[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

Dan Glover daneglover at gmail.com
Sat Oct 22 16:10:23 PDT 2016


Tuk, all,

On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:34 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
<mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> Dan, all,
>
> I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is about the
> logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation 67. The
> annotation includes the following statement:
>
> MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces ideas,
> which produce what we know as matter."
>
> The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical consistency and
> logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They cannot be
> applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ idealism
> includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is logically
> equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism.
>
> MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says that
> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
>
> The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that the MOQ
> cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either
> inconsistent or not a single metaphysics.

Dan:
The answer as you render it is an either/or solution. However, Pirsig
goes to some lengths in Lila referring to the coexistence of ideas as
a bedrock of his MOQ. For instance:

"In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided
into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all
there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic,
Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing,"
that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any
encyclopedia, is absent

'But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive.
They all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost
independent of each other.." [Lila]

Dan comments:
There. Right there. See it? "...they are not exclusive. They operate
at the same time..." So in this sense, in the sense that Pirsig means,
idealism and materialism are not exclusive. They operate at the same
time. So in effect, in the MOQ idealism and materialism are both good
ideas, neither contradicting the other unless as you have done a
person focuses exclusively upon one or the other.

>
> If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem. So we
> shall assume that the MOQ is consistent.
>
> If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter
> problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However, Pirsig
> thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true, the MOQ is a
> single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a single metaphysics.
>
> Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas.
>
> But the MOQ subscribes to idealism.
>
> Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea.

Dan:
Your logic is based on faulty either/or parameters.

Thank you,
Dan

http://www.danglover.com



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