[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

[Dan Glover]

Tuk, all,

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 8:11 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
<mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> Dan, all,
>
>
>
> On 23-Oct-16 2:10, Dan Glover wrote:
>>
>> Tuk, all,
>>
>> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:34 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> Dan, all,
>>>
>>> I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is about
>>> the
>>> logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation 67. The
>>> annotation includes the following statement:
>>>
>>> MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces
>>> ideas,
>>> which produce what we know as matter."
>>>
>>> The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical consistency
>>> and
>>> logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They cannot
>>> be
>>> applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ idealism
>>> includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is logically
>>> equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism.
>>>
>>> MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says
>>> that
>>> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
>>>
>>> The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that the
>>> MOQ
>>> cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either
>>> inconsistent or not a single metaphysics.
>>
>> Dan:
>> The answer as you render it is an either/or solution. However, Pirsig
>> goes to some lengths in Lila referring to the coexistence of ideas as
>> a bedrock of his MOQ. For instance:
>>
>> "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided
>> into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
>> patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all
>> there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic,
>> Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing,"
>> that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any
>> encyclopedia, is absent
>>
>> 'But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive.
>> They all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost
>> independent of each other.." [Lila]
>>
>> Dan comments:
>> There. Right there. See it? "...they are not exclusive. They operate
>> at the same time..." So in this sense, in the sense that Pirsig means,
>> idealism and materialism are not exclusive. They operate at the same
>> time.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> I think your reply demonstrates how amateurs of logic might be inclined to
> find many-valued logics more useful than they really are.

Dan:
So you I take it make a profession of logic and as such are saying
people like Kurt Gödel and Neils Bohr and Robert Pirsig are wrong. So
what chance do I stand?

>
> In fuzzy logic the only truth values aren't true or false like they are in
> classical logic. Instead, a truth value may be any real number from 0
> (false) to 1 (true).
>
> At first this seems like an improvement. But what could you do with it in
> this case?
>
> You could use it to argue that your options are:
>
> * To concede that the MOQ isn't completely consistent.
> * To concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea.
> * To concede that the MOQ doesn't completely solve the mind-matter problem.
> * To modify the MOQ.
>
> Would this really improve your situation? You'd still have to choose. And if
> you were to choose anything else than modifying the MOQ you'd kind of need
> to explain what would you mean.
>
> Suppose you decided to concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea.
> Then what would be the moral value of the MOQ on a scale from 0 to 1? Would
> it be 0.5? Or 0.75? Something else? And most importantly, how would you have
> determined this value?
>
> You don't seem like you could explain that. And it would be quite
> disappointing if you chose one of these fuzzy logic concessions anyway.
>
> You could also try to use three-valued logic to argue that your options are:
>
> * To concede that the consistency of the MOQ is unknown.
> * To concede that the moral value of the MOQ is unknown.
> * To concede that it is unknown whether the MOQ solves the mind-matter
> problem.
> * To modify the MOQ.
>
> To me these options don't seem better than your original options. I think
> they're worse because, like with fuzzy logic, it wouldn't be enough that
> you'd just select a concession you'd want to make. You'd also need to
> explain what would you mean with your concession. Your original options
> don't require you to explain that.

Dan:
No idea.

>
>
>> So in effect, in the MOQ idealism and materialism are both good
>> ideas, neither contradicting the other unless as you have done a
>> person focuses exclusively upon one or the other.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Which one do you find me to have focused on exclusively, idealism or
> materialism?

Dan:
That depends.

>
> Where does Pirsig state that idealism is a good idea? In LC RMP annotation
> 67 he states idealism to be true. He doesn't state that it's good.

Dan:
Truth isn't a shining ideal in the MOQ. Truth is a high quality
intellectual value pattern, in other words, good.

>
> Obviously, truth and morality are not equivalent. Most people agree that in
> some situations it is moral to lie.

Dan:
Again with the either/or. But yes, in the MOQ, truth and morality are
equivalent. And sometimes, truth can be a lie we tell to make someone
feel better.

>
>
>>
>>> If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem. So
>>> we
>>> shall assume that the MOQ is consistent.
>>>
>>> If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter
>>> problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However,
>>> Pirsig
>>> thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true, the MOQ
>>> is a
>>> single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a single
>>> metaphysics.
>>>
>>> Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas.
>>>
>>> But the MOQ subscribes to idealism.
>>>
>>> Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Your logic is based on faulty either/or parameters.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> If either/or parameters are faulty, you should neither posit that either/or
> parameters are faulty nor posit that they're not faulty. To do either would
> be to posit an either/or parameter. And to do both would be to posit a
> contradiction.

Dan:
I didn't say all either/or parameters are faulty though you seem to
think I did. Other than that, again, no idea.

Thank you,
Dan

http://www.danglover.com