[MD] Annotations to LC

[mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net]

Dan, all,


Lainaus Dan Glover <daneglover at gmail.com>:

> Tuk, all,
>
> On Wed, Nov 9, 2016 at 5:44 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
>> dmb, Dan, Adrie, David, all,
>>
>>
>> On 08-Nov-16 10:50, Dan Glover wrote:
>>>
>>> Tuk, all,
>>>
>>> I haven't time to go through this document in its entirety. David
>>> Buchanan answered some of the earlier questions so I have deleted
>>> them.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 12:20 AM, Tuukka Virtaperko
>>> <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net>  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> >Dan, Horse, Adrie, all,
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> >"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have a
>>>> >dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
>>>> > that
>>>> >is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has been
>>>> >done. The MOQ is an idea."
>>>> >
>>>> >If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
>>>> > Pirsig
>>>> >doesn't get it.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
>>> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
>>>
>>> dichotomize
>>>
>>> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>> 1.
>>> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
>>> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>> 2.
>>> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
>>> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
>>>
>>>
>>> Dialetheism
>>>
>>> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
>>>
>>> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
>>> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
>>> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
>>> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
>>> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
>>> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
>>> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
>>> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
>>>
>>> Dan comments:
>>> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> What Donny actually says is:
>
> Dan:
> Yes, just as I said.
>
>>
>> "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B),
>> iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
>>
>> Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
>>
>> (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
>> B))))
>>
>> This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
>>
>> The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
>> dichotomistic distinction to itself.
>
> Dan:
> I fail to see that as an option. From what I understand, you are still
> working with the assumption 'everything is either A or B' regardless
> of is or not. There is no problem here other than your
> misinterpretation of what Donny (and Pirsig) is saying.
>


Tuukka:

Yeah, I get it. You're suggesting that (either ((everything is either
A or B) or (not (everything is either A or B)))) is a dialetheia as
well. I don't know of any such system in which that makes sense. Never
heard of them. Otherwise that's a reasonable suggestion but it also
contradicts Pirsig. According to Pirsig, the MOQ is logically
consistent, which means there are no logical dialetheia in the MOQ.

Personally I am not at all opposed to dialetheism. My motivation for
arguing this point is that previously I was told that this mailing
list is for discussing Pirsig's thoughts. Since I believe I've
improved the MOQ I'd rather discuss the improvements. But I thought
that isn't okay, so all there was left for me to do was to criticize
Pirsig in case I actually found a serious mistake made by him. But now
I notice that you are a proponent of dialetheism.

It would make sense to suppose that Pirsig would have a favorable
opinion of dialetheism and paraconsistent logic, given how much
Eastern philosophy has influenced the MOQ. Oriental philosophy is
abundant with dialetheism and paraconsistency. But Pirsig doesn't
express a favorable opinion, because he states the MOQ to be logically
consistent. Perhaps he wouldn't have made such a statement had he
understood the implications. But he did state that. And I can't go too
far to guess what the man might have really meant. I think it's
ultimately up to him to say what he means. And so far he has said no
to dialetheism and paraconsistent logic.

Apparently, you and I do not share this refusal of dialetheism and
paraconsistent logic. Therefore it might be appropriate at this point
that we ignore what Pirsig says, for now, and focus on what we
ourselves believe in.


>>>
>>>> >
>>>> >"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>>> >object.'
>>>> >[111] RMP: Object: n.
>>>> >Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by vision
>>>> > or
>>>> >touch; a material thing.
>>>> >   1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>>> >   2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>> >   3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>> >affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>> > substantive
>>>> >following and governed by a preposition.
>>>> >   4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>> >   (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>> >The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are biological
>>>> >patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>>> >'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>>> > that
>>>> >in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>>> > between
>>>> >them is meaningless."
>>>> >
>>>> >If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus of
>>>> >attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>>> >
>>>> >Why is there no Definition #5?
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>>
>>> Object: n.
>>>
>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>>
>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>>
>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>
>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>>
>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>
>>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>
>>> The ?objects? in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>>> patterns. The ?objects? Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>>
>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA. The
>> distinction is very sharp."
>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They exist
>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>>
>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social things,
>> but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and physical
>> objects.
>
> Dan:
> It isn't meaningless. Where do you get that from?
>


Tuukka:
You wrote: "It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be
objects. Thus any distinction between them is meaningless."


>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> >
>>>> >"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>>> >experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel gives
>>>> > a
>>>> >strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>>> >
>>>> >Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>>> >deduction?
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
>> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains why
>> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
>> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ doesn't
>> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
>> deduction.
>
> Dan:
> Oh. I see the confusion. Logical deduction is a static value pattern,
> not experience. In the MOQ, experience and Dynamic Quality are
> synonymous.


Tuukka:

I agree that "experience" and "Dynamic Quality" are largely used as
synonyms although it would also make some sense to think of individual
experiences as something static, or to think of Dynamic Quality as a
concept derived from anthropology.

