[MD] Ah-ha Qua Ah-ha

[Dan Glover]

Hello everyone

On Mon, Nov 22, 2010 at 1:24 PM, Matt Kundert
<pirsigaffliction at hotmail.com> wrote:
>
> Matt said:
> You wish to isolate the "ah-ha moment" _as_ ah-ha moment
> (ah-ha qua ah-ha, as it were).
>
> Marsha said:
> It will be a false isolation, but yes, I am addressing what I see as an
> experience of realization. (Btw, that isolating to theorize is an
> example of reification and typical of intellectualizing, imho.)
>
> Matt:
> This exchange occurred a day or two ago, and my first response was
> to say that this was an important qualification with "many implications"
> (I gestured vaguely).  As I've been thinking about the oddity of talking
> to Marsha, for whom the notion of "assertion" is itself authoritarian
> and anathema, I thought I might put the point by saying that, while
> Marsha is right that the notion of assertion is by its very nature
> authoritarian and arrogant, to vacate the space of assertion in
> philosophical conversation is to turn a _dialogue_ into an _exchange
> of monologues_.  The proper behavioral consequence that Marsha
> has been looking for in excavating the notion of "relativism," I think, is
> just this, but I hesitate to say it out loud except in a near-by room
> with the door closed for fear of violating the new norm.
>
> If this seems funny, it is at the same time true of the consequences
> of the antiauthoritarian relativism Marsha has been pursuing, and lies
> at the heart of what I called a conflict between Marsha's desires--one
> to sit in silence, the other to actually talk to other people.  I think
>  Marsha genuinely wants to dialogue with other people, but the mere
> hint of authority or assertional dominance pisses her off.  I find
> Marsha's dialogic style emblematic of the general pattern of
> discourse of Pirsigians.

Hi Matt

I don't know... that seems a pretty general statement to make in the
face of the differences we all seek to amend by posting here. I for
one don't consider myself a "Pirsigian" even though it isn't meant as
a disparagement (so far as I can fathom, anyway). I am a pretty
isolated person, not only here, but in life. Even in a room full of
people, I find myself standing alone. So when I post here, it is not
out of a need to discourse with anyone. I don't mean to say that it
isn't a pleasant thing once in a while to hold a discussion, mind you.
But the real reason I contribute (when I contribute) is to settle some
muddle in my mind that otherwise seems to go unsettled. Whether anyone
answers my posts is beside the point, although it is somehow
fulfilling when they do answer in a positive way.

On the other hand, and for the most part, the answers I receive to my
contributions seem shaky to shallow at best and downright rude at
worse. The thing is, I know this beforehand just by seeing the name of
the contributor and I immediately become defensive on account of some
past slight or perceived slight. It seems unlikely that I can sway any
opinion already formed. But that is only part of the frustration.
While I do not consider myself a Pirsigian, I have been at this for
years now and I am looking past the formative notions regarding the
MOQ to the underlying, if you will. I suspect we're alike in that
regard although of course you'd have to answer that for yourself.

And in seeking those underlying notions that contributed to the
formation of the MOQ, I find myself unable to adequately explain my
reasoning for getting there, other than saying, go and read the book.
Which may seem like a cop-out, but in fact is merely my way of
pointing out how I have arrived at the conclusions I have arrived at
without going all the way back to the beginning and risking losing the
reader anyway.

>Matt:
> The tension that creates this style is created by the notion of
> "intellectualizing"--how do we theorize about the non-theoretical?
> _Should_ we?  We all, clearly, go in for Pirsig's answer, "bah, go
> ahead--picking up bar ladies and writing metaphysics is a part of
> life."  But I also think we might better stop and wonder just what
> this thing called "intellectualizing" is that causes the problems.
> Pirsig, among many here, has often seemed bothered by this kind
> of question, mainly because the thought has been that the notion
> isn't esoteric, and quite commonsensical.  "Why ask?  You already
> know."  But, just what is it that we already know, that we are
> constantly doing?
.
Dan:

Well, I think that is a personal agenda we all have to ask
ourselves... what are we doing here in this discussion group? Is it
for fun? And if so, how serious can that be? I've said in the past
that I am here for precisely that reason, but over the years I suspect
that to be not entirely true, and that may be another source of
frustration that I feel when attempting to hold an "intelligent"
discussion with someone, anyone. I am not here just for the fun of it.
Still, how serious can one be? And there are times when I do have fun.

>Matt:
> Pirsig, when finally pushed by Paul Turner, said that it was the
> "manipulation of abstract symbols."  What is abstraction, what does it
> mean "to abstract"?  Pirsig, again, leads the way with (in that letter)
> his earlier description as "independently manipulable signs."  To
> _abstract_ is to make _independent_.  It is, in a word, _to isolate_.
>
> This is what I think "intellectualizing" is: the isolation of X from its
> surrounding relationships: the severing of relations.  Marsha, in her
> above short comment, articulates an ambiguity when it comes to
> whether she might agree with this notion, for by saying "it will be a
> false isolation," she could either be saying that _any_ isolation is
> "false" or that _this particular_ one is false.  If the former, then it
> displays the tension we want to know more about.  If the latter, then
> by understanding theory _as_ isolation, "isolating to theorize" displays
> a headache.
>
> These, of course, are my definitions foisted on Marsha's comment,
> but what I hope to isolate is the problem-area I think needs to be
> addressed about what "intellectualizing" is and what's wrong with it.
> Later in that post, Marsha implied that "the point of philosophy is to
> add appreciation to the living experience," and I at the time agreed,
> and still now agree.  But by understanding theory, intellectualizing,
> as isolation, we can now understand philosophy as the skill of
> moving back and forth between the cutting of relations by isolation
> and the thrusting back into relation of the previously cut.  That's
> what "thinking" is.

