[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

[Dan Glover]

dmb, tuk, all,

On Fri, Oct 21, 2016 at 3:19 PM, david <dmbuchanan at hotmail.com> wrote:
> Tuk said to dmb:
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> I do see the point in making helpful simplifications about subjects being social and intellectual and objects being inorganic and biological. But what is the real deal about subjects and objects?
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> dmb says:
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> The real deal with subjects and objects is that they are not real. Like you said, social and intellectual values aren't "strictly" subjective. But that's NOT because the subjective emerges from the objective or the other way around. To say everything emerges from the subjective is to assert idealism and to say everything is objective and subjectivity emerges from that is to assert materialism. The MOQ is neither but it can explain both of them and, to a certain extent and with qualifications, both can fit into the MOQ.
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> The MOQ says that Quality comes first and subjects and objects both emerge from that. Instead of saying that mind is primary or that matter is primary, the MOQ says immediate experience is primary. That's why it makes sense for Pirsig to call Quality "the primary empirical reality" or "the cutting edge of experience". In the MOQ subjects and objects are concepts rather than actually existing substances or ontological structures.
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> Remember that section in ZAMM where the entirety of our reality is made of analogies? Every last bit of that reality was generated by Quality and among these analogies - which include earth and sky, religion and science, moons and stars - are subjects and objects. And if we try to explain all of reality in terms of those two opposed analogies we will certainly get into all kinds of philosophical trouble.
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> The question you're asking is seriously complicated by the nature of the statements you've used as a launching pad. In those quotes Pirsig is trying to explain how SOM would fit into the MOQ even though the MOQ is supposed to reject and replace SOM. That makes it super easy to get all tangled up. But just remember that empirical reality is what generated both sets of ideas. SOM can't be abandoned entirely because it's based on empirical reaIity so that the basic distinctions are not crazy. Even in the MOQ, imaginary guns can't shoot you and physical guns can't be stopped by wishes. But the MOQ insists that our inferences and idea about the ontological structure of reality can never be more real than the experiences from which they were inferred.

Dan:
Yes I pretty much agree with what you're saying and sure it is all
well and good to reject and replace subject/object metaphysics but
then how does anyone unfamiliar with Robert Pirsig's work know what
we're talking about? The way I see it, we need that stepping stone,
those pesky subjects and objects, to acclimate those who're still
trying to get a grasp on MOQ fundamentals. We say Quality comes first
and yeah I agree but now define Quality for me. Okay. So we cut up the
undefinable into four levels of quality, levels of evolution, patterns
of quality, if you will. But how do those patterns of quality relate
to what most people take to be the real world of subjects and objects?
Because no we are not now or ever going to do away with those terms. I
mean you can try but you just end up sounding like a madman. So the
best we can do is try and get it right. The MOQ. Because really it is
all about organizing the reality of experience in a better fashion is
what I'm saying.

Thanks,

Dan

http://www.danglover.com