However, I also find logical deduction to be experience. It's kind of
difficult not to, given how much I've done that. It's not sensory or
emotional experience but it's not a static value pattern, either.

Sometimes deduction is Dynamic. Sometimes a correct and relevant
deduction just pops into my mind out of nowhere. Is that static? No,
otherwise it would've already been there. Is that experience? Yes... I
don't quite understand what would someone mean by stating that it's
not experience. But it's perhaps not empirical experience.


>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> >
>>>> >At this point in LC there's a Pirsig quote in which he compares critics
>>>> > to
>>>> >sharks smelling blood. I think some people here see me as a similar
>>>> > shark.
>>>> >But what is despicable about such a shark are the lack of effort and the
>>>> >profuse amount of rhetoric. I'm a MOQ scholastic, not a shark.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Prove it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> According to Antti Kukkonen (MA, M.Soc.Sci) my research and development of
>> the MOQ, published in my work "Zen and the Art of Insanity" (2013), is an
>> important contribution to process philosophy.
>
> Dan:
> Nice. Hey though. I just searched Amazon and came up empty.
>


Tuukka:
Please see my message titled "The Analytic Metaphysics of Quality".
Thank you for your interest!



>>
>>
>>>
>>>> "Bodvar: (...) how can SOM avoid being trashed if it competes with the
>>>> Quality of being reality?
>>>> [135] RMP: As far as I know the MOQ does not trash the SOM. It contains
>>>> the
>>>> SOM within a larger system. The only thing it trashes is the SOM
>>>> assertion
>>>> that values are unreal."
>>>>
>>>> I agree.
>>>>
>>>> "Magnus: Truth comes with a context, the context in which it is true.
>>>> Mostly
>>>> for Struan: the MOQ does not provide absolute answers to ethical
>>>> dilemmas.
>>>> It /does/ however provide a framework with which to contextualize
>>>> dilemmas.
>>>> [143]
>>>> RMP: This is how I have always seen it. Just as two opposing sides can
>>>> cite
>>>> the Constitution as support for their case in the Supreme Court, so can
>>>> two
>>>> opposing sides cite the MOQ. 'The Devil can quote scripture to his own
>>>> choosing,' but there is no reason to throw out the Bible, the U.S.
>>>> Constitution or the MOQ as long as they can provide a larger context for
>>>> understanding."
>>>>
>>>> Yeah, but the mind-matter problem isn't solved before it is explained how
>>>> to
>>>> correctly select idealism or materialism as the context in a given
>>>> situation.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Not sure what you are objecting to here.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Idealism states that "mind precedes matter" but materialism states that
>> "matter precedes mind". Pirsig's MOQ states both are true. But they
>> contradict each other. So, how do we know when should we believe in
>> materialism and when should we believe in idealism? The only answer that can
>> be logically inferred from Pirsig's writings is that when we believe in bad
>> ideas that are true we may believe in idealism, and when we believe in good
>> ideas we may believe in materialism. I think that's a weird answer.
>
> Dan:
> Look at it this way: we 'believe' in neither idealism or materialism.
> Instead, the MOQ encompasses both in a more expansive framework


Tuukka:

But does that framework make sense? Idealism is just a nominal feature
of Pirsig's MOQ. Suppose Pirsig's MOQ were a car with those furry dice
hanging from the front window. The furry dice would be idealism. Then
you tried to sell that car to a guy who hates furry dice. He could
just take the furry dice off and the customer wouldn't consider it an
essentially different car. That's the problem. Idealism is just stuck
on to Pirsig's MOQ. It doesn't function, it's just an inert add-on.

The theory of static value patterns isn't idealistic. What makes the
MOQ norminally idealistic are Pirsig's some strikingly casual and
short remarks in the LS annotations.


>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> "Why the ambiguity on four or more levels? [151]
>>>> RMP: The answer is that Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily
>>>> arbitrary.
>>>> If someone likes fire levels, he can have them. It's still the MOQ, even
>>>> though he personally prefers four levels."
>>>>
>>>> What does it mean it's "still the MOQ"? Can it be discussed on MD?
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Yes.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Great! Then perhaps there's something else to discuss than the Heinous
>> Quadrilemma.
>
> Dan:
> This five+ levels in the MOQ came from Doug Renselle, who went on to
> develop his own offshoot of the MOQ which if memory serves he named
> Quantonics.


Tuukka:
This "theory" sounds more like rhetoric than a theory. But the website
is confusing and I didn't go through all of it.


>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> That Pirsig doesn't like being unnecessarily arbitrary increases the
>>>> potency
>>>> of the Heinous Quadrilemma.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> How so? If your Heinous Quadrilemma is faulty, then your argument falls
>>> apart.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Same is true for Pirsig's MOQ.
>
> Dan:
> Well, yes. If the MOQ is faulty, then the argument falls apart. But I
> haven't seen any proof of that. It is kind of funny not funny ha ha
> just funny huh but your Heinous Quadrilemma seems based upon Donny's
> dichotomistic distinction while the MOQ is based more on a dialetheia.
> So I can sort of see why you objected to my answer on that query.
>


Tuukka:
Pirsig states in LILA that the MOQ is logically consistent. This means
Pirsig's MOQ disallows dialetheia. I know, you'd expect Pirsig's MOQ to allow
them. I'd expect that too. But according to Pirsig it doesn't.


