a single theory.
>
> Since Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is a variant of
> emergent materialism and LILA subscribes to empiricism, I assumed that
> the theory of static value patterns of LILA is a theory of the
> objective quality of ZAMM.
>
> Since neither romantic nor classical quality seem to be Dynamic
> Quality I assumed they're static quality. I proceeded to assume that
> each static level of LILA has a romantic subset and a classical subset.
>
> Now we have a hierarchy of objective quality, but a similar hierarchy
> of subjective quality is missing. We will construct such a hierarchy
> as follows.
>
> Each subjective level of static value has a romantic subset that is
> the same as the romantic subset of some objective level. But the
> romantic subset of the lowest ranking subjective level is the same is
> the romantic subset of the highest ranking objective level, and vice
> versa. The order of the subjective levels is therefore inverse to the
> order of the objective levels if we use the subsets of romantic
> quality as a point of reference.
>
> Note how this is in partial agreement with Pirsig's LC stance that
> "the mind" is the intellectual level. The agreement is only partial
> because the lowest subjective level of AMOQ isn't called the
> intellectual level. But it has a nonempty intersection with the
> intellectual level. That intersection is a subset of romantic quality.
>
> At this point we may pause to wonder about what all this means.
> Frankly, I'm surprised if you've read this far. I don't suppose
> mathematical form is the optimal way to introduce the AMOQ on MD, but
> going through that part is kind of necessary for justifying the
> theory. The mathematical form is the best way to demonstrate that the
> AMOQ is neither arbitrary nor needlessly complicated. However, the
> subsets of romantic quality and the subjective levels also need to be
> described in order for the theory to be understood.
>
>
> Subjective levels
>
> Pirsig's theory of static levels corresponds closely with Maslow's
> hierarchy of needs with the exception that the inorganic level
> corresponds to no need described in Maslow's theory. The biological
> level corresponds to Maslow's lower needs, such as food and warmth.
> The social level corresponds to Maslow's higher needs, such as respect
> and privacy. And the intellectual level corresponds to Maslow's
> self-actualization, which includes creativity, problem solving and
> lack of prejudice.
>
> In the subjective hierarchy of levels, the lowest subjective level is
> what we might call the believing level. It is similar to the intellectual
> level with regards to its romantic quality. But intellectual patterns
> are understood as results of empirical observations whereas belief
> patterns, though similar in appearance, are understood as starting
> points of a subjective experience. In any case the contents of both
> the intellectual level and the belief level could be called
> "thoughts". They could include statements like "Violence is bad" or
> "Tim Roth plays the same archetype in 'The Hateful Eight' as
> Christpher Waltz plays in 'Django Unchained'".
>
>   From the belief level emerges the considering level, which
> romantically corresponds to the social level. Subjectively, it is a
> more basic need to behave appropriately in a group than to acquire
> food. From an evolutionary viewpoint, this is probably because if the
> group disintegrates the long-term survival of all of its members is
> threatened.
>
>   From the considering level emerges what could be called the
> motivational level. This includes long-term goals and dreams, which
> may involve family, work or interpersonal relationships. These
> correspond romantically to the biological level. Calculations are
> subjective aspirations towards love, wealth, sex, happiness,
> parenthood or
> whatever it is that one wishes to achieve.
>
> The highest subjective level is the epiphanic level. This includes
> those subjective experiences that are so profound they seem to
> manifest through the senses. Examples of such experiences are
> religious visions and hallucinations. Although hallucinations can be
> symptomatic of mental illness, this isn't always the case. Throughout
> the times there have been seers and prophets that have been regarded
> in high esteem. Not all people are capable of having such experiences,
> but then again, not everyone is smart enough to conceive a new
> intellectual idea, either.
>
> I have once experienced a wintry forest turning into fractals during a
> ritual. No mind-altering substances were used. This qualifies as an
> epiphanic pattern. I have also seen colorful flashes of light emanate
> from a person. Someone might say they were his aura. In any case the
> experience of seeing them was accompanied by feelings of relaxation,
> casual conversation and mutual respect. I don't suppose a camera would
> have captured them, so they are highly subjective. Also, importantly,
> they are not inorganic although they're romantically indistinguishable
> from inorganic pattens. What makes them subjective is that I knew the
> flashes of light didn't exist as photons or as something that would
> make plants grow. They existed in my mind.
