[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

Sat Oct 22 05:20:52 PDT 2016

Dan,

>>
>>>> But if it's moral to believe matter to come before mind it cannot be
>>>> moral
>>>> to also believe mind to come before matter unless it's moral to be
>>>> inconsistent. And scientists are highly unlikely to find it moral to be
>>>> inconsistent.
>>> Dan:
>>> This isn't what the citations I offered stated.
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> I didn't imply your citations would've stated what I stated. I meant to
>> uncover the logical consequences of LC RMP annotation 67 as follows. The
>> annotation includes the statement:
>>
>> "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas, which produce
>> what we know as matter."
>>
>> This is a metaphysical statement. To be more exact, it is an ontological
>> statement that is equivalent to idealism insofar as we're using defined
>> concepts.
> Dan:
> I tend to disagree. Idealism is loosely defined as:
>
> Philosophy.
> any system or theory that maintains that the real is of the nature of
> thought or that the object of external perception consists of ideas.
>
> Note how Quality comes first, and then ideas.

Tuukka:
Quality is an undefined concept. I wrote that the statement in question 
is equivalent to idealism insofar as we're using defined concepts.

>
>> "The scientific community that has produced Complementarity, almost
>> invariably presumes that matter comes first and produces ideas."
>>
>> This presumption typically made by the scientific community is another
>> ontological statement. It is called materialism.
>>
>> "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that the idea that
>> matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
>>
>> According to this statement, materialism is moral (ie. is a high quality
>> idea). Materialism is inconsistent with idealism.
> Dan:
> Not under the umbrella of the MOQ.

Tuukka:

Do you realize the tradeoff here? In order for the inconsistency not to 
arise the MOQ has to contradict classical logic and set theory. These 
are theories of normative science. Dalai Lama said that if science 
proves some aspect of Buddhism wrong, Buddhism has to change. Why 
doesn't the same apply to the MOQ?

I'm not saying classical logic and ZFC set theory are irreplaceable. But 
can anyone here fathom a replacement for them that would serve the 
purpose of providing a good logical structure for the MOQ while not 
requiring us to question any statement made by Robert Pirsig? I don't 
think so.

>
>> Consequently, either
>> idealism is immoral or inconsistency is moral. Inconsistency isn't moral. If
>> idealism is an immoral ontological thought and the MOQ is idealistic insofar
>> as we're using defined concepts, then the MOQ is ontologically immoral
>> insofar as we're using defined concepts.
> Dan:
> By using the framework of the MOQ to unite idealism and materialism
> this inconsistency does not arise.

Tuukka:
Then the MOQ is inconsistent.

>
>> "I think Bohr would say that philosophic idealism (i.e. ideas before matter)
>> is a viable philosophy since complementarity allows multiple contradictory
>> views to coexist."
>>
>> Viability, coexistence and complementarity do not mean that idealism and
>> materialism are consistent with each other.
> Dan:
> So you are taking the ideas of viability, coexistence, and
> complementarity as meaningless?

Tuukka:
No. I'm merely stating that the issue I'm raising is about consistency 
and consistency isn't equivalent to viability, coexistence or 
complementarity.

>
>>
>>
>>
>>>> Therefore Pirsig's rudimentary context assignment implies that the MOQ is
>>>> ontologically and/or epistemologically bad philosophy. Why would he
>>>> intentionally imply that? The implication seems unintentional.
>>> Dan:
>>> Your interpretation twists the ideas that Pirsig is offering up in
>>> ways that do indeed make the MOQ bad philosophy. Why would you
>>> intentionally do that? Or is it unintentional?
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> It is completely unintentional. I am merely following premises to their
>> logical conclusion while assuming that if this would uncover a logical
>> defect in the MOQ it'd be obvious that I'm not willfully causing the defect
>> but exposing a defect that was already there.
> Dan:
> Fair enough. I of course cannot answer for Robert Pirsig. I can only
> offer up my understanding of the MOQ.
>
>>
>>>> A more appropriate context assignment would seem to be: "Subjectively
>>>> mind
>>>> comes before matter but objectively matter comes before mind." However,
>>>> this
>>>> implies that Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is objective. Is
>>>> that
>>>> a problem?
>>> Dan:
>>> As dmb pointed out, subjective and objective are meant to simplify the
>>> MOQ, not complicate it. It is okay to use those terms as long as we
>>> remember they represent patterns of value. So yes, this is a problem,
>>> since you seem to be pointing to subjects and objects as primary.
>>>

Tuukka:

Do the notions of subjectivity and objectivity, when defined this way, 
simplify the MOQ? Pirsig approves of this interpretation but I don't 
think it really simplifies things. In chapter 19 of ZAMM Pirsig states 
that subjective things cannot be detected by instruments. In LC RMP 
annotation 4 Pirsig states:

"In the MOQ, all organisms are objective. They exist in the material 
world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the mental world. 
Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the 'President of the 
U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific instrument can 
distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."

