[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

Dan Glover daneglover at gmail.com
Wed Oct 19 20:04:17 PDT 2016


Tuk, all,

On Wed, Oct 19, 2016 at 8:40 AM,  <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> All,
>
> Thanks to Dan it became apparent that the former topic of this thread, which
> included the question "Why are sociality and intellectuality strictly
> subjective?", was badly chosen. Sociality and intellectuality aren't
> "strictly" subjective because the subjective emerges from the objective and
> thus everything subjective is also objective. I will begin by explicating
> the exact reason for this.
>
> In the Turner letter Pirsig states that:
>
> - The levels of static quality are, in ascending order, the inorganic, the
> biological, the social and the intellectual level.
> - What belongs to a higher level belongs also to the level below.
> - What belongs to a lower level doesn't necessarily belong to the level
> above.
>
> If A is a subset of B and B is a subset of C, then A is a subset of C. I
> have actually seen what looked like a Venn diagram of the static levels,
> probably by Anthony McWatt, and I've never heard anyone complain about that.
> So it seems reasonable to assume that what belongs to a higher level belongs
> to all the levels below, not just the one level immediately below.
>
> In chapter 24 of LILA Pirsig states:
>
> "The Metaphysics of Quality resolves the relationship between intellect and
> society, subject and object, mind and matter, by embedding all of them in a
> larger system of understanding.  Objects are inorganic and biological
> values; subjects are social and intellectual values."
>
> According to the Turner letter this means that everything subjective is
> necessarily objective, but everything objective is not necessarily
> subjective. Furthermore, the subjective emerges from the objective.
>
> However, in chapter 12 of LILA Pirsig writes:
>
> "So what the Metaphysics of Quality concludes is that all schools are right
> on the mind-matter question.  Mind is contained in static inorganic
> patterns.  Matter is contained in static intellectual patterns.  Both mind
> and matter are completely separate evolutionary levels of static patterns
> of value, and as such are capable of each containing the other without
> contradiction."
>
> Why does Pirsig write this? According to idealism everything exists in the
> mind. But if the subjective emerges from the objective, there are things
> that are objective but that aren't subjective. This contradicts idealism.
> Hence, all schools are not right on the mind-matter question.

Dan:
According to the MOQ, ideas come before matter. Thus, matter is
contained in static intellectual patterns. But it is a good idea to
believe matter comes first. Thus, mind is contained in static
inorganic patterns. So, instead of saying the subjective emerges from
the objective, it is the other way around. The objective emerges from
the subjective. Therefore, there is no contradiction. All schools are
right on the mind-matter question.

Thank you,

Dan

http://www.danglover.com



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