[MD] Annotations to LC

[Tuukka Virtaperko]

Dan,


>> I don't know of any such system in which that makes sense. Never
>> heard of them. Otherwise that's a reasonable suggestion but it also
>> contradicts Pirsig. According to Pirsig, the MOQ is logically
>> consistent, which means there are no logical dialetheia in the MOQ.
> Dan:
> I don't see the logic here.


Tuukka:
A statement that's both true and false is a contradiction. There are no 
such theorems in classical logic. This is why classical logic is 
consistent. But dialetheia are true contradictions. So if the MOQ is 
logically consistent it means that there are no true contradictions in 
the MOQ. That's not an opinion - that's what the words mean.


>
>
>> It would make sense to suppose that Pirsig would have a favorable
>> opinion of dialetheism and paraconsistent logic, given how much
>> Eastern philosophy has influenced the MOQ. Oriental philosophy is
>> abundant with dialetheism and paraconsistency. But Pirsig doesn't
>> express a favorable opinion, because he states the MOQ to be logically
>> consistent. Perhaps he wouldn't have made such a statement had he
>> understood the implications. But he did state that. And I can't go too
>> far to guess what the man might have really meant. I think it's
>> ultimately up to him to say what he means. And so far he has said no
>> to dialetheism and paraconsistent logic.
> Dan:
> No he doesn't. You say he says.


Tuukka:

In chapter 8 of LILA Pirsig writes:

"The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with experience, 
and economy of explanation.  The Metaphysics of Quality satisfies these."


> But you are contradicting your own
> logic by saying how Pirsig is wrong to state the MOQ is logically
> consistent while at the same time citing dialetheism and
> paraconsistent logic.


Tuukka:
So if somebody cites Pirsig and then cites something else, it means the 
Pirsig citation is wrong?


>
>> Apparently, you and I do not share this refusal of dialetheism and
>> paraconsistent logic. Therefore it might be appropriate at this point
>> that we ignore what Pirsig says, for now, and focus on what we
>> ourselves believe in.
> Dan:
> No.


Tuukka:
Not share, or not appropriate?


>
>>
>>>>>>> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>>>>>> object.'
>>>>>>> [111] RMP: Object: n.
>>>>>>> Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>>>>> vision
>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>> touch; a material thing.
>>>>>>>    1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>>>>>>    2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>>>>    3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>>>>> substantive
>>>>>>> following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>>>>    4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>>>>    (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>>>> The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>>>>> biological
>>>>>>> patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns. The
>>>>>>> 'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to me
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>> in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>> them is meaningless."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the focus
>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>> attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Why is there no Definition #5?
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>>>>
>>>>> Object: n.
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>>>>
>>>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>>
>>>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>>
>>>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>>
>>>>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>>
>>>>> The ?objects? in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>>>>> patterns. The ?objects? Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>>>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>>>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>
>>>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>>>>
>>>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
>>>> The
>>>> distinction is very sharp."
>>>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They
>>>> exist
>>>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
>>>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
>>>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
>>>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>>>>
>>>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
>>>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
>>>> things,
>>>> but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
>>>> physical
>>>> objects.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> It isn't meaningless. Where do you get that from?
>>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> You wrote: "It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be
>> objects. Thus any distinction between them is meaningless."
> Dan:
> For the record, I didn't write that. Robert Pirsig wrote it in
> response to Donny's post:
>
> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known object.'
>
> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>
> What Robert Pirsig is pointing to is Donny's definition and how it
> makes any distinction between them (known subject, known object)
> meaningless. Key word: known. So I think you've misinterpreted what is
> being said.


Tuukka:

Okay, so Pirsig says that in definition 5 the distinction is meaningless 
but he uses another definition. In any case Pirsig argues:

In definition 5 subjects can be objects. Therefore the distinction 
between subjects and objects is meaningless in definition 5.

How come? Even if subjects can be objects, can objects be subjects? If 
they can, a rock can be a subject. What would that kind of a subject be, 
apart from being at least superficially silly?


>
>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Donny: In plainer words, can you have knowledge of (the world of)
>>>>>>> experience prior to experience? Hume says no, Kant says yes, Hegel
>>>>>>> gives
>>>>>>> a
>>>>>>> strenuous no and Pirsig says yes. [112] RMP: Pirsig says no."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then what kind of an experience is the experience of making a logical
>>>>>>> deduction?
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan:
>>>>> That has nothing to do with the annotation.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Tuukka:
>>>> Logical deduction supposedly allows us to infer relevant predictions of
>>>> experience. If logical deduction itself is experience, the MOQ explains
>>>> why
>>>> mathematical formalisms sometimes lead to hypotheses of empirical science
>>>> that turn out true. If logical deduction isn't experience, the MOQ
>>>> doesn't
>>>> explain that. This is why I asked what kind of an experience is logical
>>>> deduction.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> Oh. I see the confusion. Logical deduction is a static value pattern,
>>> not experience. In the MOQ, experience and Dynamic Quality are
>>> synonymous.
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> I agree that "experience" and "Dynamic Quality" are largely used as
>> synonyms although it would also make some sense to think of individual
>> experiences as something static, or to think of Dynamic Quality as a
>> concept derived from anthropology.
> Dan:
> It is important to keep Dynamic Quality concept free.