Why does Pirsig write of "objective scientific instruments"? Is 
"objective" just a filler word or are there subjective scientific 
instruments? If there are, what are they? Intuition? A passion for 
science? Perhaps quite so. But mere passion or intuition should never 
pass peer-review. Earlier, I cited the abstract of a scientific paper at 
http://cpa.sagepub.com/content/45/7/607.short. A part of the abstract goes:

"We summarize evidence for the social origins of mental health problems 
and illustrate the ongoing responses of individuals and communities to 
the legacy of colonization."

How can a paper about the social origins of mental health problems pass 
peer-review if social patterns are, by definition, invisible to 
scientific instruments? Does the referee who approved the paper merely 
voice his opinion? Could the referee have as well been anyone, even 
someone with no credentials?

Furthermore, the referee's credentials are social patterns. If a police 
is capable of figuring out what kind of an academic degree does some 
person hold, why should the MOQ insist that a scientist is unable to do 
so because the degree is invisible to his scientific instruments?

How do we explain social sciences within the MOQ if social patterns 
cannot be detected by objective instruments?

Who wants to answer these kind of questions? But there are more and more 
of them if we use the currently accepted definitions of subjectivity and 
objectivity. You don't have to answer the questions but that doesn't 
make them bad questions.

I just don't understand what these definitions of subjectivity and 
objectivity do to simplify the MOQ.

>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> According to LILA, the primary split of the MOQ is dynamic/static. If static
>> quality is split into subjects and objects, that's secondary, not primary.
> Dan:
> Static quality is not split into subjects and objects. Static quality
> is split into four levels.

Tuukka:

In chapter 24 of LILA Pirsig states:

"Objects are inorganic and biological values; subjects are social and 
intellectual values."

The four levels are subsets of subjects and objects. As such, splitting 
static quality into subjects and objects is equally correct to splitting 
it into four levels.

>
>> It's important to remember that the definition of static quality and the
>> theory of static value patterns are two different things.
> Dan:
> How so?

Tuukka:

The definition, or rather, the description of static quality tells us 
that static quality is something like permanence. Pirsig's theory of 
static value patterns is a theory of things that fit the description. 
But there's no reason why there couldn't be another kind of theory of 
those things.

Newtonian physics are still widely used despite the arrival of quantum 
physics. Both are theories of inorganic patterns. These theories 
complement each other. They don't contradict each other because they're 
not intended to be consistent with each other in the first place. Also, 
both of them are supported by empirical observations.

In a similar vein, it's possible that there are multiple theories of 
static value patterns. If Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is 
objective there could still be a subjective theory of static value 
patterns that's also correct.

>
>> If Pirsig's theory of static value patterns is objective it doesn't follow
>> that static patterns of value are inherently objective.
> Dan:
> I am not sure I understand you here.

Tuukka:

Static patterns of value are the "terrain". Pirsig's theory of static 
value patterns is the "map". But if Pirsig's map has rectangular 
coordinates and is correct, it doesn't mean that a map with polar 
coordinates would be incorrect.

>
>> Can you find some other reason to consider this a problem?
> Dan:
> Well, yeah. Otherwise I wouldn't take my time to answer you. I think
> this primary focus on subject and object is detrimental to an
> understanding a proper understanding of the MOQ.

Tuukka:

You just thought I consider subjectivity/objectivity the primary split 
of the MOQ, so I dislike your way of still calling my focus on subjects 
and objects "primary". It's clearly not primary in the sense of 
including an attempt to alter the status of the Dynamic/static split. 
It's just a focus.

My focus on subjects and objects is detrimental to either one of the 
following stances:

* The MOQ is consistent.
* The MOQ is good ontology.

You may pick either one of these stances if you don't mind losing the 
other. If you want both of them someone has to change the MOQ.

Thank you for your contribution,
Tuukka

---
This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software.
https://www.avast.com/antivirus