[MD] Annotations to LC

[Dan Glover]

Tuk,

On Thu, Nov 17, 2016 at 6:03 PM, Tuukka Virtaperko
<mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net> wrote:
> Dan,
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>>>>>> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>>>>>>>> object.'
>>>>>>>> [111] RMP: Object: n.
>>>>>>>> Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>>>>>> vision
>>>>>>>> or
>>>>>>>> touch; a material thing.
>>>>>>>>    1. A focus of attention, feeling, thought or action.
>>>>>>>>    2. The purpose, aim, goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>>>>>    3. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or
>>>>>>>> is
>>>>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>>>>>> substantive
>>>>>>>> following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>>>>>    4. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>>>>>    (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>>>>> The 'objects' in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>>>>>> biological
>>>>>>>> patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social patterns.
>>>>>>>> The
>>>>>>>> 'objects' Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5. It seems to
>>>>>>>> me
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects. Thus any distinction
>>>>>>>> between
>>>>>>>> them is meaningless."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If ideas can't be objects does that mean they can't even be the
>>>>>>>> focus
>>>>>>>> of
>>>>>>>> attention, feeling, thought or action?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Why is there no Definition #5?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Dan:
>>>>>> My apologies. This error was corrected in later versions of LC:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Object: n.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 1. Something perceptible by one or more of the senses, especially by
>>>>>> vision or touch; a material thing.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 2. A focus of attention, feeling, thought, or action.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 3. The purpose, aim, or goal of a specific action or effort.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 4. Abbr. obj. Grammar. a. A noun or substantive that receives or is
>>>>>> affected by the action of a verb within a sentence. b. A noun or
>>>>>> substantive following and governed by a preposition.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (American Heritage Dictionary)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The ?objects? in the MOQ refer to Definition #1. Objects are
>>>>>> biological patterns and inorganic patterns, not thoughts or social
>>>>>> patterns. The ?objects? Donny refers to seem to be in Definition #5.
>>>>>> It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be objects.
>>>>>> Thus any distinction between them is meaningless.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>>
>>>>> Okay, good to have that sorted out. Anyway:
>>>>>
>>>>> * LC RMP annotation 3: "Life is matter that has been configured by DNA.
>>>>> The
>>>>> distinction is very sharp."
>>>>> * LC RMP annotation 4: "In the MOQ all organisms are objective. They
>>>>> exist
>>>>> in the material world. All societies are subjective. They exist in the
>>>>> mental world. Again, the distinction is very sharp. For example, the
>>>>> 'President of the U.S.' is a social pattern. No objective scientific
>>>>> instrument can distinguish a President of the U.S. from anyone else."
>>>>>
>>>>> Funny that the distinction between objects and subjects should be "very
>>>>> sharp" when it comes to the difference between biological and social
>>>>> things,
>>>>> but meaningless when it comes to the difference between ideas and
>>>>> physical
>>>>> objects.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> It isn't meaningless. Where do you get that from?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> You wrote: "It seems to me that in Definition #5 subjects can also be
>>> objects. Thus any distinction between them is meaningless."
>>
>> Dan:
>> For the record, I didn't write that. Robert Pirsig wrote it in
>> response to Donny's post:
>>
>> "Donny: 'Subject' means 'knowing subject', and 'object' means 'known
>> object.'
>>
>> 5. Philosophy. Something intelligible or perceptible by the mind.
>>
>> What Robert Pirsig is pointing to is Donny's definition and how it
>> makes any distinction between them (known subject, known object)
>> meaningless. Key word: known. So I think you've misinterpreted what is
>> being said.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
>
> Okay, so Pirsig says that in definition 5 the distinction is meaningless but
> he uses another definition. In any case Pirsig argues:
>
> In definition 5 subjects can be objects. Therefore the distinction between
> subjects and objects is meaningless in definition 5.
>
> How come? Even if subjects can be objects, can objects be subjects? If they
> can, a rock can be a subject. What would that kind of a subject be, apart
> from being at least superficially silly?

Dan:
You seem to be taking subjects and objects as primary.

>
>
>>
>>> Sometimes deduction is Dynamic.
>>
>> Dan:
>> Oh no. Dynamic Quality comes first. Deduction may appear as a flash of
>> insight but without intellect, how can there be deduction?
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Oh come on, dmb does rhetoric all the time but I'm not allowed to?

Dan:
Where did rhetoric enter the discussion? What I said was if there is
no intellect there can be no deduction. Dynamic Quality comes first.

