[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

Sun Oct 23 06:11:11 PDT 2016

Dan, all,

On 23-Oct-16 2:10, Dan Glover wrote:
> Tuk, all,
>
> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:34 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>> Dan, all,
>>
>> I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is 
>> about the
>> logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation 67. 
>> The
>> annotation includes the following statement:
>>
>> MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces 
>> ideas,
>> which produce what we know as matter."
>>
>> The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical 
>> consistency and
>> logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They 
>> cannot be
>> applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ idealism
>> includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is logically
>> equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism.
>>
>> MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ 
>> says that
>> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
>>
>> The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that 
>> the MOQ
>> cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either
>> inconsistent or not a single metaphysics.
> Dan:
> The answer as you render it is an either/or solution. However, Pirsig
> goes to some lengths in Lila referring to the coexistence of ideas as
> a bedrock of his MOQ. For instance:
>
> "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided
> into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
> patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all
> there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic,
> Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing,"
> that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any
> encyclopedia, is absent
>
> 'But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive.
> They all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost
> independent of each other.." [Lila]
>
> Dan comments:
> There. Right there. See it? "...they are not exclusive. They operate
> at the same time..." So in this sense, in the sense that Pirsig means,
> idealism and materialism are not exclusive. They operate at the same
> time.

Tuukka:

I think your reply demonstrates how amateurs of logic might be inclined 
to find many-valued logics more useful than they really are.

In fuzzy logic the only truth values aren't true or false like they are 
in classical logic. Instead, a truth value may be any real number from 0 
(false) to 1 (true).

At first this seems like an improvement. But what could you do with it 
in this case?

You could use it to argue that your options are:

* To concede that the MOQ isn't completely consistent.
* To concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea.
* To concede that the MOQ doesn't completely solve the mind-matter problem.
* To modify the MOQ.

Would this really improve your situation? You'd still have to choose. 
And if you were to choose anything else than modifying the MOQ you'd 
kind of need to explain what would you mean.

Suppose you decided to concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good 
idea. Then what would be the moral value of the MOQ on a scale from 0 to 
1? Would it be 0.5? Or 0.75? Something else? And most importantly, how 
would you have determined this value?

You don't seem like you could explain that. And it would be quite 
disappointing if you chose one of these fuzzy logic concessions anyway.

You could also try to use three-valued logic to argue that your options are:

* To concede that the consistency of the MOQ is unknown.
* To concede that the moral value of the MOQ is unknown.
* To concede that it is unknown whether the MOQ solves the mind-matter 
problem.
* To modify the MOQ.

To me these options don't seem better than your original options. I 
think they're worse because, like with fuzzy logic, it wouldn't be 
enough that you'd just select a concession you'd want to make. You'd 
also need to explain what would you mean with your concession. Your 
original options don't require you to explain that.

> So in effect, in the MOQ idealism and materialism are both good
> ideas, neither contradicting the other unless as you have done a
> person focuses exclusively upon one or the other.

Tuukka:

Which one do you find me to have focused on exclusively, idealism or 
materialism?

Where does Pirsig state that idealism is a good idea? In LC RMP 
annotation 67 he states idealism to be true. He doesn't state that it's 
good.

Obviously, truth and morality are not equivalent. Most people agree that 
in some situations it is moral to lie.

>
>> If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem. 
>> So we
>> shall assume that the MOQ is consistent.
>>
>> If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter
>> problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However, 
>> Pirsig
>> thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true, the 
>> MOQ is a
>> single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a single 
>> metaphysics.
>>
>> Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas.
>>
>> But the MOQ subscribes to idealism.
>>
>> Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea.
> Dan:
> Your logic is based on faulty either/or parameters.

Tuukka:
If either/or parameters are faulty, you should neither posit that 
either/or parameters are faulty nor posit that they're not faulty. To do 
either would be to posit an either/or parameter. And to do both would be 
to posit a contradiction.

Regards,
Tuk

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