>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> "Q&A [4]
>>>> Yes, it's clear I've been of two minds on whether subjects and objects
>>>> should be included in the MOQ. My earlier view, when I was concentrating
>>>> on
>>>> the confusion of subject-object thinking, was to get rid of them entirely
>>>> to
>>>> help clarify things. Later I began to see it's not necessary to get rid
>>>> of
>>>> them because MOQ can encase them neatly within its structure--the upper
>>>> two
>>>> levels being subjective, and the lower two, objective. Still later I saw
>>>> that the subject-object distinction is very useful for sharply
>>>> distinguishing between biological and social levels.
>>>> If I had been more careful in my editing, I would have eliminated or
>>>> modified the earlier statements to bring them into agreement with the
>>>> latter
>>>> ones. However I missed these and it's valuable that the Lila Squad has
>>>> caught them. The main danger to the MOQ from subject-object thinking at
>>>> present seems to be when it tries in a conversational way to encase
>>>> values
>>>> and declare them to be either objects or thoughts. That was the attempt
>>>> of
>>>> the professors in Bozeman in ZMM that started this whole MOQ.
>>>> At present, I don't see that the terms 'subject' and 'object' need to be
>>>> dropped, as long as we remember they are just levels of value, not
>>>> expressions of independent scientific reality."
>>>>
>>>> Horse said I'm incapable of backtracking but dmb obviously isn't, since
>>>> he
>>>> reverted to Pirsig's earlier stance when I demolished Pirsig's MOQ
>>>> logically. But I don't think we need to revert if we make some other kind
>>>> of
>>>> changes. A logically demolished MOQ wouldn't be very attractive anyway.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Come on, dude. You did not demolish the MOQ. This is silly.
>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Indeed I didn't, as Pirsig doesn't claim the final word on what is the MOQ.
>> Instead, he writes things like: "If I understand the MOQ correctly... "
>
> Dan:
> When I first found out that Robert Pirsig was reading LC (the original
> manuscript, without annotations, of course) and that he agreed to
> supply me though I mean us with the annotations he was making, I sort
> of freaked. I first read ZMM back in 1974 give or take and I was
> instantly captivated by Robert Pirsig's powerful words. Fast forward
> 20some years and all of a sudden here I am actually talking with the
> man. I always thought of him as this guy who taught like his hair was
> on fire and me I've never been much of a student so what common ground
> did we have? Honestly, though, Mr. Pirsig was such a delight to work
> with. Not once did he talk down to me. So when I see words like "If I
> understand the MOQ correctly" it only enhances that delight I felt.
> You are right. He doesn't claim the final word on the MOQ.


Tuukka:
I've always thought of Pirsig as likable. But looks like I'll never
get to experience that closely.


>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>> "Q&A [4]
>>>> RMP: Yes, the relationship of the MOQ to philosophic idealism is an
>>>> important one that is not adequately spelled out in LILA. In a
>>>> materialist
>>>> system mind has no reality because it is not material. In an idealist
>>>> system
>>>> matter has no reality because it is just an idea. The acceptance of one
>>>> meant the rejection of the other. In the MOQ, both mind and matter are
>>>> levels of value. Materialist explanations and idealist explanations can
>>>> coexist because they are descriptions of coexisting levels of a larger
>>>> reality.
>>>> The MOQ does not deny the traditional scientific view of reality as
>>>> composed
>>>> of material substance and independent of us. It says it is an extremely
>>>> high
>>>> quality idea. We should follow it whenever it is practical to do so. But
>>>> the
>>>> MOQ, like philosophic idealism, says this scientific view of reality is
>>>> still an idea. If it were not an idea, then that 'independent scientific
>>>> material reality' would not be able to change as new scientific
>>>> discoveries
>>>> come in."
>>>>
>>>> Even if the MOQ attempt to contain idealism wouldn't cause the Heinous
>>>> Quadrilemma there would be a problem with this. This is just a taxonomic
>>>> declaration. There is no idealistic system. There's just a conceptual box
>>>> that's labeled "idealism". The box is nearly empty. It does contain the
>>>> MOQ
>>>> but the MOQ is also contained in the box labeled "materialism". So, why
>>>> put
>>>> the MOQ alone into this other box, too?
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> No idea what you are saying here.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of sand.
>
> Dan:
> I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of
> view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic
> idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ.
> That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent
> with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila
> cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on
> materialism due to our Western culture's biases.


Tuukka:
The static patterns in LILA don't contain idealism. They contain
materialism. Idealism is something Pirsig just sticks on the MOQ in
LC, you know, like gluing a sore thumb on the hood of your car.


Thank you,
Tuk