[MD] Annotations to LC

Dan Glover daneglover at gmail.com
Wed Nov 16 21:07:09 PST 2016


Tuk, all,

On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 7:05 AM,  <mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> Dan, all,
>

>>>>> >"Donny: Put this tool in your philosophical toolbox: whenever you have
>>>>> > a
>>>>> >dichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or B), iterate it,
>>>>> > that
>>>>> >is, apply it to itself, and see where it falls. [107] RMP: This has
>>>>> > been
>>>>> >done. The MOQ is an idea."
>>>>> >
>>>>> >If I read this correctly, Donny suggests dialetheism to Pirsig and
>>>>> > Pirsig
>>>>> >doesn't get it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> I am guessing you read it incorrectly. Donny suggested dichotomistic
>>>> distinction, not dialetheism. These terms are diametrically opposed.
>>>>
>>>> dichotomize
>>>>
>>>> verb (used with object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>>> 1.
>>>> to divide or separate into two parts, kinds, etc.
>>>> verb (used without object), dichotomized, dichotomizing.
>>>> 2.
>>>> to become divided into two parts; form a dichotomy.
>>>> [http://www.dictionary.com/browse/dichotomistic]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dialetheism
>>>>
>>>> First published Fri Dec 4, 1998; substantive revision Thu Mar 28, 2013
>>>>
>>>> A dialetheia is a sentence, A, such that both it and its negation, ¬A,
>>>> are true (we shall talk of sentences throughout this entry; but one
>>>> could run the definition in terms of propositions, statements, or
>>>> whatever one takes as one's favourite truth-bearer: this would make
>>>> little difference in the context). Assuming the fairly uncontroversial
>>>> view that falsity just is the truth of negation, it can equally be
>>>> claimed that a dialetheia is a sentence which is both true and false.
>>>> [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/]
>>>>
>>>> Dan comments:
>>>> Note that Donny says: everything is either A or B. Not both.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> What Donny actually says is:
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Yes, just as I said.
>>
>>>
>>> "whenever you have adichotomistic distinction (everything is either A or
>>> B),
>>> iterate it, thatis, apply it to itself, and see where it falls."
>>>
>>> Applying a dichotomistic distinction to itself could to lead us to:
>>>
>>> (either ((everything is either A or B) or (not (everything is either A or
>>> B))))
>>>
>>> This seems to suggest dialetheism is an option.
>>>
>>> The problem with your interpretation is that you don't apply the
>>> dichotomistic distinction to itself.
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> I fail to see that as an option. From what I understand, you are still
>> working with the assumption 'everything is either A or B' regardless
>> of is or not. There is no problem here other than your
>> misinterpretation of what Donny (and Pirsig) is saying.
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Yeah, I get it. You're suggesting that (either ((everything is either
> A or B) or (not (everything is either A or B)))) is a dialetheia as
> well.

Dan:
No.

> I don't know of any such system in which that makes sense. Never
> heard of them. Otherwise that's a reasonable suggestion but it also
> contradicts Pirsig. According to Pirsig, the MOQ is logically
> consistent, which means there are no logical dialetheia in the MOQ.

Dan:
I don't see the logic here.

>
> Personally I am not at all opposed to dialetheism. My motivation for
> arguing this point is that previously I was told that this mailing
> list is for discussing Pirsig's thoughts. Since I believe I've
> improved the MOQ I'd rather discuss the improvements. But I thought
> that isn't okay, so all there was left for me to do was to criticize
> Pirsig in case I actually found a serious mistake made by him. But now
> I notice that you are a proponent of dialetheism.

Dan:
I never even heard of dialetheism before this discussion so I hardly
see how I can be a proponent. But maybe.

>
> It would make sense to suppose that Pirsig would have a favorable
> opinion of dialetheism and paraconsistent logic, given how much
> Eastern philosophy has influenced the MOQ. Oriental philosophy is
> abundant with dialetheism and paraconsistency. But Pirsig doesn't
> express a favorable opinion, because he states the MOQ to be logically
> consistent. Perhaps he wouldn't have made such a statement had he
> understood the implications. But he did state that. And I can't go too
> far to guess what the man might have really meant. I think it's
> ultimately up to him to say what he means. And so far he has said no
> to dialetheism and paraconsistent logic.

Dan:
No he doesn't. You say he says. But you are contradicting your own
logic by saying how Pirsig is wrong to state the MOQ is logically
consistent while at the same time citing dialetheism and
paraconsistent logic.

>
> Apparently, you and I do not share this refusal of dialetheism and
> paraconsistent logic. Therefore it might be appropriate at this point
> that we ignore what Pirsig says, for now, and focus on what we
> ourselves believe in.

Dan:
No.

>
>
>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>> >"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>>>> >object.'
>>>>> >[111] RMP: Object: n.
>>>>> >Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>>> > vision
>>>>> > or
>>>>> >touch; a material thing.
>>>>> >   1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>>>> >   2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>> >   3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>>> >affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>>> > substantive
>>>>> >following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>> >   4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>> >   (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>> >The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>>> > biological
>>>>> >patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>>>> >'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>>>> > that
>>>>> >in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>>>> > between
>>>>> >them is meaningless."
>>>>> >
>>>>> >If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus
>>>>> > of
>>>>> >attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>>>> >
>>>>> >Why is there no Definition #5?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>>>
>>>> Object: n.
>>>>
>>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>>>
>>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>>>
>>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>
>>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>
>>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>
>>>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>
>>>> The ?objects? in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>>>> patterns. The ?objects? Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>>>
>>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
>>> The
>>> distinction is very sharp."
>>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They
>>> exist
>>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
>>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
>>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
>>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>>>
>>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
>>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
>>> things,
>>> but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
>>> physical
>>> objects.
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> It isn't meaningless. Where do you get that from?
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> You wrote: "It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be
> objects. Thus any distinction between them is meaningless."

