[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

Sun Oct 23 15:39:57 PDT 2016

Dan,

On 23-Oct-16 22:52, Dan Glover wrote:
> Tuk, all,
>
> On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 8:11 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>> Dan, all,
>>
>>
>>
>> On 23-Oct-16 2:10, Dan Glover wrote:
>>> Tuk, all,
>>>
>>> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:34 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>>>> Dan, all,
>>>>
>>>> I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is about
>>>> the
>>>> logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation 67. The
>>>> annotation includes the following statement:
>>>>
>>>> MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces
>>>> ideas,
>>>> which produce what we know as matter."
>>>>
>>>> The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical consistency
>>>> and
>>>> logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They cannot
>>>> be
>>>> applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ idealism
>>>> includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is logically
>>>> equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism.
>>>>
>>>> MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says
>>>> that
>>>> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
>>>>
>>>> The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that the
>>>> MOQ
>>>> cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either
>>>> inconsistent or not a single metaphysics.
>>> Dan:
>>> The answer as you render it is an either/or solution. However, Pirsig
>>> goes to some lengths in Lila referring to the coexistence of ideas as
>>> a bedrock of his MOQ. For instance:
>>>
>>> "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided
>>> into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
>>> patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all
>>> there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic,
>>> Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing,"
>>> that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any
>>> encyclopedia, is absent
>>>
>>> 'But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive.
>>> They all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost
>>> independent of each other.." [Lila]
>>>
>>> Dan comments:
>>> There. Right there. See it? "...they are not exclusive. They operate
>>> at the same time..." So in this sense, in the sense that Pirsig means,
>>> idealism and materialism are not exclusive. They operate at the same
>>> time.
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> I think your reply demonstrates how amateurs of logic might be inclined to
>> find many-valued logics more useful than they really are.
> Dan:
> So you I take it make a profession of logic and as such are saying
> people like Kurt Gödel and Neils Bohr and Robert Pirsig are wrong. So
> what chance do I stand?

Tuukka:

Logic doesn't care what is my profession.

Bohr doesn't state anything in annotation 67 so he can't be wrong. 
Pirsig merely presumes Bohr would've had a certain opinion.

Why shouldn't I dare to say Robert Pirsig is wrong if that's the 
conclusion of my deductive argument?

How do you find me to have contradicted Kurt Gödel?

>
>> In fuzzy logic the only truth values aren't true or false like they are in
>> classical logic. Instead, a truth value may be any real number from 0
>> (false) to 1 (true).
>>
>> At first this seems like an improvement. But what could you do with it in
>> this case?
>>
>> You could use it to argue that your options are:
>>
>> * To concede that the MOQ isn't completely consistent.
>> * To concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea.
>> * To concede that the MOQ doesn't completely solve the mind-matter problem.
>> * To modify the MOQ.
>>
>> Would this really improve your situation? You'd still have to choose. And if
>> you were to choose anything else than modifying the MOQ you'd kind of need
>> to explain what would you mean.
>>
>> Suppose you decided to concede that the MOQ isn't a completely good idea.
>> Then what would be the moral value of the MOQ on a scale from 0 to 1? Would
>> it be 0.5? Or 0.75? Something else? And most importantly, how would you have
>> determined this value?
>>
>> You don't seem like you could explain that. And it would be quite
>> disappointing if you chose one of these fuzzy logic concessions anyway.
>>
>> You could also try to use three-valued logic to argue that your options are:
>>
>> * To concede that the consistency of the MOQ is unknown.
>> * To concede that the moral value of the MOQ is unknown.
>> * To concede that it is unknown whether the MOQ solves the mind-matter
>> problem.
>> * To modify the MOQ.
>>
>> To me these options don't seem better than your original options. I think
>> they're worse because, like with fuzzy logic, it wouldn't be enough that
>> you'd just select a concession you'd want to make. You'd also need to
>> explain what would you mean with your concession. Your original options
>> don't require you to explain that.
> Dan:
> No idea.
>
>>
>>> So in effect, in the MOQ idealism and materialism are both good
>>> ideas, neither contradicting the other unless as you have done a
>>> person focuses exclusively upon one or the other.
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> Which one do you find me to have focused on exclusively, idealism or
>> materialism?
> Dan:
> That depends.

Tuukka:
Then my focus isn't exclusive.

>
>> Where does Pirsig state that idealism is a good idea? In LC RMP annotation
>> 67 he states idealism to be true. He doesn't state that it's good.
> Dan:
> Truth isn't a shining ideal in the MOQ. Truth is a high quality
> intellectual value pattern, in other words, good.

Tuukka:
Where does Pirsig state so?

>
>> Obviously, truth and morality are not equivalent. Most people agree that in
>> some situations it is moral to lie.
> Dan:
> Again with the either/or. But yes, in the MOQ, truth and morality are
> equivalent. And sometimes, truth can be a lie we tell to make someone
> feel better.

Tuukka:

Where does Pirsig state that truth and morality are equivalent in the MOQ?

It's actually quite trivial to prove that truth and morality aren't 
equivalent in the MOQ. Suppose that a totalitarian regime wants to 
assassinate a productive scientist because he's voiced a critical 
opinion of said regime. You know where this scientist lives but the 
regime doesn't. Should you contact the regime and expose the scientist's 
location?

If truth and morality are equivalent, you should.

However, the MOQ states that the scientist is a source of thought, an 
intellectual pattern, whereas the regime is merely a social pattern. 
Causing the regime to assassinate the scientist would favor social 
values over intellectual ones. Therefore you shouldn't.

>
>>
>>>> If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem. So
>>>> we
>>>> shall assume that the MOQ is consistent.
>>>>
>>>> If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter
>>>> problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However,
>>>> Pirsig
>>>> thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true, the MOQ
>>>> is a
>>>> single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a single
>>>> metaphysics.
>>>>
>>>> Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas.
>>>>
>>>> But the MOQ subscribes to idealism.
>>>>
>>>> Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea.
>>> Dan:
>>> Your logic is based on faulty either/or parameters.
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> If either/or parameters are faulty, you should neither posit that either/or
>> parameters are faulty nor posit that they're not faulty. To do either would
>> be to posit an either/or parameter. And to do both would be to posit a
>> contradiction.
> Dan:
> I didn't say all either/or parameters are faulty though you seem to
> think I did. Other than that, again, no idea.

Tuukka:
Which of my either/or parameters are faulty?

Regards,
Tuk

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