>
>
>>
>>> Sometimes a correct and relevant
>>> deduction just pops into my mind out of nowhere. Is that static?
>>
>> Dan:
>> Yes.
>>
>>> No,
>>> otherwise it would've already been there. Is that experience?
>>
>> Dan:
>> The deduction comes after experience.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> The experience is identified as deduction afterwards.

Dan:
Yes.

>
>
>>
>>> Yes... I
>>> don't quite understand what would someone mean by stating that it's
>>> not experience. But it's perhaps not empirical experience.
>>
>> Dan:
>> If you want to qualify it like that, yes. Deduction is always a memory.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Well, one needs to remember the premises.
>
>
>>
>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> Look at it this way: we 'believe' in neither idealism or materialism.
>>>> Instead, the MOQ encompasses both in a more expansive framework
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>>
>>> But does that framework make sense? Idealism is just a nominal feature
>>> of Pirsig's MOQ. Suppose Pirsig's MOQ were a car with those furry dice
>>> hanging from the front window. The furry dice would be idealism. Then
>>> you tried to sell that car to a guy who hates furry dice. He could
>>> just take the furry dice off and the customer wouldn't consider it an
>>> essentially different car. That's the problem. Idealism is just stuck
>>> on to Pirsig's MOQ. It doesn't function, it's just an inert add-on.
>>>
>>> The theory of static value patterns isn't idealistic. What makes the
>>> MOQ norminally idealistic are Pirsig's some strikingly casual and
>>> short remarks in the LS annotations.
>>
>> Dan:
>> It appears (to me) that you've either misread or misinterpreted Lila.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> It appears to me that you're a busy man.

Dan:
I am. And it appears I am wasting my time here.

>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> Pirsig states in LILA that the MOQ is logically consistent. This means
>>> Pirsig's MOQ disallows dialetheia. I know, you'd expect Pirsig's MOQ to
>>> allow
>>> them. I'd expect that too. But according to Pirsig it doesn't.
>>
>> Dan:
>> You are (apparently) fixating upon one form of logic to the exclusion
>> of all else.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Did you mean: "Pirsig is fixating... "?

Dan:
No.

>
>
>
>>
>>>>> Tuukka:
>>>>> LILA actually contains an elaborate variant of emergent materialism:
>>>>> Pirsig's theory of static value patterns. When one compares that to
>>>>> what
>>>>> Pirsig writes of idealism it's like comparing a mountain to a grain of
>>>>> sand.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dan:
>>>> I disagree. What Pirsig is hammering at is how the prevalent point of
>>>> view today is materialism. That is why he suggested how philosophic
>>>> idealism might help in forming a better understanding with the MOQ.
>>>> That is why it may seem as if Lila is concerned to a greater extent
>>>> with one than the other. But the static patterns as described in Lila
>>>> cover both idealism and materialism. The reader fixates more on
>>>> materialism due to our Western culture's biases.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Tuukka:
>>> The static patterns in LILA don't contain idealism. They contain
>>> materialism. Idealism is something Pirsig just sticks on the MOQ in
>>> LC, you know, like gluing a sore thumb on the hood of your car.
>>
>> Dan:
>>  From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/idealism/
>> It nevertheless seems safe to say that within modern philosophy there
>> have been two fundamental conceptions of idealism:
>>
>> 1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate
>> foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
>>
>> 2 although the existence of something independent of the mind is
>> conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent
>> “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or
>> constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all
>> claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of
>> self-knowledge.
>>
>> There are numerous examples of idealism in Lila. Here are a few:
>>
>> The Dharmakaya light.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> Hallucinations do not prove idealism, so why would Dharmakaya light?
>
>
>>
>> "It is this subjective side of values that led to their being long
>> tabooed as improper for consideration by natural science," Kroeber and
>> Kluckhohn said.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> How does this pertain to idealism?

Dan:
I provided the Stanford definition for a reason. Or did you not realize that?

>
>
>>
>> By virtue of their subjective emotion and ethical character, norms and
>> especially values are among the world's most difficult objects to
>> identify with certainty.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> How does this pertain to idealism?
>
>
>>
>> In a subject-object metaphysics morals and art are worlds apart,
>> morals being concerned with the subject quality and art with object
>> quality. But in the Metaphysics of Quality that division doesn't
>> exist. They're the same. They both become much more intelligible when
>> references to what is subjective and what is objective are completely
>> thrown away and references to what is static and what is Dynamic are
>> taken up instead.
>
>
>
> Tuukka:
> None of these citations have so far even mentioned idealism.

Dan:
Okay. Have it your way. I am pretty much done here.




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