[MD] Annotations to LC

mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Fri Nov 18 13:14:13 PST 2016


Dan,


>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> Okay, so Pirsig says that in definition 5 the distinction is    
>>> meaningless but
>>> he uses another definition. In any case Pirsig argues:
>>>
>>> In definition 5 subjects can be objects. Therefore the distinction between
>>> subjects and objects is meaningless in definition 5.
>>>
>>> How come? Even if subjects can be objects, can objects be subjects? If they
>>> can, a rock can be a subject. What would that kind of a subject be, apart
>>> from being at least superficially silly?
>> Dan:
>> You seem to be taking subjects and objects as primary.


Tuukka:

Well, at least that made me laugh. You know, I read this story about
two World War I figter pilots. They were dogfighting. First they fired  
all their machine gun rounds at each other. Then they fired all their  
pistol rounds. Then they began shooting at each other with those  
emergency rockets that are used as distress signals if you crash land  
in the middle of nowhere. Then one of the guys began laughing.

He was just laughing and couldn't stop. And the other guy began
laughing, too. They laughed and laughed and then they waved each other
goodbye and flew back to their respective airbases.


>>
>>>
>>>>> Sometimes deduction is Dynamic.
>>>> Dan:
>>>> Oh no. Dynamic Quality comes first. Deduction may appear as a flash of
>>>> insight but without intellect, how can there be deduction?
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Oh come on, dmb does rhetoric all the time but I'm not allowed to?
>> Dan:
>> Where did rhetoric enter the discussion? What I said was if there is
>> no intellect there can be no deduction. Dynamic Quality comes first.


Tuukka:
Rhetoric probably didn't know it can't attend this discussion without
signing up first. I think we should also ask it to pay a fee.


>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>> Pirsig states in LILA that the MOQ is logically consistent. This means
>>>>> Pirsig's MOQ disallows dialetheia. I know, you'd expect Pirsig's MOQ to
>>>>> allow
>>>>> them. I'd expect that too. But according to Pirsig it doesn't.
>>>> Dan:
>>>> You are (apparently) fixating upon one form of logic to the exclusion
>>>> of all else.
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Did you mean: "Pirsig is fixating... "?
>> Dan:
>> No.


Tuukka:
I'm not "fixating upon one form of logic". I'm focusing on dialectic.
I tried to do rhetoric, too, but you didn't like it.


>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>>>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>>>>>>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to
>>>>>>> what
>>>>>>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of
>>>>>>> sand.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>> I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of
>>>>>> view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic
>>>>>> idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ.
>>>>>> That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent
>>>>>> with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila
>>>>>> cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on
>>>>>> materialism due to our Western culture's biases.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>> The static patterns in LILA don't contain idealism. They contain
>>>>> materialism. Idealism is something Pirsig just sticks on the MOQ in
>>>>> LC, you know, like gluing a sore thumb on the hood of your car.
>>>> Dan:
>>>>  From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/
>>>> It nevertheless seems safe to say that within modern philosophy there
>>>> have been two fundamental conceptions of idealism:
>>>>
>>>> 1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate
>>>> foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
>>>>
>>>> 2 although the existence of something independent of the mind is
>>>> conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent
>>>> ?reality? is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or
>>>> constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all
>>>> claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of
>>>> self-knowledge.
>>>>
>>>> There are numerous examples of idealism in Lila. Here are a few:
>>>>
>>>> The Dharmakaya light.
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Hallucinations do not prove idealism, so why would Dharmakaya light?
>>>
>>>
>>>> "It is this subjective side of values that led to their being long
>>>> tabooed as improper for consideration by natural science," Kroeber and
>>>> Kluckhohn said.
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> How does this pertain to idealism?
>> Dan:
>> I provided the Stanford definition for a reason. Or did you not    
>> realize that?


Tuukka:
You're providing citations about subjective or mental things. This
doesn't pertain to idealism because subjective or mental things could
also emerge from inorganic patterns, in which case they belong to a
materialistic (not idealistic) theory.


>>>
>>>> By virtue of their subjective emotion and ethical character, norms and
>>>> especially values are among the world's most difficult objects to
>>>> identify with certainty.
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> How does this pertain to idealism?
>>>
>>>
>>>> In a subject-object metaphysics morals and art are worlds apart,
>>>> morals being concerned with the subject quality and art with object
>>>> quality. But in the Metaphysics of Quality that division doesn't
>>>> exist. They're the same. They both become much more intelligible when
>>>> references to what is subjective and what is objective are completely
>>>> thrown away and references to what is static and what is Dynamic are
>>>> taken up instead.
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> None of these citations have so far even mentioned idealism.
>> Dan:
>> Okay. Have it your way. I am pretty much done here.
>>
>>


Tuukka:

I'm glad you compiled LC, although you might find me to be glad for
the wrong reasons. You have good intentions. I have good intentions.
And I need to talk about the MOQ with people in order to make progress
with my research. I'd like to thank the people I discuss with. I'd
like them to be glad for their contribution. But sometimes it seems
like I just reject their input in such a way that they probably don't
depart with a smile on their face.

Once I was in a night club and the DJ came to me on the dance floor
and gave me drink tickets. He didn't say anything but he was all:
"Looks like you could use these to buy a round for your friends! No  
need to mention me. *wink*"

I did offer a round to my friends and myself. But I still remember the  
way he gave me the tickets. I could probably do that once or twice if  
I really felt like that. But he seemed like he could do that any time.

If I tried to do something like that often, I'd probably give the
tickets in such a way that people would feel like I'm going to get
angry if they don't buy the drinks. Even if I wouldn't. Which feels
kind of sad.

I wish I could present my metaphysical views like the DJ handed out  
those drink tickets, but I don't know how to do it. Pirsig could do  
something like that. That's what made him a bestselling author.

Regards,
Tuk



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