[MD] The Analytic Metaphysics of Quality

mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Tue Nov 15 05:04:46 PST 2016


Dan, all,



>> Tuukka:
>> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of
>> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
>> important contribution to process philosophy.
>
> Dan:
> Nice. Hey though. I just searched Amazon and came up empty.
>



Tuukka:


The edition has sold out and, furthermore, as a summary of my research
and development "Zen and the Art of Insanity" is obsolete. There is a
wiki on the web about my work but that's also obsolete. I can
summarize the current state of my research here.

Though I always wanted to develop my own metaphysical system it took
years to find a way to create something that's an improvement to
the metaphysical ideas we already know. The development of my own
theory, the Analytic Metaphysics of Quality, began when I realized a
logically elegant possibility in which the subject matter of ZAMM and
LILA could be combined into a coherent whole that is a single theory.

Since Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is a variant of
emergent materialism and LILA subscribes to empiricism, I assumed that
the theory of static value patterns of LILA is a theory of the
objective quality of ZAMM.

Since neither romantic nor classical quality seem to be Dynamic
Quality I assumed they're static quality. I proceeded to assume that
each static level of LILA has a romantic subset and a classical subset.

Now we have a hierarchy of objective quality, but a similar hierarchy
of subjective quality is missing. We will construct such a hierarchy
as follows.

Each subjective level of static value has a romantic subset that is
the same as the romantic subset of some objective level. But the
romantic subset of the lowest ranking subjective level is the same is
the romantic subset of the highest ranking objective level, and vice
versa. The order of the subjective levels is therefore inverse to the
order of the objective levels if we use the subsets of romantic
quality as a point of reference.

Note how this is in partial agreement with Pirsig's LC stance that
"the mind" is the intellectual level. The agreement is only partial
because the lowest subjective level of AMOQ isn't called the
intellectual level. But it has a nonempty intersection with the
intellectual level. That intersection is a subset of romantic quality.

At this point we may pause to wonder about what all this means.
Frankly, I'm surprised if you've read this far. I don't suppose
mathematical form is the optimal way to introduce the AMOQ on MD, but
going through that part is kind of necessary for justifying the
theory. The mathematical form is the best way to demonstrate that the
AMOQ is neither arbitrary nor needlessly complicated. However, the
subsets of romantic quality and the subjective levels also need to be
described in order for the theory to be understood.


Subjective levels

Pirsig's theory of static levels corresponds closely with Maslow's
hierarchy of needs with the exception that the inorganic level
corresponds to no need described in Maslow's theory. The biological
level corresponds to Maslow's lower needs, such as food and warmth.
The social level corresponds to Maslow's higher needs, such as respect
and privacy. And the intellectual level corresponds to Maslow's
self-actualization, which includes creativity, problem solving and
lack of prejudice.

In the subjective hierarchy of levels, the lowest subjective level is
what we might call the believing level. It is similar to the intellectual
level with regards to its romantic quality. But intellectual patterns
are understood as results of empirical observations whereas belief
patterns, though similar in appearance, are understood as starting
points of a subjective experience. In any case the contents of both
the intellectual level and the belief level could be called
"thoughts". They could include statements like "Violence is bad" or
"Tim Roth plays the same archetype in 'The Hateful Eight' as
Christpher Waltz plays in 'Django Unchained'".

   From the belief level emerges the considering level, which
romantically corresponds to the social level. Subjectively, it is a
more basic need to behave appropriately in a group than to acquire
food. From an evolutionary viewpoint, this is probably because if the
group disintegrates the long-term survival of all of its members is
threatened.

   From the considering level emerges what could be called the
motivational level. This includes long-term goals and dreams, which
may involve family, work or interpersonal relationships. These
correspond romantically to the biological level. Calculations are
subjective aspirations towards love, wealth, sex, happiness,
parenthood or
whatever it is that one wishes to achieve.