Tuukka:
Yeah, Bo always kept talking about this when he had nothing else to say.


>
>> Sometimes deduction is Dynamic.
> Dan:
> Oh no. Dynamic Quality comes first. Deduction may appear as a flash of
> insight but without intellect, how can there be deduction?


Tuukka:
Oh come on, dmb does rhetoric all the time but I'm not allowed to?


>
>> Sometimes a correct and relevant
>> deduction just pops into my mind out of nowhere. Is that static?
> Dan:
> Yes.
>
>> No,
>> otherwise it would've already been there. Is that experience?
> Dan:
> The deduction comes after experience.


Tuukka:
The experience is identified as deduction afterwards.


>
>> Yes... I
>> don't quite understand what would someone mean by stating that it's
>> not experience. But it's perhaps not empirical experience.
> Dan:
> If you want to qualify it like that, yes. Deduction is always a memory.


Tuukka:
Well, one needs to remember the premises.


>
>
>>> Dan:
>>> Look at it this way: we 'believe' in neither idealism or materialism.
>>> Instead, the MOQ encompasses both in a more expansive framework
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>>
>> But does that framework make sense? Idealism is just a nominal feature
>> of Pirsig's MOQ. Suppose Pirsig's MOQ were a car with those furry dice
>> hanging from the front window. The furry dice would be idealism. Then
>> you tried to sell that car to a guy who hates furry dice. He could
>> just take the furry dice off and the customer wouldn't consider it an
>> essentially different car. That's the problem. Idealism is just stuck
>> on to Pirsig's MOQ. It doesn't function, it's just an inert add-on.
>>
>> The theory of static value patterns isn't idealistic. What makes the
>> MOQ norminally idealistic are Pirsig's some strikingly casual and
>> short remarks in the LS annotations.
> Dan:
> It appears (to me) that you've either misread or misinterpreted Lila.


Tuukka:
It appears to me that you're a busy man.


>
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> Pirsig states in LILA that the MOQ is logically consistent. This means
>> Pirsig's MOQ disallows dialetheia. I know, you'd expect Pirsig's MOQ to
>> allow
>> them. I'd expect that too. But according to Pirsig it doesn't.
> Dan:
> You are (apparently) fixating upon one form of logic to the exclusion
> of all else.


Tuukka:
Did you mean: "Pirsig is fixating... "?


>
>>>> Tuukka:
>>>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>>>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to what
>>>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of
>>>> sand.
>>>
>>> Dan:
>>> I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of
>>> view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic
>>> idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ.
>>> That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent
>>> with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila
>>> cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on
>>> materialism due to our Western culture's biases.
>>
>>
>> Tuukka:
>> The static patterns in LILA don't contain idealism. They contain
>> materialism. Idealism is something Pirsig just sticks on the MOQ in
>> LC, you know, like gluing a sore thumb on the hood of your car.
> Dan:
>  From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/
> It nevertheless seems safe to say that within modern philosophy there
> have been two fundamental conceptions of idealism:
>
> 1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate
> foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
>
> 2 although the existence of something independent of the mind is
> conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent
> “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or
> constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all
> claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of
> self-knowledge.
>
> There are numerous examples of idealism in Lila. Here are a few:
>
> The Dharmakaya light.


Tuukka:
Hallucinations do not prove idealism, so why would Dharmakaya light?


>
> "It is this subjective side of values that led to their being long
> tabooed as improper for consideration by natural science," Kroeber and
> Kluckhohn said.


Tuukka:
How does this pertain to idealism?


>
> By virtue of their subjective emotion and ethical character, norms and
> especially values are among the world's most difficult objects to
> identify with certainty.


Tuukka:
How does this pertain to idealism?


>
> In a subject-object metaphysics morals and art are worlds apart,
> morals being concerned with the subject quality and art with object
> quality. But in the Metaphysics of Quality that division doesn't
> exist. They're the same. They both become much more intelligible when
> references to what is subjective and what is objective are completely
> thrown away and references to what is static and what is Dynamic are
> taken up instead.


Tuukka:
None of these citations have so far even mentioned idealism.


>
> What is today conventionally called "morality" covers only one of
> these sets of moral codes, the social-biological code. In a
> subject­object metaphysics this single social-biological code is
> considered to be a minor, "subjective," physically non-existent part
> of the universe. But in the Metaphysics of Quality all these sets of
> morals, plus another Dynamic morality, are not only real, they are the
> whole thing.
>
> A subject-object metaphysics presumes that all these mirrors are
> subjective and therefore unreal and unimportant, but that presumption,
> like so many others, seems to deliberately ignore the obvious.
>
> Dan comments:
> So. Are you ignoring the obvious?


Tuukka:
No. Your citations obviously do not include even one instance of the 
word "idealism" or any synonym of that word, therefore they're not relevant.

Regards,
Tuk

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