>
> Now we have a subjective theory of static quality and an objective
> theory of static quality. They differ so that the objective theory is
> rational whereas the subjective theory is associative. In other words,
> subjective patterns do not follow the laws of logic but merely are
> associated to each other. From the viewpoint of the conscious mind
> they pop out of nowhere and are to be perceived and accepted as they
> are.
>
> The theories can be expressed as a table. Numbering marks the moral
> order of a level in its theory.
>
> Subjective level:?Romantic subset:?Objective level:
> 1.?Believing??????"Deliberation"???4.?Intellectual
> 2.?Considering????Higher needs?????3.?Social
> 3.?Motivational???Lower needs??????2.?Biological
> 4.?Epiphanic??????"Sense-data"?????1.?Inorganic
>
> The subjective and the objective theory of static value patterns are
> similar in the sense that both are empirical. This goes well with
> Pirsig's writings about how the MOQ is empiricistic. However, Pirsig
> also writes that the highest form of intellectuality is the
> manipulation of abstract symbols that bear no relation to
> corresponding experience and that behave according to rules of their
> own. In other words, Pirsig finds pure logic to be the highest, most
> morally valuable form of experience. However, logic isn't an empirical
> science.
>
>
> Logical levels
>
> I add a third theory of static value: the theory of logical patterns
> of value. This theory isn't empirical. It's normative. This means the
> "atoms" of the theory are norms, that is, abstract rules. However, the
> theory is still rational, like the objective theory.
>
> The lowest level of the logical hierarchy of static value is the
> lingual level. It could be said that this level contains syntax rules
> of some logical language. For example, the expression 1 + 1 = 2 has
> more lingual quality than the expression = + 1 2 1.
>
> Lingual patterns make facilitate the expression of logical ideas. But
> they are just the basic level. From the lingual level emerges the
> theoretical level. This level introduces the notion of theoremhood,
> that is, what kind of statements can be inferred from other statements
> that are considered as axioms. 1 + 1 = 2 and 1 + 1 = 0 both have equal
> lingual quality. But the former has more theoretical quality than the
> latter.
>
> The metatheoretical level emerges from the theoretical level. To
> examine something from a metalevel means that we examine it from an
> outsider's perspective. For example, if we're studying the French
> language, we use the English language as a metalevel because that's a
> language we already know. In logic, truth tables are an example of a
> metatheoretical pattern. There's no way to prove truth tables as a
> theorem of the axioms of the object-level logic, but truth tables are
> anyway a valid proof method.
>
>   From the metatheoretical level emerges the analogic level. Analogic
> patterns manifest as understanding of deep similarities between formal
> constructs that appear to have very different starting points. For
> example, consider the barber paradox:
>
> "Suppose that in a village there's a barber who shaves all men who
> don't shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself?"
>
> and another paradox that has sometimes been used to argue that an
> omnipotent god doesn't exist:
>
> "Suppose an omnipotent god. Can that god create a rock so heavy he
> can't lift it?"
>
> Both paradoxes are analogous by virtue of defining something that
> necessarily has some attribute it cannot have. In other words, they're
> both paradoxes, like I already stated. But the previous example is
> rather simplistic. A deeper analogy can be found between Gödel's first
> incompleteness theorem and the halting problem.
>
> First, let's summarize Gödel's theorem.
>
> Let us construct within a sufficiently strong consistent theory L a
> (closed) sentence G := "L doesn't prove sentence G". Let G be a
> sentence that has a Gödel number as an unique identifier. (The Gödel
> number of a sentence is formed by giving each character of the
> sentence a Gödel number according to a certain pattern and then
> multiplying these numbers with each other.) Now, if L proves sentence
> G, L is consistent, which is contrary to our initial assumption. But
> if L proves the negation of G, it proves an equivalent sentence "L
> proves sentence G". This again means L is inconsistent. Therefore L
> neither proves G nor the negation of G. Consequently, L is incomplete.