The highest subjective level is the epiphanic level. This includes
those subjective experiences that are so profound they seem to
manifest through the senses. Examples of such experiences are
religious visions and hallucinations. Although hallucinations can be
symptomatic of mental illness, this isn't always the case. Throughout
the times there have been seers and prophets that have been regarded
in high esteem. Not all people are capable of having such experiences,
but then again, not everyone is smart enough to conceive a new
intellectual idea, either.

I have once experienced a wintry forest turning into fractals during a
ritual. No mind-altering substances were used. This qualifies as an
epiphanic pattern. I have also seen colorful flashes of light emanate
from a person. Someone might say they were his aura. In any case the
experience of seeing them was accompanied by feelings of relaxation,
casual conversation and mutual respect. I don't suppose a camera would
have captured them, so they are highly subjective. Also, importantly,
they are not inorganic although they're romantically indistinguishable
from inorganic pattens. What makes them subjective is that I knew the
flashes of light didn't exist as photons or as something that would
make plants grow. They existed in my mind.

Now we have a subjective theory of static quality and an objective
theory of static quality. They differ so that the objective theory is
rational whereas the subjective theory is associative. In other words,
subjective patterns do not follow the laws of logic but merely are
associated to each other. From the viewpoint of the conscious mind
they pop out of nowhere and are to be perceived and accepted as they
are.

The theories can be expressed as a table. Numbering marks the moral
order of a level in its theory.

Subjective level:?Romantic subset:?Objective level:
1.?Believing??????"Deliberation"???4.?Intellectual
2.?Considering????Higher needs?????3.?Social
3.?Motivational???Lower needs??????2.?Biological
4.?Epiphanic??????"Sense-data"?????1.?Inorganic

The subjective and the objective theory of static value patterns are
similar in the sense that both are empirical. This goes well with
Pirsig's writings about how the MOQ is empiricistic. However, Pirsig
also writes that the highest form of intellectuality is the
manipulation of abstract symbols that bear no relation to
corresponding experience and that behave according to rules of their
own. In other words, Pirsig finds pure logic to be the highest, most
morally valuable form of experience. However, logic isn't an empirical
science.


Logical levels

I add a third theory of static value: the theory of logical patterns
of value. This theory isn't empirical. It's normative. This means the
"atoms" of the theory are norms, that is, abstract rules. However, the
theory is still rational, like the objective theory.

The lowest level of the logical hierarchy of static value is the
lingual level. It could be said that this level contains syntax rules
of some logical language. For example, the expression 1 + 1 = 2 has
more lingual quality than the expression = + 1 2 1.

Lingual patterns make facilitate the expression of logical ideas. But
they are just the basic level. From the lingual level emerges the
theoretical level. This level introduces the notion of theoremhood,
that is, what kind of statements can be inferred from other statements
that are considered as axioms. 1 + 1 = 2 and 1 + 1 = 0 both have equal
lingual quality. But the former has more theoretical quality than the
latter.

The metatheoretical level emerges from the theoretical level. To
examine something from a metalevel means that we examine it from an
outsider's perspective. For example, if we're studying the French
language, we use the English language as a metalevel because that's a
language we already know. In logic, truth tables are an example of a
metatheoretical pattern. There's no way to prove truth tables as a
theorem of the axioms of the object-level logic, but truth tables are
anyway a valid proof method.

   From the metatheoretical level emerges the analogic level. Analogic
patterns manifest as understanding of deep similarities between formal
constructs that appear to have very different starting points. For
example, consider the barber paradox:

"Suppose that in a village there's a barber who shaves all men who
don't shave themselves. Does the barber shave himself?"

and another paradox that has sometimes been used to argue that an
omnipotent god doesn't exist:

"Suppose an omnipotent god. Can that god create a rock so heavy he
can't lift it?"

Both paradoxes are analogous by virtue of defining something that
necessarily has some attribute it cannot have. In other words, they're
both paradoxes, like I already stated. But the previous example is
rather simplistic. A deeper analogy can be found between Gödel's first
incompleteness theorem and the halting problem.

First, let's summarize Gödel's theorem.

