[MD] Marsha's Relativism

[Steve Peterson]

Hi DMB,

> Steve said to dmb:
> I wasn't saying that a moral claim is no different from a statement of 
> mathematical fact. What I was suggesting is that there is no 
> difference in what we mean by the word 'true' in the sentences "it is 
> true that slavery is wrong" and "it is true that 2+2=4." Obviously, 
> the sentences are very different, but I think 'true' is used in the 
> same way in both. Do you agree or do you think that there is a 
> difference in usage of 'true' in these two sentences?
>
> dmb says:
> Yea, I definitely think there is a huge difference in the usage of 
> "true" in those two sentences for the reason already stated. One is a 
> moral claim about human suffering and the other is true by virtue of 
> mathematical definitions.

Steve:
What I've been trying to distinguish and what I think you continue to 
conflate here are 'truth' and 'justification.' Your objection here is 
that these two statements are justified in very different ways, but 
that is a completely separate issue from what we mean by truth. In 
other words, though we would justify these statements differently, we 
can still simply say that both sentences are true.

This is an important issue for pragmatists to sort out because James 
and Dewey often seemed to be conflating justification with truth and 
why many modern philosophers of a pragmatic bent refuse to 
self-identify as pragmatists.


> Steve said:
> When pragmatists of Rorty's brand decline to propose a theory of truth 
> and justification, it is because they doubt that there is anything to 
> know about truth or justification once we've learned how to use these 
> words and once we've learned how these words function in language. 
> What I was trying to establish in my numbered sentences is a consensus 
> about how these words are used since the tradition of pragmatism 
> suggests to me that if we want to answer the question "what does this 
> mean?" we might consider asking the question "how is this used?" 
> instead.
>
> dmb says:
> Hmmm. I don't get that either. Isn't it true that words mean what they 
> mean precisely because of the way they're used? To my mind, that just 
> what "meaning" means. I mean, asking what it means and asking how its 
> used is the same question so I don't understand what it means to 
> replace one with the other.

Steve:
Well then, good. I'm glad we agree that there is no pragmatic 
difference. Neither one of us is concerned with finding the essence of 
Truth or Reason and the like.



> Steve said:
> The distinction between belief, justification, and truth is usually 
> considered in discussion of knowledge. There may be other ways of 
> talking about knowledge but I think knowledge is generally taken in 
> philosophy class to be "justified true belief," where each of these 
> three terms is important. For more info, see: http:// 
> plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#JTB
>
> dmb says:
> Oh dear. I honestly had no idea we were talking about Plato. No wonder 
> I'm confused.

Steve:
We are talking about knowledge and trying to understand what knowledge 
means in relation to belief, justification, and truth.


> Steve said:
> As an example to distinguish justification from belief and to answer 
> your question 'How can Bob be "justified" in believing what is "not 
> true"?' consider this situation: Bob is a member of a jury where the 
> defense attorney did a horrible job. Bob may be justified in believing 
> that the defendant is guilty when in fact the defendant is innocent. 
> We are always in such a position as Bob where we don't know what we 
> don't know, so we CAN be justified in believing things that are 
> actually false.
>
>
> dmb says:
>
> Well, if the defense attorney did a horrible job then I really think 
> it would be wrong to say Bob's false beliefs are not at all 
> "justified". We can sympathize with Bob and we can understand the 
> reason he came to believe what isn't true but "justified" is not the 
> right word for that. In fact, convicting an innocent man is pretty 
> much the definition of the opposite term. That would be unjust and 
> would be considered an injustice.

Steve:
You are taking the "bad defense attorney" thing too literally and 
conflating legal justice (which is usually thought of as Justice, as 
one of those essences like Truth and The American Way) with being 
justified in a belief. If it is confusing for you, try substituting 
"warrant" for "justification."

The point of the trial analogy is that we are always in the epistemic 
situation of such a juror who can only make a decision based on the 
arguments and evidence that are available to him. Justification of 
belief happens within a social context while truth swings freely of 
justification. Knowledge is relative not because truth is relative but 
because justification is relative. And even justification is not so 
subjective as to be relative to the whim of a person but is relative to 
the epistemic situation. The epistemic situation includes the 
assertion, the person, and the context. These three must be related in 
the required way for it to be true that Bob is justified in believing 
that the defendant is innocent. Recall that pragmatists don't think we 
will find much fruit in pursuing a theory about what this way must be 
like, but note that there is nothing merely subjective about this 
situation as I described it. Though some of the facts involved concern 
the human subject Bob himself, like the facts about the assertion and 
the context, they are facts nonetheless.

Best,
Steve