Dan:

Well, actually, this is thinking. What we are doing right now, by
applying our experience to the problem at hand. I don't know as there
is a point to philosophy. Yes, perhaps to philosophize is to deepen
the appreciation of living but that isn't necessarily true either.
Most people I know in life would roll their eyes at these discussions
and wonder what the hell the point of it all is. Perhaps that's why
(despite my deep and enduring frustrations) I keep coming back here...
on account of some kindred feeling that we seem to be seeking... and
however different the seeking methods may be they do for the most part
revolve around the work of Robert Pirsig.

>Matt:
> If this is true, I think it also means that the notion of "pre-intellectual
> experience" is a vanishing point that cannot be understand _as_ itself.
> And _this_ is the case because _nothing_ can be understood
> _as itself_: to understand X qua X ("being qua being" as in Aristotle's
> definition of metaphysics or "ah-ha qua ah-ha" as in Marsha's search)
> would be to cut X from _all_ its relations, but once that is done, what
> is left?

Dan:

Pre-intellectual experience, Dynamic Quality, cannot be understood
intellectually. On the other hand, static quality can be
intellectually understood, which is how we are holding this discussion
in the first place, of course. Yet, by seeking to define the
undefined, we are taking ourselves away from whatever "reality" is
"really" out there, if you will. Still, that is what we do as human
beings. We define the undefined. We can't help it. That is what the
practice of meditation and zazen seeks... to instill a sense of quiet
to still that inner voice that is constantly chattering, telling us
what this means and that means. Over time, and little by little, it is
possible to glimpse that which lies before the intellectualization
starts, but of course once glimpsed, the thinking starts all over
again. It is in my opinion a never-ending process that leads nowhere
in the end, or the beginning, whichever the case may be.

>Matt:
> This is the performative contradiction of speaking about silence--you
> can only talk around it.  This is something we've all been toying
> around with in various ways (as Pirsig did too), but I'm not sure
> we've come to grips with what it means.  So, how _do_ we
> understand "pre-intellectual experience"?  By how it functions (like
> some of the ways articulated in "DQ as Pre-Intellectual Experience").
> But by displaying how it functions, I'm defining it, setting it into
> relation to something, which means I've disappeared the thing I was
> talking about.  Which is just the bitch of it.  However, this is _only_
> the difficulty of those kinds of objects, things, that we've attached
> certain kinds of descriptions to: like, "pre-intellectual" or "ineffable."
> To understand is to set into relation, but these things have no
> relations.
>
> So, what are the functions of these kinds of objects?  One, I think,
> useful function of such objects is to defeat the absolutist from
> closing the loop of life and saying all problems have been solved and
> defined--it ever dispels the notion that, e.g., Plato could have
> encapsulated the Form of the Good.  It functions as the symbol of
> metaphysical openness.  In this way, it functions as the symbol of the
> composition instructor who tells his students that no person will ever
> cease their quest for better articulation.
>
> If these things are the case, then that means the quest to articulate
> inarticulateness doesn't get much better than "I'm not happy with this
> description, but it's the best I got right now."  To push harder is to
> countenance the _actual ability_ to perform the contradiction hiding
> in "speaking about silence."  This means that to _want_ to talk about
> one's most private and special experiences, to try and convey the
> ephemeral, mind-blowing experiences one terms a "direct experience"
> _as_ private, direct experiences is to want to speak in a language that
> only you can understand, because the intelligibility of that notion of
> privacy and directness depends on its being _unrelated_ ("undefined")
> to any but you.
>
> And if this is the case, it is a monologue in an alcove with the door shut.
> The alcove is there, without a doubt, but the dinner conversation can
> only happen out here.  And since this metaphorical alcove is actually
> inside of our minds, we should think twice before telling each other,
> _asserting_ to each other, that we should get more experience in the
> alcove, because if these descriptions are right, then the alcove is a daily
> experience for all of us, the leaving of which happens every time we
> open our mouths.  And what is actually being discussed are more
> relatable things, like meditation, instead of the unrelatable thing that
> was thought to have been discussed, but never actually is.

Dan:

I really see nothing to disagree with in any of your words here. On
the other hand, I sense that you sense a righteousness to words that
is hard to pin down, hence your love for them in the first place, I
suppose. I have to say that I don't sense that in most authors... I
sense that words are being used mostly as playthings, hence another of
my many frustrations. Ah, but what of it...

Anyway, and for what it is worth, thank you for sharing,

Dan