>
> Then a summary of Turing's solution to the halting problem.
>
> Let us construct a theory of Turing machines that manipulate symbols
> on a strip of tape according to certain rules. The halting problem
> means the question that, given a certain input, does a Turing machine
> halt or continue to run forever. Let's assume that the halting problem
> has a solution, that is, there's a Turing machine P(x) that, upon
> being given x as input, will tell whether x is the code of such a
> Turing machine that will halt or not. In the former case it will
> output 1 and in the latter case it will output 0 and halt. Let's then
> code a Turing machine T(x) that runs P(x) for a given input and will
> get stuck in an endless loop upon receiving 1 but will otherwise halt.
> Now let's run T(x) so that the input is the code of T(x). If T(x)
> halts, it must have received 0 from P(x), which means it will not
> halt. P(X) doesn't therefore work as intended. But if T(x) doesn't
> halt it must have received 1 from P(x) which means that it will halt.
> In this case, too, P(x) doesn't work correctly. Therefore the Turing
> machine P(x) doesn't exist.
>
> Analogies:
> 1. The Gödel numbered sentence "L proves a sentence whose Gödel number
> is x" <~> P(x), that is, a coded solution to the halting problem
> 2. L is complete, that is, listing all of its proofs (ordered for
> example according length) will always halt into a
> queried closed sentence or the negation of that sentence. <~> P(x)
> always works.
> 3. "L doesn't prove a sentence, whose Gödel number is x" <~> T(x)
> 4. G, that is, "L doesn't prove sentence G" <~> T(x) which has been
> input the code of T(x)
>
>
> Cultural levels
>
> Now we have three theories: objective levels (Pirsig's original
> levels), subjective levels and logical levels. Of these, objective and
> logical levels are rational whereas subjective levels are associative.
> Furthermore, objective and subjective levels are empirical whereas the
> logical level is normative. Consequently, we have an empty space for a
> fourth theory: one that is normative and associative. I call this the
> theory of artistic levels. However, it doesn't apply merely to art. It
> applies to life so that life itself is considered an art form. Just
> like Pirsig wrote in ZAMM about assembling that barbecue thing, that
> that was "sculpting".
>
> "'You mean,' DeWeese asks, 'that when I was putting this rotisserie
> together I was actually sculpting it?'"
>
> The lowest artistic level is the prescriptive level. This includes
> prescriptive rules such as: "Do not go to the balcony naked if the
> neighbors can see." These artistic norms are somehow intuitively
> figured out but that process isn't like the rational process of
> solving a puzzle. It has more to do with belonging to where you are
> and knowing who you are.
>
>   From the prescriptive level emerges the cultural level. Certain sets
> of prescriptive patterns are associated to each other and this way
> form a cultural context such as Islam, Christianity, Finnish culture,
> Russian culture, upper-class culture, punk culture, heavy metal
> culture, demoscene and so on. For example, in some cultures the
> "thumbs up" hand gesture is offensive whereas in others it's not.
>
>   From the cultural level emerges the freedom level. This is what
> Buddha teaches in the Diamond Sutra. The Diamond Sutra is a freedom
> pattern that strives to make us abandon unquestioning normative belief
> in cultural prescriptions:
>
> "Then the lord Buddha made his meaning even more emphatic by saying:
> 'Subhuti, when people begin their practice of seeking to attaining
> total Enlightenment, they ought to see, to perceive, to know, to
> understand, and to realize that all things and all spiritual truths
> are no-things, and, therefore, they ought not to conceive within their
> minds any arbitrary conceptions whatsoever.'"
>
> Freedom patterns encourage us to go against cultural expectations when
> doing so is in our best interests. The spirit of the freedom level is,
> in a Western way, captured by postmodernism.
>
> The highest level of artistic quality is the aesthetic level. It
> emerges from the freedom level. The reasoning behind this is that even
> if we're free we still do make some choices about things. Since these
> choices are no longer prescribed by cultural norms, the only remaining
> criterion, if the choices aren't thought of as random, is aesthetic
> quality. Aesthetical patterns are inferred as generalizations of what
> kind of freedom patterns work. Some generalizations have been
> successfully made over what is aesthetic or not. For example, symmetry
> and the Golden Ratio are well-known aesthetic patterns.
