[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?
Tuukka Virtaperko
mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net
Sat Oct 22 08:34:41 PDT 2016
Dan, all,
I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is about
the logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation
67. The annotation includes the following statement:
MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces
ideas, which produce what we know as matter."
The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical consistency
and logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They
cannot be applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ
idealism includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is
logically equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism.
MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says
that the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that the
MOQ cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either
inconsistent or not a single metaphysics.
If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem. So
we shall assume that the MOQ is consistent.
If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter
problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However,
Pirsig thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true,
the MOQ is a single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a
single metaphysics.
Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas.
But the MOQ subscribes to idealism.
Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea.
Regards,
Tuk
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