[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

[Dan Glover]

Tuk, all,

On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 5:39 PM, Tuukka Virtaperko
<mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> Dan,
>
>
>
> On 23-Oct-16 22:52, Dan Glover wrote:
>>
>> Tuk, all,
>>
>> On Sun, Oct 23, 2016 at 8:11 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>>>
>>> Dan, all,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 23-Oct-16 2:10, Dan Glover wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Tuk, all,
>>>>
>>>> On Sat, Oct 22, 2016 at 10:34 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>>>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan, all,
>>>>>
>>>>> I wish to provide maximum clarity for my argument. The argument is
>>>>> about
>>>>> the
>>>>> logical consistency and logical implications of LC RMP annotation 67.
>>>>> The
>>>>> annotation includes the following statement:
>>>>>
>>>>> MOQ idealism: "The MOQ says that Quality comes first, which produces
>>>>> ideas,
>>>>> which produce what we know as matter."
>>>>>
>>>>> The concept of Quality is undefined. The notions of logical consistency
>>>>> and
>>>>> logical implications can only be applied to defined concepts. They
>>>>> cannot
>>>>> be
>>>>> applied to the concept of Quality. Therefore, even though MOQ idealism
>>>>> includes the concept of Quality, the notion of MOQ idealism is
>>>>> logically
>>>>> equivalent to the ordinary notion of idealism.
>>>>>
>>>>> MOQ materialism: "However, as if to further the confusion, the MOQ says
>>>>> that
>>>>> the idea that matter comes first is a high quality idea!"
>>>>>
>>>>> The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that
>>>>> the
>>>>> MOQ
>>>>> cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is either
>>>>> inconsistent or not a single metaphysics.
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> The answer as you render it is an either/or solution. However, Pirsig
>>>> goes to some lengths in Lila referring to the coexistence of ideas as
>>>> a bedrock of his MOQ. For instance:
>>>>
>>>> "In this plain of understanding static patterns of value are divided
>>>> into four systems: inorganic patterns, biological patterns, social
>>>> patterns and intellectual patterns. They are exhaustive. That's all
>>>> there are. If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic,
>>>> Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out. No "thing,"
>>>> that is. Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any
>>>> encyclopedia, is absent
>>>>
>>>> 'But although the four systems are exhaustive they are not exclusive.
>>>> They all operate at the same time and in ways that are almost
>>>> independent of each other.." [Lila]
>>>>
>>>> Dan comments:
>>>> There. Right there. See it? "...they are not exclusive. They operate
>>>> at the same time..." So in this sense, in the sense that Pirsig means,
>>>> idealism and materialism are not exclusive. They operate at the same
>>>> time.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> I think your reply demonstrates how amateurs of logic might be inclined
>>> to
>>> find many-valued logics more useful than they really are.
>>
>> Dan:
>> So you I take it make a profession of logic and as such are saying
>> people like Kurt Gödel and Neils Bohr and Robert Pirsig are wrong. So
>> what chance do I stand?
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Logic doesn't care what is my profession.

Dan:
Your answer seems to infer that since I am an amateur and you a
professional that I haven't much of a clue. Perhaps I took it wrong.

>
> Bohr doesn't state anything in annotation 67 so he can't be wrong. Pirsig
> merely presumes Bohr would've had a certain opinion.
>
> Why shouldn't I dare to say Robert Pirsig is wrong if that's the conclusion
> of my deductive argument?

Dan:
You are welcome to say Robert Pirsig is wrong but it seems to me you
should at least make an effort to understand what he is saying first.

>
> How do you find me to have contradicted Kurt Gödel?

Dan:
Both Bohr and Gödel were advocates of many-valued logic, which you say
is not really useful.

>
>>
>>>
>>>> So in effect, in the MOQ idealism and materialism are both good
>>>> ideas, neither contradicting the other unless as you have done a
>>>> person focuses exclusively upon one or the other.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> Which one do you find me to have focused on exclusively, idealism or
>>> materialism?
>>
>> Dan:
>> That depends.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Then my focus isn't exclusive.