Let us construct within a sufficiently strong consistent theory L a
(closed) sentence G := "L doesn't prove sentence G". Let G be a
sentence that has a Gödel number as an unique identifier. (The Gödel
number of a sentence is formed by giving each character of the
sentence a Gödel number according to a certain pattern and then
multiplying these numbers with each other.) Now, if L proves sentence
G, L is consistent, which is contrary to our initial assumption. But
if L proves the negation of G, it proves an equivalent sentence "L
proves sentence G". This again means L is inconsistent. Therefore L
neither proves G nor the negation of G. Consequently, L is incomplete.

Then a summary of Turing's solution to the halting problem.

Let us construct a theory of Turing machines that manipulate symbols
on a strip of tape according to certain rules. The halting problem
means the question that, given a certain input, does a Turing machine
halt or continue to run forever. Let's assume that the halting problem
has a solution, that is, there's a Turing machine P(x) that, upon
being given x as input, will tell whether x is the code of such a
Turing machine that will halt or not. In the former case it will
output 1 and in the latter case it will output 0 and halt. Let's then
code a Turing machine T(x) that runs P(x) for a given input and will
get stuck in an endless loop upon receiving 1 but will otherwise halt.
Now let's run T(x) so that the input is the code of T(x). If T(x)
halts, it must have received 0 from P(x), which means it will not
halt. P(X) doesn't therefore work as intended. But if T(x) doesn't
halt it must have received 1 from P(x) which means that it will halt.
In this case, too, P(x) doesn't work correctly. Therefore the Turing
machine P(x) doesn't exist.

Analogies:
1. The Gödel numbered sentence "L proves a sentence whose Gödel number
is x" <~> P(x), that is, a coded solution to the halting problem
2. L is complete, that is, listing all of its proofs (ordered for
example according length) will always halt into a
queried closed sentence or the negation of that sentence. <~> P(x)
always works.
3. "L doesn't prove a sentence, whose Gödel number is x" <~> T(x)
4. G, that is, "L doesn't prove sentence G" <~> T(x) which has been
input the code of T(x)


Cultural levels

Now we have three theories: objective levels (Pirsig's original
levels), subjective levels and logical levels. Of these, objective and
logical levels are rational whereas subjective levels are associative.
Furthermore, objective and subjective levels are empirical whereas the
logical level is normative. Consequently, we have an empty space for a
fourth theory: one that is normative and associative. I call this the
theory of artistic levels. However, it doesn't apply merely to art. It
applies to life so that life itself is considered an art form. Just
like Pirsig wrote in ZAMM about assembling that barbecue thing, that
that was "sculpting".

"'You mean,' DeWeese asks, 'that when I was putting this rotisserie
together I was actually sculpting it?'"

The lowest artistic level is the prescriptive level. This includes
prescriptive rules such as: "Do not go to the balcony naked if the
neighbors can see." These artistic norms are somehow intuitively
figured out but that process isn't like the rational process of
solving a puzzle. It has more to do with belonging to where you are
and knowing who you are.

   From the prescriptive level emerges the cultural level. Certain sets
of prescriptive patterns are associated to each other and this way
form a cultural context such as Islam, Christianity, Finnish culture,
Russian culture, upper-class culture, punk culture, heavy metal
culture, demoscene and so on. For example, in some cultures the
"thumbs up" hand gesture is offensive whereas in others it's not.

   From the cultural level emerges the freedom level. This is what
Buddha teaches in the Diamond Sutra. The Diamond Sutra is a freedom
pattern that strives to make us abandon unquestioning normative belief
in cultural prescriptions:

"Then the lord Buddha made his meaning even more emphatic by saying:
'Subhuti, when people begin their practice of seeking to attaining
total Enlightenment, they ought to see, to perceive, to know, to
understand, and to realize that all things and all spiritual truths
are no-things, and, therefore, they ought not to conceive within their
minds any arbitrary conceptions whatsoever.'"

Freedom patterns encourage us to go against cultural expectations when
doing so is in our best interests. The spirit of the freedom level is,
in a Western way, captured by postmodernism.

