[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

david at goodmetaphysics.com david at goodmetaphysics.com
Fri Oct 21 14:13:31 PDT 2016


All,

dmb wrote:

The question you're asking is seriously complicated by the nature of the statements you've used as a launching pad. In those quotes Pirsig is trying to explain how SOM would fit into the MOQ even though the MOQ is supposed to reject and replace SOM. That makes it super easy to get all tangled up. But just remember that empirical reality is what generated both sets of ideas. SOM can't be abandoned entirely because it's based on empirical reaIity so that the basic distinctions are not crazy. Even in the MOQ, imaginary guns can't shoot you and physical guns can't be stopped by wishes. But the MOQ insists that our inferences and idea about the ontological structure of reality can never be more real than the experiences from which they were inferred.

That’s right dmb. And the interpretations of our experience we use depend on the Quality of the descriptions.  If it makes more sense to assume objects are fundamental, do that.  If it makes more sense to assume ideas are, then do that.  It all depends on the context and not losing sight that Quality drives everything -  including which assumptions we make at the time.

It’s a different way than our culture teaches us - but once understood - it’s better… Of course - I could go on :)

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