Dan:
Okay. But you said... oh never mind. No time for games.

>
>
>>
>>> Where does Pirsig state that idealism is a good idea? In LC RMP
>>> annotation
>>> 67 he states idealism to be true. He doesn't state that it's good.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Truth isn't a shining ideal in the MOQ. Truth is a high quality
>> intellectual value pattern, in other words, good.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Where does Pirsig state so?

"Gravitation is an inorganic pattern of values. Is science
unconcerned? Truth is an intellectual pattern of values. Is science
unconcerned? A scientist may argue rationally that the moral question,
"Is it all right to murder your neighbor?" is not a scientific
question. But can he argue that the moral question, "Is it all right
to fake your scientific data?" is not a scientific question? Can he
say, as a scientist, "The faking of scientific data is no concern of
science?" If he gets tricky and tries to say that that is a moral
question about science which is not a part of science, then he has
committed schizophrenia. He is admitting the existence of a real world
that science cannot comprehend." [Lila]

>
>
>>
>>> Obviously, truth and morality are not equivalent. Most people agree that
>>> in
>>> some situations it is moral to lie.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Again with the either/or. But yes, in the MOQ, truth and morality are
>> equivalent. And sometimes, truth can be a lie we tell to make someone
>> feel better.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Where does Pirsig state that truth and morality are equivalent in the MOQ?

"Because Quality is morality. Make no mistake about it. They're
identical. And if Quality is the primary reality of the world then
that means morality is also the primary reality of the world." [Lila]

Dan comments:
So if Quality and morality are identical, truth, being a pattern of
quality, is also identical to morality.

>
> It's actually quite trivial to prove that truth and morality aren't
> equivalent in the MOQ. Suppose that a totalitarian regime wants to
> assassinate a productive scientist because he's voiced a critical opinion of
> said regime. You know where this scientist lives but the regime doesn't.
> Should you contact the regime and expose the scientist's location?
>
> If truth and morality are equivalent, you should.
>
> However, the MOQ states that the scientist is a source of thought, an
> intellectual pattern, whereas the regime is merely a social pattern. Causing
> the regime to assassinate the scientist would favor social values over
> intellectual ones. Therefore you shouldn't.

Dan:
But haven't you just contradicted yourself, if trivially? Yes you
have, at least according to the MOQ. Remember, truth is a high quality
intellectual pattern of value. So why on earth would you expose the
scientist's location? Only someone under the sway of social patterns
would do so.


>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>> If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem.
>>>>> So
>>>>> we
>>>>> shall assume that the MOQ is consistent.
>>>>>
>>>>> If the MOQ isn't a single metaphysics it doesn't solve the mind-matter
>>>>> problem but instead merely reports that the problem exists. However,
>>>>> Pirsig
>>>>> thinks the MOQ solves the mind-matter problem. If this is true, the MOQ
>>>>> is a
>>>>> single metaphysics. So we shall assume that the MOQ is a single
>>>>> metaphysics.
>>>>>
>>>>> Therefore, idealism must belong to the context of not-good ideas.
>>>>>
>>>>> But the MOQ subscribes to idealism.
>>>>>
>>>>> Therefore, the MOQ is not a good idea.
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> Your logic is based on faulty either/or parameters.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> If either/or parameters are faulty, you should neither posit that
>>> either/or
>>> parameters are faulty nor posit that they're not faulty. To do either
>>> would
>>> be to posit an either/or parameter. And to do both would be to posit a
>>> contradiction.
>>
>> Dan:
>> I didn't say all either/or parameters are faulty though you seem to
>> think I did. Other than that, again, no idea.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Which of my either/or parameters are faulty?

Dan:
Again, that depends.

Thank you,

Dan

http://www.danglover.com