[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

[mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net]

All,

Thanks to Dan it became apparent that the former topic of this thread,  
which included the question "Why are sociality and intellectuality  
strictly subjective?", was badly chosen. Sociality and intellectuality  
aren't "strictly" subjective because the subjective emerges from the  
objective and thus everything subjective is also objective. I will  
begin by explicating the exact reason for this.

In the Turner letter Pirsig states that:

- The levels of static quality are, in ascending order, the inorganic,  
the biological, the social and the intellectual level.
- What belongs to a higher level belongs also to the level below.
- What belongs to a lower level doesn't necessarily belong to the level above.

If A is a subset of B and B is a subset of C, then A is a subset of C.  
I have actually seen what looked like a Venn diagram of the static  
levels, probably by Anthony McWatt, and I've never heard anyone  
complain about that. So it seems reasonable to assume that what  
belongs to a higher level belongs to all the levels below, not just  
the one level immediately below.

In chapter 24 of LILA Pirsig states:

"The Metaphysics of Quality resolves the relationship between intellect and
society, subject and object, mind and matter, by embedding all of them in a
larger system of understanding.  Objects are inorganic and biological
values; subjects are social and intellectual values."

According to the Turner letter this means that everything subjective  
is necessarily objective, but everything objective is not necessarily  
subjective. Furthermore, the subjective emerges from the objective.

However, in chapter 12 of LILA Pirsig writes:

"So what the Metaphysics of Quality concludes is that all schools are right
on the mind-matter question.  Mind is contained in static inorganic
patterns.  Matter is contained in static intellectual patterns.  Both mind
and matter are completely separate evolutionary levels of static patterns
of value, and as such are capable of each containing the other without
contradiction."

Why does Pirsig write this? According to idealism everything exists in  
the mind. But if the subjective emerges from the objective, there are  
things that are objective but that aren't subjective. This contradicts  
idealism. Hence, all schools are not right on the mind-matter question.

Regards,
Tuk