Dan:
For the record, I didn't write that. Robert Pirsig wrote it in
response to Donny's post:

"Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known object.'

5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.

What Robert Pirsig is pointing to is Donny's definition and how it
makes any distinction between them (known subject, known object)
meaningless. Key word: known. So I think you've misinterpreted what is
being said.

>
>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>> >"Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>>>> >experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel
>>>>> > gives
>>>>> > a
>>>>> >strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>>>> >
>>>>> >Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>>>> >deduction?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
>>> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains
>>> why
>>> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
>>> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ
>>> doesn't
>>> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
>>> deduction.
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> Oh. I see the confusion. Logical deduction is a static value pattern,
>> not experience. In the MOQ, experience and Dynamic Quality are
>> synonymous.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> I agree that "experience" and "Dynamic Quality" are largely used as
> synonyms although it would also make some sense to think of individual
> experiences as something static, or to think of Dynamic Quality as a
> concept derived from anthropology.

Dan:
It is important to keep Dynamic Quality concept free.

>
> However, I also find logical deduction to be experience. It's kind of
> difficult not to, given how much I've done that. It's not sensory or
> emotional experience but it's not a static value pattern, either.

Dan:
Sure it is. Logical deduction is a set of intellectual value patterns.

>
> Sometimes deduction is Dynamic.

Dan:
Oh no. Dynamic Quality comes first. Deduction may appear as a flash of
insight but without intellect, how can there be deduction?

> Sometimes a correct and relevant
> deduction just pops into my mind out of nowhere. Is that static?

Dan:
Yes.

> No,
> otherwise it would've already been there. Is that experience?

Dan:
The deduction comes after experience.

> Yes... I
> don't quite understand what would someone mean by stating that it's
> not experience. But it's perhaps not empirical experience.

Dan:
If you want to qualify it like that, yes. Deduction is always a memory.


>>
>> Dan:
>> Look at it this way: we 'believe' in neither idealism or materialism.
>> Instead, the MOQ encompasses both in a more expansive framework
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> But does that framework make sense? Idealism is just a nominal feature
> of Pirsig's MOQ. Suppose Pirsig's MOQ were a car with those furry dice
> hanging from the front window. The furry dice would be idealism. Then
> you tried to sell that car to a guy who hates furry dice. He could
> just take the furry dice off and the customer wouldn't consider it an
> essentially different car. That's the problem. Idealism is just stuck
> on to Pirsig's MOQ. It doesn't function, it's just an inert add-on.
>
> The theory of static value patterns isn't idealistic. What makes the
> MOQ norminally idealistic are Pirsig's some strikingly casual and
> short remarks in the LS annotations.

Dan:
It appears (to me) that you've either misread or misinterpreted Lila.

>
>
>>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Pirsig states in LILA that the MOQ is logically consistent. This means
> Pirsig's MOQ disallows dialetheia. I know, you'd expect Pirsig's MOQ to
> allow
> them. I'd expect that too. But according to Pirsig it doesn't.

Dan:
You are (apparently) fixating upon one form of logic to the exclusion
of all else.

>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
>>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of
>>> sand.
>>
>>
>> Dan:
>> I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of
>> view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic
>> idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ.
>> That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent
>> with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila
>> cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on
>> materialism due to our Western culture's biases.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> The static patterns in LILA don't contain idealism. They contain
> materialism. Idealism is something Pirsig just sticks on the MOQ in
> LC, you know, like gluing a sore thumb on the hood of your car.

Dan:
>From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/
It nevertheless seems safe to say that within modern philosophy there
have been two fundamental conceptions of idealism:

1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate
foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and

2 although the existence of something independent of the mind is
conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent
“reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or
constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all
claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of
self-knowledge.

There are numerous examples of idealism in Lila. Here are a few:

The Dharmakaya light.

"It is this subjective side of values that led to their being long
tabooed as improper for consideration by natural science," Kroeber and
Kluckhohn said.

By virtue of their subjective emotion and ethical character, norms and
especially values are among the world's most difficult objects to
identify with certainty.

In a subject-object metaphysics morals and art are worlds apart,
morals being concerned with the subject quality and art with object
quality. But in the Metaphysics of Quality that division doesn't
exist. They're the same. They both become much more intelligible when
references to what is subjective and what is objective are completely
thrown away and references to what is static and what is Dynamic are
taken up instead.

What is today conventionally called "morality" covers only one of
these sets of moral codes, the social-biological code. In a
subject­object metaphysics this single social-biological code is
considered to be a minor, "subjective," physically non-existent part
of the universe. But in the Metaphysics of Quality all these sets of
morals, plus another Dynamic morality, are not only real, they are the
whole thing.

A subject-object metaphysics presumes that all these mirrors are
subjective and therefore unreal and unimportant, but that presumption,
like so many others, seems to deliberately ignore the obvious.

Dan comments:
So. Are you ignoring the obvious?

Thank you,
Dan

http://www.danglover.com



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