>
> Logical and artistic theories as a table:
>
> Artistic level:?Romantic subset:?Logical level:
> 1.?Prescriptive?"Unity"??????????4.?Analogical
> 2.?Cultural?????"Awareness"??????3.?Metatheoretic
> 3.?Freedom??????"Significance"???2.?Theoretic
> 4.?Aesthetical??"Harmony"????????1.?Lingual
>
> The romantic subsets are largely hypothetical. They could be detected
> by brain imaging, but then again, perhaps not. If it's possible in
> some way to detect the romantic subsets then all experience isn't
> empirical, which is something we discussed in our earlier post.
>
>
> Value accumulation in different theories
>
> I have already described objective value accumulation in some detail
> on earlier MD posts, namely:
> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/moq-discuss/JXhDqpHWBPM/eiq8BsEjBAAJ.
> It is a relevant question whether value accumulation is identical in
> the other theories of static value. For example, it would seem that
> value accumulation from prescriptive level and cultural level would
> resemble value accumulation from biological level to social level.
> Freedom, on the other hand would seem to accumulate value so that
> transgressing cultural norms causes greater value than that of
> adhering to them. Aesthetics, then, emerge as generalizations of
> freedom patterns that work well. Obviously, some transgressions are
> more valuable than others.
>
> Subjective value accumulation would seem to work in a similar way. But
> logical value accumulation would seem to work in the same way as the
> objective one. So, associativity and rationality are apparently
> different models of value accumulation.
>
>
> Multiple identity of patterns
>
> I am experimenting with the idea that patterns manifest in all
> theories. But how? It seems to me that the romantic quality of an
> intellectual pattern isn't the same element as the romantic quality of
> a belief pattern. Rather, the elements are merely members of the same
> subset. So, the romantic quality of a subjective pattern is
> independent of the romantic quality of an objective pattern even
> though the rank would be equal. The classical quality of the pattern
> may be identical, though.
>
> Furthermore, it seems like the classical quality of a subjective
> pattern is identical with the classical quality of an artistic
> pattern. On the other hand, the classical quality of an objective
> pattern is identical with the classical quality of a logical pattern.
>
>
> Application of the AMOQ
>
> The AMOQ improves Pirsig's MOQ into a more complete, refined and
> developed whole with more questions answered and no necessary
> inconsistency. This is why I've kept criticizing Pirsig on MD despite
> the fact that there are consistent logics that do not include the
> disjunctive syllogism, which means the Heinous Tetralemma doesn't work
> in them. Even though it's possible to construct a logical model of
> Pirsig's static quality within such nonstandard logic it would be quite
> unfortunate to interpret MOQ so that it's necessary to use a
> nonstandard logic. It would arguably be better to interpret the MOQ so
> that we may also use classical logic. Furthermore, such an
> interpretation would probably also work in most nonstandard logics if
> not all of them.
>
> The theory of the multiple identity of patterns allows us to sum
> patterns to each other as sets of four vectors so that we can
> calculate the value of the result.
>
> I regard this to solve the mind-matter problem. That's because the
> theory includes a metatheory that tells when the different theories
> should or shouldn't be used, and how.
>
> I'm considering the possibility that external patterns always manifest
> both artistically and objectively, and that internal patterns always
> manifest both subjectively and logically. Since logical patterns
> affect objective patterns and subjective patterns affect artistic
> patterns and vice versa, and objective patterns affect subjective
> patterns whereas logical patterns affect artistic patterns and vice
> versa, the AMOQ solves the mind-matter problem.
>
> The AMOQ might serve as a framework for an artificial intelligence of
> unprecedented capacity to mimic human behavior. Even in its current
> form the AMOQ is interesting due to its striking similarity with
> Jungian psychology. Objectivity corresponds with sensing, subjectivity
> with feeling, logicality with thinking and artisticality with intuition.
>
>
>
> Regards,
> Tuk
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