The highest level of artistic quality is the aesthetic level. It
emerges from the freedom level. The reasoning behind this is that even
if we're free we still do make some choices about things. Since these
choices are no longer prescribed by cultural norms, the only remaining
criterion, if the choices aren't thought of as random, is aesthetic
quality. Aesthetical patterns are inferred as generalizations of what
kind of freedom patterns work. Some generalizations have been
successfully made over what is aesthetic or not. For example, symmetry
and the Golden Ratio are well-known aesthetic patterns.

Logical and artistic theories as a table:

Artistic level:?Romantic subset:?Logical level:
1.?Prescriptive?"Unity"??????????4.?Analogical
2.?Cultural?????"Awareness"??????3.?Metatheoretic
3.?Freedom??????"Significance"???2.?Theoretic
4.?Aesthetical??"Harmony"????????1.?Lingual

The romantic subsets are largely hypothetical. They could be detected
by brain imaging, but then again, perhaps not. If it's possible in
some way to detect the romantic subsets then all experience isn't
empirical, which is something we discussed in our earlier post.


Value accumulation in different theories

I have already described objective value accumulation in some detail
on earlier MD posts, namely:
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/moq-discuss/JXhDqpHWBPM/eiq8BsEjBAAJ.
It is a relevant question whether value accumulation is identical in
the other theories of static value. For example, it would seem that
value accumulation from prescriptive level and cultural level would
resemble value accumulation from biological level to social level.
Freedom, on the other hand would seem to accumulate value so that
transgressing cultural norms causes greater value than that of
adhering to them. Aesthetics, then, emerge as generalizations of
freedom patterns that work well. Obviously, some transgressions are
more valuable than others.

Subjective value accumulation would seem to work in a similar way. But
logical value accumulation would seem to work in the same way as the
objective one. So, associativity and rationality are apparently
different models of value accumulation.


Multiple identity of patterns

I am experimenting with the idea that patterns manifest in all
theories. But how? It seems to me that the romantic quality of an
intellectual pattern isn't the same element as the romantic quality of
a belief pattern. Rather, the elements are merely members of the same
subset. So, the romantic quality of a subjective pattern is
independent of the romantic quality of an objective pattern even
though the rank would be equal. The classical quality of the pattern
may be identical, though.

Furthermore, it seems like the classical quality of a subjective
pattern is identical with the classical quality of an artistic
pattern. On the other hand, the classical quality of an objective
pattern is identical with the classical quality of a logical pattern.


Application of the AMOQ

The AMOQ improves Pirsig's MOQ into a more complete, refined and
developed whole with more questions answered and no necessary
inconsistency. This is why I've kept criticizing Pirsig on MD despite
the fact that there are consistent logics that do not include the
disjunctive syllogism, which means the Heinous Tetralemma doesn't work
in them. Even though it's possible to construct a logical model of
Pirsig's static quality within such nonstandard logic it would be quite
unfortunate to interpret MOQ so that it's necessary to use a
nonstandard logic. It would arguably be better to interpret the MOQ so
that we may also use classical logic. Furthermore, such an
interpretation would probably also work in most nonstandard logics if
not all of them.

The theory of the multiple identity of patterns allows us to sum
patterns to each other as sets of four vectors so that we can
calculate the value of the result.

I regard this to solve the mind-matter problem. That's because the
theory includes a metatheory that tells when the different theories
should or shouldn't be used, and how.

I'm considering the possibility that external patterns always manifest
both artistically and objectively, and that internal patterns always
manifest both subjectively and logically. Since logical patterns
affect objective patterns and subjective patterns affect artistic
patterns and vice versa, and objective patterns affect subjective
patterns whereas logical patterns affect artistic patterns and vice
versa, the AMOQ solves the mind-matter problem.

The AMOQ might serve as a framework for an artificial intelligence of
unprecedented capacity to mimic human behavior. Even in its current
form the AMOQ is interesting due to its striking similarity with
Jungian psychology. Objectivity corresponds with sensing, subjectivity
with feeling, logicality with thinking and artisticality with intuition.



Regards,
Tuk



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