[MD] The Heinous Quadrilemma

[mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net]

All,

I found an interesting and quite recent article by Paul Turner at  
http://robertpirsig.org/Two%20Contexts%20of%20the%20MOQ.html. This  
article has merit. It clearly points out an important starting point  
for discussion. The article is titled: "The Two Contexts of the  
Metaphysics of Quality".

In the article Turner identifies two contexts of the MOQ which he  
calls "the first context" and "the second context". I suggest the  
first context to be called the rhetorical context and the second  
context the dialectical context. The rhetorical context includes  
statements like the last sentence of this LILA citation:

"If you construct an encyclopedia of four topics-Inorganic,  
Biological, Social and Intellectual-nothing is left out.  No 'thing,'  
that is.  Only Dynamic Quality, which cannot be described in any  
encyclopedia, is absent."

The last sentence is obviously rhetorical, since Dynamic Quality is  
undefinable. Should the last sentence be interpreted as dialectical  
then it would follow that Dynamic Quality is defined in terms of  
having the property of "cannot be described in any encyclopedia". This  
would be contrary to the MOQ.

The dialectical context, on the other hand, includes things like logic.

If my suggestion about naming the two contexts is approved then  
Turner's article states that idealism is rhetoric and materialism is  
dialectic.

However, the theory of static value patterns is dialectic. And if  
idealism is an idea it's also a static pattern of value and as such  
may be subjected to dialectic. Furthemore, the mind-matter problem is  
dialectic. Which brings us back to the Heinous Quadrilemma, which is  
also dialectic.

* If materialism is good and idealism is good then the MOQ is inconsistent.
* If materialism is good then idealism isn't good so the MOQ isn't  
good, either.
* If the MOQ offers a rhetorical solution to the mind-matter problem  
instead of a dialectical solution then the MOQ doesn't solve the  
mind-matter problem but merely encourages said problem to be ignored.

By the way, does Pirsig ever write that idealism is good? Or that  
materialism is true?

Regards,
Tuk