[MD] Why does Pirsig write everybody's right about mind and matter although his theses imply the opposite?

[mail at tuukkavirtaperko.net]

Ron, all,

> You are dealing with the self reference paradox. It generates contradictions.

There was so much unessential stuff in your first message that  
although I read this I completely missed the point. But, in fact, this  
is a very good point I think. Don't worry about spelling mistakes if  
you present a point this good. Just keep it short. That's my advice,  
anyway. And my explanation for not taking your logical ability  
seriously at first.

What you're pointing at is dialetheism: the view that there is true  
contradictions. And, mind you, you really saved my day today when I  
realized you're knowledgeable about this stuff. I loathe feeling like  
the only one! But on with the point...

If this were a point scoring exercise then, most respectfully, I would  
like to award you 100 (one hundred) points should you decide points  
awarded by me would benefit you in any way. Please do not apologize  
for posting. There's really no need to. <3

Okay, now I really have to get on with the point or else I start  
seeming sarcastic, which I'm not at all.

As a response to the Heinous Quadrilemma, the self-reference paradox  
points towards paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent logics are  
inconsistent, which means they include contradictions, but they're not  
trivial. In other words, one cannot deduce any statement from a  
contradiction. The principle of explosion does not apply.

So I find you to suggest that the first horn of the Quadrilemma - to  
accept that the MOQ is inconsistent - isn't a problem!

This is what I thought at first. I thought it ruins this part of my argument:

"The MOQ classifies materialism as a good idea. But this implies that  
the MOQ cannot classify idealism as a good idea unless the MOQ is  
either inconsistent or not a single metaphysics."

This part of my argument relies on the so-called disjunctive  
syllogism, which goes:

Either A or B
Not B
---
Consequently, A

There are paraconsistent logics which don't include the disjunctive  
syllogism. I thought it's quite probable that some of these logics  
could be used to formalize the MOQ so that the Heinous Quardilemma  
wouldn't work. Furthermore, well, I wrote this:

"If the MOQ is inconsistent it doesn't solve any metaphysical problem."

This probably isn't literally true. It's very likely that a  
paraconsistent MOQ would solve at least some if not all philosophical  
problems it's supposed to. I don't know if it'd solve them well but it  
would be some kind of a framework in which it'd be possible to argue  
that even if it doesn't solve the problems very well it still solves  
them.

So, yeah, I think a paraconsistent interpretation of the MOQ could  
have been one way of dealing with the Heinous Quadrilemma if it  
weren't for one thing. In LILA, Pirsig writes:

"The tests of truth are logical consistency, agreement with  
experience, and economy of explanation. The Metaphysics of Quality  
satisfies these."

So, unfortunately, according to Robert Pirsig the MOQ is consistent.  
If so, it cannot be paraconsistent.

Thank you for trying. Better luck next time. Just throw the points  
away if you don't want them for any reason. You can see not everyone  
likes me. So if I give you points, maybe you can't show off with them.  
How could you if someone breaks a rule he himself set, to express a  
dislike for me? But I gave them to you with sincerity and wish you  
good luck in the future.

Good luck, in my opinion, is not in winning but in meaningful  
participation. When I posted my formalization about the theory of  
static value patterns people just said that's a good idea. I  
appreciate that. I'm grateful. But how to continue discussion from  
that? Hmm, hard.

If you keep up making observations like these, you can just throw me  
one-liners and forget about upper case letters and punctuation!

Kind regards,
Tuk